The New America Foundation's Steve Coll and Peter Bergen were on CNN the other day, and they made some encouraging comments to Wolf Blitzer:

WOLF BLITZER (Host): [...] What's the latest in terms of the hunt for bin Laden? Is the U.S. and the West any closer to finding him?

STEVE COLL (President, CEO of New America Foundation): Well, I'm not aware of any specific intelligence that has lit up the trail in the last six months or so, but the circumstances in which he's hiding have changed. And he's probably in Pakistan and there his popularity has declined considerably, and also you've got a new government in power, so the motivations on the Pakistani side are changing very quickly.

BLITZER: What do you think, Peter?

PETER BERGEN (New America's Schwartz Senior Fellow): Yes, I think the hunt for bin Laden is going very poorly. As Steve said, bin Laden's support is evaporating in the North-West Frontier Province, where he's almost certainly hiding. A recent poll showed he had dropped from 70 percent favorable in August of 2007 to 4 percent.

BLITZER: So wouldn't that make it easier for Pakistani or other -- or the U.S., Afghan troops, somebody to find him?

PETER BERGEN: Yes. And I think the short answer is yes. Also a very sharp decline in support for suicide bombings amongst Pakistanis. Unfortunately, on the other hand, you have got a Pakistani government which is doing a deal with some of the militants in the North-West Frontier Province at the same time. So as always, sort of a mixed message here with the Pakistanis.

If the Pakistanis can convince those militants to dime out their special guest, it might all be worth it.

(Hat tip: Sameer Lalwani)

John Moore/Getty Images

The State Department has just released its annual report on global terrorism, as it does every April 30. Some highlights (read the AP synopsis here):

• On the strength of Al Qaeda: "It has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas ... and [restored] some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri."
• On Al Qaeda's leadership: "Numerous senior al-Qaida operatives have been captured or killed, but al-Qaida leaders continued to plot attacks and to cultivate stronger operational connections that radiated outward from Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe."
• Terrorist attacks in Pakistan doubled between 2006 and 2007 and the number of fatalities quadrupled
• In Afghanistan, the number of terrorist attacks rose 16 percent in 2007
• Terrorist attacks in Iraq declined slightly between 2006 and 2007, but still accounted for 60 percent of terrorism fatalities worldwide, including 17 of the 19 Americans killed in attacks last year
• More than 22,000 people were killed by terrorists worldwide in 2007, 8 percent more than in 2006
• Iran is the world's "most active" state sponsor of terrorism
• In Iraq: 13,600 noncombatants were killed in 2007; suicide bombings in country rose by 50 percent; suicide car bombings were up 40 percent and suicide bombings outside of vehicles climbed 90 percent over 2006

The conclusions on Pakistan are likely to garner the most attention, and quite rightly. Watch for more calls like this one for a three-front war.

SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images

Last week, our Web editor, Blake Hounshell, ably deflated some of the optimism surrounding the surge. The security gains are impressive, he contends, but the deadly combination of underdevelopment and overeliance on oil make Iraq's political prospects grim. Far better to cut our losses and focus on Afghanistan ("the real fight against Al Qaeda").

But what is it that Blake would have us do in Afghanistan? If Iraq's political prospects are poor, Afghanistan's must be considered even worse. Afghanistan doesn't have oil (yet), but it is one of the world's least developed countries, with infrastructure decimated by a quarter century of war and no history of effective governance. Why then spend billions and risk hundreds of lives propping up a doomed democratic government?

On Blake's logic, it's hard to see the rationale. Commandos and Predator drones can wage the "real fight" against the al Qaeda luminaries in the Pakistani hinterlands with or without an effective central government. Is Blake then willing to jettison the doomed Afghan nation-building project? And, if not, why not?

Blake also believes that cutting Iraq loose will free up America's taxed diplomats to concentrate on managing the rise of China. This has become something of a mantra on the left recently (indeed, it's almost "drearily familiar"). And it's not implausible -- Iraq is consuming vast quanities of senior executive time and energy. But I've never understood what precisely the United States could be doing vis-à-vis China that the Iraq mission now renders impossible. The U.S. has been engaging China economically, tamping down Taiwanese separatism, and working with Beijing diplomatically on North Korea. In sum, an accomodationist stance designed to guide China toward responsible great- power status. What vast benefit would our China policy enjoy once we've cast off the nettlesome Maliki and millions of ordinary Iraqis with him?

