We've got to get a handle on what we call "provocations" when talking about North Korea. Last week, a sizeable South Korean naval force conducted defensive anti-submarine drills in the waters near the Northern Limit Line--waters claimed by the North Koreans and not recognized as belonging to the South by any government outside of Seoul. This is seen as a necessary step for ensuring South Korean naval readiness.

Monday, the DPRK responds with its own live-fire drills of defensive coastal artillery in the same area. Of the 130 shells fired, only 10 even crossed the maritime border that was unilaterally drawn by the ROK. This is labelled as "provocative" and "unhelpful." Given Pyongyang's obligation to respond to U.S. and South Korean moves over the past few weeks, this is probably the least disruptive response we could have hoped to see. Given that Seoul should have been fully aware its exercises would elicit a response from the North, the timing and location of last week's exercises ought to be considered at least as "unhelpful."

So long as we are unable to acknowledge that the DPRK has its own valid set of security concerns (though certainly a smaller set of concerns than those it claims), we will not be able to come to any sort of securty solution in Northeast Asia. As it is, North Korea policy--and let's not forget that for the North Koreans, rhetoric is policy--continues to reflect an inability to distinguish between the irrational, chest-thumping caricatures of North Koreans in the mainstream media and the fact that North Korea has real interests, goals, and vulnerabilities that the U.S. can use to resolve this conflict over time.

We've got to get a handle on what we call "provocations" when talking about North Korea. Last week, a sizeable South Korean naval force conducted defensive anti-submarine drills in the waters near the Northern Limit Line--waters claimed by the North Koreans and not recognized as belonging to the South by any government outside of Seoul. This is seen as a necessary step for ensuring South Korean naval readiness.

Monday, the DPRK responds with its own live-fire drills of defensive coastal artillery in the same area. Of the 130 shells fired, only 10 even crossed the maritime border that was unilaterally drawn by the ROK. This is labelled as "provocative" and "unhelpful." Given Pyongyang's obligation to respond to U.S. and South Korean moves over the past few weeks, this is probably the least disruptive response we could have hoped to see. Given that Seoul should have been fully aware its exercises would elicit a response from the North, the timing and location of last week's exercises ought to be considered at least as "unhelpful."

So long as we are unable to acknowledge that the DPRK has its own valid set of security concerns (though certainly a smaller set of concerns than those it claims), we will not be able to come to any sort of securty solution in Northeast Asia. As it is, North Korea policy--and let's not forget that for the North Koreans, rhetoric is policy--continues to reflect an inability to distinguish between the irrational, chest-thumping caricatures of North Koreans in the mainstream media and the fact that North Korea has real interests, goals, and vulnerabilities that the U.S. can use to resolve this conflict over time.