I'd still rather have a president who's pressured into reluctantly taking a hard line, than one who does so with glee.

Either the Iranian government agrees to Iran not having the same rights as other countries (and letting the US decide what those rights should be) or it faces continually harsher sanctions.
Is either of those cases likely to leave the Iranian regime in power?
I pity the Iranian people that, no doubt, will bear the brunt of the sanctions.

In your dreams, Obama (and Bibi).

I find it amusing that about half of the current comments are spam.

In any case it's also possible that there are actually several higher-up officials who have much bigger ambitions for these sanctions than just leverage, they may very well want regime change. If so there's going to be plenty more arguments over the next year.

He is doing as little as he can but still look like he is addressing the situation.

The guy has enough problems on his plate domestically to bother with this and it shows in the kinds of actions the US is taking.

Of course if the Iranian regime changes, it would be a happy bonus for everyone who isn't forced to wear a beard by law. But I don't see a real concerted effort to bring it about.

...may simply be maintaining equilibrium among factions in Washington with radically different ideas as to how to proceed.

Sanctions are not war, which is appreciated by the many people who can read a map well enough to know that attempting to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capability development by force is impractical. Sanctions are also not normalization, which people (including President Obama's most dedicated political opponents) who think a working Iranian nuclear weapon would be disastrous like.

Tightening sanctions indicates movement, something most people in Washington seem to prize, even or perhaps especially because movement on Iraq does not seem to be possible in any other form. It also conveys multilateralism, which the Obama administration cherishes. The idea that sanctions could increase discontent with the Tehran regime in Iran itself is attractive, because all of Washington fell in love with the Arab Spring narrative of oppressed peoples choosing on their own to rise up peacefully, or not, against oppressive governments. If that could happen in Arab countries, why not in Iran?

OK then. Here's my problem: I keep hearing reports that Iranians -- outside the regime itself -- don't understand the reason for sanctions, let alone the reason for new or tightened sanctions. That's what one would expect if the real objective of our current policy were to maintain peace in Washington among all the people who are sure we need an Iran policy but who cannot agree among themselves about what that policy ought to strive for. It's not a good thing.

"Reaching out" to the Iranian government at this point -- unless one believes that we ought to be negotiating based on giving the Iranians everything they want without asking anything in return -- is, to be sure, unattractive at the present time. Too many powerful figures in an Iran struggling with economic and other difficulties are too deeply invested in hostility to the American superpower for dramatic gestures to lead anywhere.

I really don't think, though, we ought to be proceeding as if it were self-evident to the Iranian public why the United States and its allies are doing what they are with respect to sanctions. The Obama administration does now appear to have placed itself at risk of being defined, within Iran, entirely by the least reasonable people in the Iranian government. That's not a desirable state of affairs, but in the absence of a more active approach to our public diplomacy that where we will end up if we're not there already.

All these damnable sanctions ,embargos, and saber rattling is based on the grand lie that Iran is building or has the capability to build a nuke. Obama could get all the votes that have so far gone to Ron Paul if he gets a political backbone and kicks butt and uses a sharp hatchet on the Zionist zealots in the State Department who parrot the propaganda and deliberate lies from the Israelis. He needs to call out the Zionist members of Congress with dual Israeli citizenship for the constant lies they crank out. He needs to publicly disavow the Bush program that allocated $400 million to destabilize the government of Iran. He needs to tell H. Clinton and Leon Panetta to shut up with all their "all options are on the table" and "crossing the red lines". He could pull all those carrier groups out of the Persion Gulf and have an honest talks with the Iranians without any sabotageing by the State Department Zionists like Dennis Ross. He could also do a signing statement that the US will not enforce the BS unilateral sanctions created by Congress. This is just a start, but any attempt by the State Department to keep the Iranians from executing the ex-Marine they have charged with spying will fail. When you piss off the Iranians over and over, including murdering their nuclear scientists and pleading ignorance, they will lose all sense of compassion.

