Posted By Blake Hounshell Share

Richard Haass, the realist  former Bush administration official who heads the Council on Foreign Relations, turned a few heads Friday when he came out in favor of a policy of "regime change" in Iran:

I've changed my mind. The nuclear talks are going nowhere. The Iranians appear intent on developing the means to produce a nuclear weapon; there is no other explanation for the secret uranium-enrichment facility discovered near the holy city of Qum. Fortunately, their nuclear program appears to have hit some technical snags, which puts off the need to decide whether to launch a preventive strike. Instead we should be focusing on another fact: Iran may be closer to profound political change than at any time since the revolution that ousted the shah 30 years ago.

Haass goes on to lay out some measures that he argues will strengthen the opposition and put pressure on the clerical leadership, such as avoiding high-level meetings with Iranian officials, sanctioning the Revolutionary Guards, documenting and publicizing human rights abuses, and so on.

As regime change policies go, I'd rather have  Haass's than, say, John Bolton's. And Haass is careful to say that "Iran's opposition should be supported by Western governments, not led."

Still, I think we need to be realistic about what can be accomplished here. Some Iran observers, like Hooman Majd, emphasize that that the core of the green movement is pushing for civil rights, not revolution. And there still appear to be very few signs that the security services, the police, and the military are fracturing or hestitating to crack down. Meanwhile, there's always the possibility that a compromise will defuse tensions.

Another reason to be skeptical of the prospects for regime change  is that similar situations don't seem to be good parallels. Iran has oil, and its economy is otherwise far less connected to the outside world than, say, Indonesia's under Suharto, the Philippines' under Marcos, or Chile's under Pinchet. Yes, Iran has lots of young bloggers and university activists, but it doesn't have a strong business class with a vested interest in the global economy. Instead, it's basically a rentier state where the apparatus of repression, the Revolutionary Guards, also controls the commanding heights of the economy. And the Guards have shown no qualms about using extremely brutal means to keep down dissent.

One conceivable pathway to change is that the opposition ratchets up the pressure on the regime so far that the next presidential election really must be free and fair. The opposition would need to rally behind one candidate so that the conservatives can't split the reformist vote. Let's assume the regime allows the opposition to put up its preferred candidate -- a big if -- and even permits it to monitor polling stations as well as the vote count, and the opposition candidate wins. But even then, there's an entire cleric-dominated superstructure above the presidency that would remain in the hands of the supreme leader. So even a new president wouldn't necessarily mean fundamental change (remember Mohamad Khatami? He was elected with a 70 percent mandate). And we'd be talking about 2013 -- which is a long ways off. Who knows where oil prices will be by then?

Another scenario is that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dies and a more moderate ayatollah, such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or Yousef Sanei, takes his place and begins a top-down reform of the system. Khamenei is often rumored to be ailing, but he's still only 70 years old. One could easily imagine him hanging on for another decade. And any successor will need to command the loyalty of the Guards, who will fight any attempt at fundamental change tooth and nail.

There's always the possibility that the green movement will gain so much momentum that it becomes unstoppable, sweeping key leaders of the Guards, the paramilitary Basij, the military, and various security services into its ranks. This would be incredible to watch, but oil prices would need to collapse or inflation would need to reach painful heights to push enough ordinary, apolitical Iranians into the streets to make it happen.

In short, betting on regime change is a hope, not a plan.

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images

 
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ZATHRAS

12:09 AM ET

January 25, 2010

I agree with Hounshell. I

I agree with Hounshell. I also agree with almost everything Haass writes, with the exception of the two words "regime change."

The regime is Tehran is hostile to the United States. It always has been, and always will be. Hostility to the United States is part of its reason for being, and policies contrary to American interests and regional stability are part of its portfolio now. I have no compunction whatever about screwing the Iranian government every chance we get.

But I also think it's important that we not nourish any apocalyptic fantasies about the kind of transformation that is possible in an oil-rich Shiite state run by its security services with clerical blessing. The United States can help embarrass and shame the Tehran regime; we can help force it to spend so much time worrying about its domestic position that it finds it more difficult to make trouble in the region; we can ask questions (like, "what does Iran need to waste tens of billions of dollars on building a nuclear arsenal it can't use?" Or "Why should Pakistan be Iran's model?") that the regime doesn't want to answer. It is highly unlikely, however, that anything America can do short of invading Iran will result in the overthrow of the Iranian government and its replacement with something better, and we've already used up our quota as far as invading Middle Eastern countries is concerned.

In short, we can deal with Iran as we dealt with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, treating it as an adversary and never letting it forget that its founding principals are wrong, but also not kidding ourselves that our rhetoric would by itself bring about any fundamental change.

 

DOGAN

4:38 AM ET

January 25, 2010

Unfortunately i can not agree

Iran, although the name suggests othervise, is a highly cosmopolitan country. Persians are not a majority, And minorities like Azeris( 30%) and Kurds(5%) know what pan-aryanism means, if they had to chose between protesters(pan-aryanist thugs) and government, they will chose (with the regional phrase) lesser of two evils for them, which is islamist regime.
All the minorities make up more than 50% of the population, which wont be silent to a lawless coup.

What free world must do is to play minority card against Tehran and strip it off from its colonies. Of course it will take long, unless there is a military act, but in case of a military act(which is more likely), West will have valuable allies who will fight for their own freedoms.

 

HASS

11:05 AM ET

January 26, 2010

Silly

Those "minorities" have been part of Iran longer than the Welsh have been part of Britain. And Iran's Supreme Leader is himself an Azeri.

 

HASS

11:02 AM ET

January 26, 2010

Iranians support their nuclear program

The people of Iran -- the same demonstrators -- massively support their nuclear program and in fact Mousavi, the leader of the Green movement, had criticized Ahmadinejad for even considering the "uranium swap" deal. So, Haass is wrong on that point. Iranians see clearly that people like Haass don't care about them and are more interested in promoting their idea of US interests. Also, polls taken in Iran before and after the elections show that the majority support Ahmadinejad. The average Iranian is, since the revolution, more likely to be literate, have access to clean water, electricity, lives longer and his children are more likely to be immunized and attend college. Those are just plain facts.

 

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