Back in September, Rand analyst Seth Jones helped us put together a list of senior al Qaeda leaders who were still at large. The list included senior commander Abu Obaidah al-Masri who, it was announced this week, died about two months ago. I spoke with Jones today about the implications of al-Masri's death for the al Qaeda leadership. He stressed that it's a mistake to think of the organization as a bureaucracy where specific offices are filled after they are vacated:

People get moved around quite a bit based on their competencies. Less-informed people talk about al Qaeda leadership in terms of numbers, as if someone was "number three or number four." I don't think the command and control structure works that way. There's a range of people who go through the different positions. There is not one job that any of these guys do. 

But this is not to say that al-Masri's death is insignificant. He played a major part in several high-profile operations and, as Jones noted, it can be hard to find someone with his particular skillset:

He played an important role both on the international front in the [2006] transatlantic plot, and was involved in a couple of other plots that European government are investigating. Recently he also played quite an important role with the Afghan insurgency. It takes time to replace competent senior al Qaeda operatives.

It can be tough to get out of the shadow of a famous sibling, and that's especially true if you're an airplane enthusiast and your brother is the world's most famous terrorist. Luxury goods entrepreneur and aviator Yeslam bin Ladin, half-brother of Osama, just can't see why anyone would find it odd that he's launching a line of specialty watches for pilots.

To be fair to Bin Ladin (he spells his last name differently), he has publicly denounced terrorism and hasn't had any links with his notorious younger brother for decades. It's also worth remembering that they are only two out of 54 siblings, but I still have a hard time believing that Yeslam didn't anticipate the aviation theme being an issue. Ironically, their father Mohammed died in a plane crash.

The watches sell for up to $9,472. If you're feeling flush, you can also buy "Yeslam" brand perfume and handbags from his store in Geneva, Switzerland. In the future, Bin Ladin may want to avoid adding some other items to his line, such as digital timers or vests.

So says veteran New York Times correspondent (now London bureau chief) John Burns. He and colleague Dexter Filkins chatted with Charlie Rose about the remarkable security progress the surge has created in the country -- and the still difficult political road ahead. Watch the entire segment:

(Hat tip: TPM)

This is still developing, but a senior U.S. counterterrorism official is saying that al Qaeda operative Abu Obaidah al-Masri has died of natural causes.

In September, al-Masri made our list of major al Qaeda figures who are still at large and was described by Rand Corporation terrorism analyst Seth Jones as “probably the most active and most important” figure we included. He played a major role in coordinating attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan and is thought to have been one of the architects of the foiled 2006 trans-Atlantic airliner plot. This is a significant loss for al Qaeda.

I managed to slog through the entire 46-pages of al Qaeda deputy commander Ayman al-Zawahiri's responses to questions (pdf), and found it very revealing as to how jihadi sympathizers view the terrorist organization.

The general tenor of the questions is sharply critical, so let me boil down the questioners' main beefs here:

• Al Qaeda talks a big game, but never attacks Israel (but we have killed plenty of Jews, Zawahiri responds)
• Al Qaeda isn't doing anything to overthrow the Egyptian regime (it ain't easy, Zawahiri pleads, but it is inevitable)
• Al Qaeda slaughters innocent Muslims (only if they get in the way)
• Al Qaeda is too harsh on Hamas (just the leaders who have sold out sharia law, not the "mujahedin")
• Al Qaeda is rumored to be dealing with Iran (a charge Zawahiri has responded to before with a non-denial denial)
• Influential clerics and ideologues have denounced al Qaeda (Zawahiri takes great pains to paint two in particular, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, the subject of "Egypt's Contrite Commander" from FP's current issue, as Zionist-Crusader stooges)

Now, it's entirely possible that some of these complaints were planted by clever Western and Arab intelligence agencies, but the fact that Zawahiri felt obliged to respond to them repeatedly and at length shows that the critiques must have stung a bit. It also suggests that he's got a lot of time on his hands.

AFP/Getty Images

The wait may finally be over.

Back in December, al Qaeda's No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that he was taking questions from the viewers of his Web videos. The sheikh apparently received over 2,000 questions and the IntelCenter monitoring service now expects the first of his video replies within the week. Watch this space for more analysis when this "Web 2.0" mass murderer addresses his public.

UPDATE: The first installment is in. Zawahiri says al Qaeda doesn't kill innocent people. The full transcript is available as a pdf here, thanks to Laura Mansfield.

KARIM SAHIB/AFP/Getty Images

The Federation of American Scientists' Project on Government Secrecy recently made available "Saddam and Terrorism," a Pentagon-requested report conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses. The five-volume report analyzes captured Iraqi documents for connections between Saddam and terrorist organizations. The document was declassified earlier this month, but was made available only in CD form.

According to FAS:

The five-volume report affirmed that there was "no 'smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda." But it also said there was "strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism."