Since the headlines in most of the Post come DIRECTLY from the Fox News feed, why would you expect anything else?

may simply be maintaining equilibrium among factions in Washington with radically different ideas as to how to proceed.

Sanctions are not war, which is appreciated by the many people who can read a map well enough to know that attempting to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capability development by force is impractical. Sanctions are also not normalization, which people (including President Obama's most dedicated political opponents) who think a working Iranian nuclear weapon would be disastrous like.

Tightening sanctions indicates movement, something most people in Washington seem to prize, even or perhaps especially because movement on Iraq does not seem to be possible in any other form. It also conveys multilateralism, which the Obama administration cherishes. The idea that sanctions could increase discontent with the Tehran regime in Iran itself is attractive, because all of Washington fell in love with the Arab Spring narrative of oppressed peoples choosing on their own to rise up peacefully, or not, against oppressive governments. If that could happen in Arab countries, why not in Iran?

OK then. Here's my problem: I keep hearing reports that Iranians -- outside the regime itself -- don't understand the reason for sanctions, let alone the reason for new or tightened sanctions. That's what one would expect if the real objective of our current policy were to maintain peace in Washington among all the people who are sure we need an Iran policy but who cannot agree among themselves about what that policy ought to strive for. It's not a good thing.

"Reaching out" to the Iranian government at this point -- unless one believes that we ought to be negotiating based on giving the Iranians everything they want without asking anything in return -- is, to be sure, unattractive at the present time. Too many powerful figures in an Iran struggling with economic and other difficulties are too deeply invested in hostility to the American superpower for dramatic gestures to lead anywhere.

I really don't think, though, we ought to be proceeding as if it were self-evident to the Iranian public why the United States and its allies are doing what they are with respect to sanctions. The Obama administration does now appear to have placed itself at risk of being defined, within Iran, entirely by the least reasonable people in the Iranian government. That's not a desirable state of affairs, but in the absence of a more active approach to our public diplomacy that where we will end up if we're not there already.may simply be maintaining equilibrium among factions in Washington with radically different ideas as to how to proceed.

Sanctions are not war, which is appreciated by the many people who can read a map well enough to know that attempting to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capability development by force is impractical. Sanctions are also not normalization, which people (including President Obama's most dedicated political opponents) who think a working Iranian nuclear weapon would be disastrous like.

Tightening sanctions indicates movement, something most people in Washington seem to prize, even or perhaps especially because movement on Iraq does not seem to be possible in any other form. It also conveys multilateralism, which the Obama administration cherishes. The idea that sanctions could increase discontent with the Tehran regime in Iran itself is attractive, because all of Washington fell in love with the Arab Spring narrative of oppressed peoples choosing on their own to rise up peacefully, or not, against oppressive governments. If that could happen in Arab countries, why not in Iran?

OK then. Here's my problem: I keep hearing reports that Iranians -- outside the regime itself -- don't understand the reason for sanctions, let alone the reason for new or tightened sanctions. That's what one would expect if the real objective of our current policy were to maintain peace in Washington among all the people who are sure we need an Iran policy but who cannot agree among themselves about what that policy ought to strive for. It's not a good thing.

"Reaching out" to the Iranian government at this point -- unless one believes that we ought to be negotiating based on giving the Iranians everything they want without asking anything in return -- is, to be sure, unattractive at the present time. Too many powerful figures in an Iran struggling with economic and other difficulties are too deeply invested in hostility to the American superpower for dramatic gestures to lead anywhere.

I really don't think, though, we ought to be proceeding as if it were self-evident to the Iranian public why the United States and its allies are doing what they are with respect to sanctions. The Obama administration does now appear to have placed itself at risk of being defined, within Iran, entirely by the least reasonable people in the Iranian government. That's not a desirable state of affairs, but in the absence of a more active approach to our public diplomacy that where we will end up if we're not there already.may simply be maintaining equilibrium among factions in Washington with radically different ideas as to how to proceed.

Sanctions are not war, which is appreciated by the many people who can read a map well enough to know that attempting to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capability development by force is impractical. Sanctions are also not normalization, which people (including President Obama's most dedicated political opponents) who think a working Iranian nuclear weapon would be disastrous like.

Tightening sanctions indicates movement, something most people in Washington seem to prize, even or perhaps especially because movement on Iraq does not seem to be possible in any other form. It also conveys multilateralism, which the Obama administration cherishes. The idea that sanctions could increase discontent with the Tehran regime in Iran itself is attractive, because all of Washington fell in love with the Arab Spring narrative of oppressed peoples choosing on their own to rise up peacefully, or not, against oppressive governments. If that could happen in Arab countries, why not in Iran?

OK then. Here's my problem: I keep hearing reports that Iranians -- outside the regime itself -- don't understand the reason for sanctions, let alone the reason for new or tightened sanctions. That's what one would expect if the real objective of our current policy were to maintain peace in Washington among all the people who are sure we need an Iran policy but who cannot agree among themselves about what that policy ought to strive for. It's not a good thing.

"Reaching out" to the Iranian government at this point -- unless one believes that we ought to be negotiating based on giving the Iranians everything they want without asking anything in return -- is, to be sure, unattractive at the present time. Too many powerful figures in an Iran struggling with economic and other difficulties are too deeply invested in hostility to the American superpower for dramatic gestures to lead anywhere.

I really don't think, though, we ought to be proceeding as if it were self-evident to the Iranian public why the United States and its allies are doing what they are with respect to sanctions. The Obama administration does now appear to have placed itself at risk of being defined, within Iran, entirely by the least reasonable people in the Iranian government. That's not a desirable state of affairs, but in the absence of a more active approach to our public diplomacy that where we will end up if we're not there already.may simply be maintaining equilibrium among factions in Washington with radically different ideas as to how to proceed.

Sanctions are not war, which is appreciated by the many people who can read a map well enough to know that attempting to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capability development by force is impractical. Sanctions are also not normalization, which people (including President Obama's most dedicated political opponents) who think a working Iranian nuclear weapon would be disastrous like.

Tightening sanctions indicates movement, something most people in Washington seem to prize, even or perhaps especially because movement on Iraq does not seem to be possible in any other form. It also conveys multilateralism, which the Obama administration cherishes. The idea that sanctions could increase discontent with the Tehran regime in Iran itself is attractive, because all of Washington fell in love with the Arab Spring narrative of oppressed peoples choosing on their own to rise up peacefully, or not, against oppressive governments. If that could happen in Arab countries, why not in Iran?

OK then. Here's my problem: I keep hearing reports that Iranians -- outside the regime itself -- don't understand the reason for sanctions, let alone the reason for new or tightened sanctions. That's what one would expect if the real objective of our current policy were to maintain peace in Washington among all the people who are sure we need an Iran policy but who cannot agree among themselves about what that policy ought to strive for. It's not a good thing.

"Reaching out" to the Iranian government at this point -- unless one believes that we ought to be negotiating based on giving the Iranians everything they want without asking anything in return -- is, to be sure, unattractive at the present time. Too many powerful figures in an Iran struggling with economic and other difficulties are too deeply invested in hostility to the American superpower for dramatic gestures to lead anywhere.

I really don't think, though, we ought to be proceeding as if it were self-evident to the Iranian public why the United States and its allies are doing what they are with respect to sanctions. The Obama administration does now appear to have placed itself at risk of being defined, within Iran, entirely by the least reasonable people in the Iranian government. That's not a desirable state of affairs, but in the absence of a more active approach to our public diplomacy that where we will end up if we're not there already.

Thanks

We are also dealing this kind in Travel agency as well ;)

Sanctions are not war, which is appreciated by the many people who can read a map well enough to know that attempting to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons capability development by force is impractical. Sanctions are also weddings101 not normalization, which people (including President Obama's most dedicated political opponents) who think a working Iranian nuclear weapon would be disastrous like.