In light of the report's mixed findings, Warren Strobel of McClatchy Newspapers writes:

The new study appears destined to be used by both critics and supporters of Bush's decision to invade Iraq to advance their own familiar arguments.

Three of the report's five volumes consist of hundreds of pages of the translated Iraqi documents. For those of you not up to the challenge, FAS has pulled out the highlights, which include this peculiar gem:

One of them, a fifty-page Iraqi "intelligence" analysis, disparages the austerely conservative Wahhabi school of Islam by claiming that its eighteenth century founder, Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab, had ancestors who were Jews. In what must be the only laugh-out-loud line in the generally dismal five-volume report, the Iraqi analysis states that Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab's grandfather's true name was not "Sulayman" but "Shulman."

"Tawran confirms that Sulayman, the grandfather of the sheikh, is (Shulman); he is Jew from the merchants of the city of Burstah in Turkey, he had left it and settled in Damascus, grew his beard, and wore the Muslim turban, but was thrown out for being voodoo."

I was struck today by the disturbing parallels between sentiments expressed by a Tibetan social worker and Osama bin Laden. Here's the social worker:

Tibetan youth are frustrated," the social worker says. She talks about her 21-day hunger strike in front of the United Nations office in New York, meant to raise awareness about the Tibetans' plight. "It didn't help," she says bitterly. The first TV cameras arrived only after 12 days. "But when a bomb explodes or a house goes up in flames," she says, "the UN is right there. The world only reacts to violence. Just like in Kosovo."

And here's Bin Laden, in his most recent tape:

Palestine cannot be retaken by negotiations and dialogue, but with fire and iron... Our enemies did not take over Palestinian through negotiations, but rather, by force."

Of course, the social worker isn't advocating violence, but merely commenting on how it seems to be the only way to get attention. And Bin Laden isn't calling for Palestinian autonomy, but the destruction of Israel (nor is he saying anything that Gamal Abdel Nasser didn't say 40 years ago). Both quotes nonetheless underline why it's so important to make negotiations and dialogue work. Because when they fail, those who say that violence is the answer will begin to win the argument.

I'm surprised U.S. media outlets haven't picked up on this nugget from a story about Monday's bombing in Lahore, Pakistan, which targeted the Federal Investigative Authority:

Deputy Inspector General (Investigations) Tasadaq Hussain said police had collected the remains of the two attackers. Part of the head and a leg of the FIA building attacker were found from the roof of a nearby building, he said. He said the attacks had targeted the US-trained Special Investigations Group (SIG) that had been working on the third floor of the building. Plastic explosive C4 was used in the attacks, he added. [my emphasis]

Syed Saleem Shahzad, writing for the Asia Times, says the unit in question is "a joint initiative of US and Pakistani planners set up to eliminate the strong roots of radicalization in Punjab province." The worry is that jihadi groups from the northwest are extending their influence into historically moderate Punjab, making it easier to infiltrate and attack hard targets. Shahzad warns:

Tuesday's attacks are significant... in that the establishment's most secret underground offices are now on the militants' radar, and more attacks are anticipated.

(Hat tip: The indispensable NightWatch)

Memri translated a Qatari newspaper's interesting interview with a fellow named Abu Turab al-Jazairi, who says he is al Qaeda's in Mesopotamia's northern commander in Iraq. In it, Jazairi acknowledges his organization is in trouble, but vows to fight on.

It is the type of attacks and the way they are planned that will be changed. Accordingly, we will be focusing on operations that cause the maximum pain and bewilderment to the enemy. This [shift] will open a new page in the fighting, which you will notice on the fifth anniversary of the occupation of Iraq..."

Then, in an eerie parallel to the umpteen newspaper columnists who repeatedly aver that "the next six months" will be decisive in Iraq, Jazairi says:

The next few months will prove decisive, and by Allah! We have prepared for this - we have humiliated the Crusaders, and have made their blood flow in the streets... And what is to come will be even worse and more bitter. Therefore, I say to those who claim that we have failed, or are paralyzed...: You will receive our answer in the next few weeks..."

Stay tuned.

(Hat tip: Pat Lang)

Uriel Sinai/Getty Images

In today's WaPo, David Ignatius rightly calls Marc Sageman's new book, Leaderless Jihad, required reading for politicians as they stump on the terrorism threat. Better yet, they can read Sageman's feature in the new issue of FP, "The Next Generation of Terror."

In the piece, Sageman, whose resume, Ignatius writes, would "suit a postmodern John le Carré," profiles the new wave of global jihadists. They are younger than their forebears, self-recruited, lacking in any leadership, globally connected through the Web, and anxious for the action that they believe will make them heroes. They are, in essence, terrorist wannabes, and the absence of any overarching control or physical network makes this new generation all the more dangerous and difficult to detect. But, as Sageman shows, this leaderless movement also contains the keys to its own demise.

It's a fascinating piece that challenges many of today's conventional wisdoms about terrorism and demands a rethink of who poses the greatest threat in the years to come. Sageman will be answering readers' questions in just a few weeks. Just send any questions you have for him to letters@ForeignPolicy.com by Mar. 25 and we'll post his responses here on Mar. 31.

Justin Webb, the BBC's North America editor and blogger, drops this incendiary bomb:

Islamic terrorists want war. They want suffering - among others and their own people alike.

They would surely surmise that McCain will give them what they want. Bin Laden himself intervened with what many thought was the effect of keeping President Bush in power in 2004 with that weird tape just before the poll.

I think al-Qaeda would back McCain - that is not an argument for or against America backing him, but it seems to me that the vague assumption that the terrorists would back a lefty is lazy thinking...

This is grossly irresponsible on Webb's part. It was wrong when right-wing pundits and politicians said al Qaeda wanted to elect John Kerry in 2004, and it's wrong when left-wing pundits and politicians say al Qaeda wants to elect John McCain today. The truth is, al Qaeda doesn't really have a sophisticated understanding of the American political system -- and its leaders likely see McCain and Obama or Clinton as merely two faces of the same enemy.

Now, would al Qaeda like to see the United States stay in Iraq for another four, eight years? It's certainly possible. Iraq is a great recruiting magnet. It's also possible, though, that al Qaeda would like the United States to withdraw so that it can declare "victory" while it still plausibly can. But I don't think Justin Webb -- or anyone else -- can really say for sure which outcome al Qaeda would prefer.

OSAMA IBRAHIM/AFP/Getty Images

Over the weekend, a police official in Iraq's Anbar Province pointed the finger at an unusual suspect: Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi, the Western-friendly scion and heir apparent of Libyan leader Moammar a-Gadhafi.

A devastating explosion in northern Iraq was spearheaded by foreign fighters under the sponsorship of Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, son of the Libyan leader, a security chief for Sunni tribesmen who rose up against al-Qaida in Iraq said Saturday.

Col. Jubair Rashid Naief, who also is a police official in Anbar province, said the Anbar Awakening Council had alerted the U.S. military to the possible arrival in the northern city of Mosul of the Seifaddin Regiment, made up of about 150 foreign and Iraqi fighters, as long as three months ago. [...]

"They crossed the Syrian border nearest to Mosul within the last two to three months. Since then, they have taken up positions in the city and begun blowing up cars and launching other terror operations," Naief told The Associated Press.

It's an accusation that comes out of left field. The explanation being peddled by DEBKAfile, an Israel-based Web site with a dubious record for accuracy, is that Seif was so outraged last September when his father chose his younger brother, Mutasim-Billah, as his successor that he began sponsoring this terrorist regiment in Iraq. According to DEBKA, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice prefer Mutasim-Billah, so Moammar went along with their requests.

It seems pretty clear that this story is a bunch of hogwash. Seif, who has been working assiduously to bring about a rapprochement with the United States, has no incentive to undermine his own efforts. Moreover, it's highly doubtful that either Mubarak or Rice has that kind of influence with the notoriously mercurial Moammar. Assuming the story is baseless, what's the motive behind those promoting it? I can't figure it out.

It's only nine days into the new year, and already Musharraf is ignoring our humble advice: Find Osama. Musharraf needs a miracle to hold onto his tenuous grip on power, and there's nothing quite like delivering the most wanted man in the world to the United States' doorstep to rewrite your political fortunes, at least in Washington's eyes.

So, why is Musharraf going around saying that Pakistan is "not particularly looking for" al Qaeda's leader? In an interview with 60 Minutes, he was quick to assert that Pakistan is "operating against terrorists and al Qaeda and militant Taliban," but then claimed that he "can't say for sure" whether extremists have grown stronger in the border regions, despite squarely blaming extremists in those very border regions for assassinating Benazir Bhutto, whom he essentially blamed for her own death. This is the United States' best hope for an ally?

Commenting on the attempted terrorist attack that greeted Gordon Brown on his first day in office, one of the U.S. presidential candidates had this to say:

I don't think it was by accident that Al Qaeda decided to test the new prime minister... They watch our elections as closely as we do, maybe more closely than some of our fellows citizens do… Let's not forget you're hiring a president not just to do what a candidate says during the election, you want a president to be there when the chips are down."

Rudy Giuliani? John McCain? Duncan Hunter? Nope. 'Twas Hillary Clinton.

One of my favorite characters in Charlie Wilson's War (the book, not the schlocky Hollywood flick) is Michael Vickers, the wonkish ex-Green Beret and CIA paramilitary officer who, at the tender age of 31, masterminded the weapons and guerrilla warfare strategy used by the Afghan mujahedin to fight the Soviets. By all accounts, Vickers is brilliant, and he was critical to the success of the CIA's covert program, in which the United States funneled hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons through Pakistan's intelligence services. Though the CIA never funded al Qaeda and the Taliban did not yet exist, many people blame U.S. policy—in which Vickers played such a key role—for fanning the flames of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan that later came back to bite the United States on 9/11.

For years, Vickers toiled away on boring but influential reports for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank with close ties to the Pentagon. But as of July 2007, Vickers is now an assistant secretary of defense with an enormous portfolio: winning the war on terrorism. Vickers oversees Special Operations Command, whose budget has recently doubled to $6 billion in 2008, and he's especially concerned about... Pakistan's growing Islamic radicalism. Funny, that.

Testifying before Congress back in March 2006, before moving to the Pentagon, Vickers predicted that the future of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) would "likely be a protracted, indirect and clandestine fight in scores [of] countries with which the U.S. is not at war." He added:

The GWOT is an intelligence and special operation-intensive war. Getting this aspect of interagency organization right, and making full use of special authorities to wage the indirect and clandestine fight, is imperative. Particularly important in this regard is leveraging the CIA's Title 50 authority for [Special Operations Forces] operations through flexible detailing of SOF personnel to the Agency.

What Vickers is reportedly doing now as assistant secretary, described in Friday's Washington Post, seems to reflect the same approach:

Vickers's plan to build a global counterterrorist network... is focused on a list of 20 "high-priority" countries, with Pakistan posing a central preoccupation for Vickers, who said al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the country's western tribal areas are a serious threat to the United States. The list also includes Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Yemen, Somalia and Iran, and Vickers hints that some European countries could be on it. Beyond that, the plan covers another 29 "priority" countries, as well as "other countries" that Vickers does not name.

Since 9/11, there have been occasional tensions between U.S. diplomats on the one hand, and the DoD and the CIA on the other, over clandestine activities that have gone on without the knowledge of the ambassador. If Vickers is inserting more special ops teams around the world, those tensions are bound to increase.

One of Vickers's former colleagues says he "tends to think like a gangster." It's a mindset that has served Vickers well in the past, yet it carries risks. If Vickers's teams nail Osama bin Laden in northwest Pakistan, he'll be hailed as a genius. If, on the other hand, they cause an international incident... 

JOHN MOORE/Getty Images

Delivering the keynote address at Wednesday's Jamestown Foundation conference on al Qaeda, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid expressed dismay that U.S. support for Pakistan has allowed the Taliban to regain a foothold in the Afghan border regions:

The Taliban were never defeated in 2001. They were routed and they came into Pakistan and regrouped in exactly the same place where they had set off to conquer Afghanistan in 1994.  

According to Rashid, efforts to control the Taliban's resurgence in southern Afghanistan are hopeless without addressing the areas of Baluchistan and the Northwest Territories that are largely controlled by the Pakistani Taliban, a faction whose leaders are "far more ideological" than those in Afghanistan. Given that Pakistani intelligence and military forces have abetted these groups in many cases, simply providing more military aid to the Musharraf regime will probably not do the trick, he said. Rashid was particularly critical of a U.S. plan to supply equipment and training to Pakistan's Frontier Corps:

The Americans are saying now that they want to arm the Frontier Corps against al Qaeda and spend $350 million giving this Corps—[which] is made up of frontier tribesmen—helicopters and heavy artillery... With all due respect, if the American idea is to throw money at the problem and it will go away, this seems to be a prime example of utter and sheer stupidity and a complete blindness to the reality of the situation. 

Who are the Frontier Corps? These are tribal paramilitary units who have been on the side of the Taliban since the 1980s... They were used by the ISI to lead the Taliban's offensive against the Northern Alliance. The reason there are so many desertions and they're so demoralized now is that the Frontier Corps are very confused. [They've] been trained for the last 25 years to do covert jihadi work by the Pakistan government and now the Pakistan army is saying, "No, you're supposed to be killing the jihadis!"

In Rashid's view, despite the trendy characterization of al Qaeda as a decentralized, transnational network, the capture of territory remains a priority for the jihadis who need "liberated areas" for training and recruitment. The chaos on the border that Pakistan has allowed to develop has provided them with just that.