Thursday, October 1, 2009 - 12:15 PM
Having read the report's conclusions, these are all basically correct. The authors do state explicitly that "Operations started with a massive Georgian artillery attack" on the night of Aug. 7 and that this attack was not justifiable under international law. They also say that Georgian claims of a Russian military incursion prior to this attack are not "sufficiently substantiated." Point for the Kremlin, but from that point on the Russians don't look very good.
The report rejects Russian claims of genocide by Georgia against Russian civilians, accuses the Russian military of allowing human rights abuses, including widespread rape, by South Ossetian forces against Georgian civilians, states that Russian troops "continued their advances for some days after the August ceasefire was declared," and finds that while their initial military reponse was justified, they went "far beyond the reasonable limits of defence" by moving into Georigan territory. In an interesting passage, the authors write:
In a matter of a very few days, the pattern of legitimate and illegitimate military action had thus turned around betweeen the two main actors Georgia and Russia.
The report also describes provocative Russian acts in the lead-up to the war, including "the formalising of links with the breakaway territories, the granting of Russian passports to their populations, and declarations about using the Kosovo precedent as a basis for the recognition fo South Ossetia and Abkhazia".
Another important passage:
"This Report shows that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus soleley on the artillery attack on Tskhinvaliin the night of 7/8 August and on what then developed into the questionable Georgian offensive in South Ossetia and the Russian military action. ...It must also take into account years of provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats and acts of violence both inside and outside the conflict zone. It has to conside, too, the impact of a great power's coercive politics and diplomacy against a small and insubordinate neighbour, together with the small neighbour's penchant for overplaying its had and acting in the heat of the moment without careful consideration fo the final outcome, not to mention its fear that it might permanently lose important parts of its territory through creeping annexation."
In retrospect Russia's excessive use of force during the conflict seems not just brutal but politically stupid. Through years of pressure, the Kremlin had goaded Saakashvili into an ill-advised attack that provided the Russian miltiary with cover to consolidate control over the breakaway regions. If they had stopped there, Russia could have (somewhat credibly) painted Georgia as the aggressor and (much less credibly) justified their incursion as a humanitarian intervention.
Thanks to their attacks on non-disputed Georgian territory, their complicity in human rights abuses by South Ossetian forces, and their violations of the ceasefire, it's hard to see Russia as anything but a bullying aggressor. And with Saakashvili still in power and the underlying political dynamics basically unchanged, it's hard to see what they gained from it.
DMITRY KOSTYUKOV/AFP/Getty Images
Just to play Devil's advocate (of course), I pose the following:
The Russians have always faulted themselves in the war primarily for their PR mistakes, the biggest one I suppose being the failure to articulate why it was necessary in their view to take the fight beyond the Ossetian (or even the Abkhazian) border, into undisputed Georgian territory.
From what I understand, this reason was essentially to destabilize or weaken the Saakashvili administration/regime to the degree that he'd get kicked out and replaced by somebody more willing to work with Russia (or at least at peace with relinquishing these northern lands that Russia now openly identified as independent).
I say there was a failure to articulate this view because the Kremlin thought it was doing something the U.S. did in Iraq, encroaching on the sovereignty of a state that essentially lost it by attacking an ally within its sphere of (privileged) interest.
Now there's been plenty of talk about the evil Russian imperial resurgence and their '19th century way of looking at the world in spheres of interest,' but one could certainly argue that Moscow reasonably rejects these talking points as empty (read: "stupid") propaganda, understanding that spheres of influence and geopolitics are no less restricted to the past than other international concerns like hunger or exploitation.
Russia's big failure, where they were "politically stupid,"was in how they argued their case, failing to realize that America's rhetoric about its international actions, despite having a firm basis in hard politics, bestows a surprisingly convincingness (or at least defensibility) to the official explanations of U.S. military behavior.
One has to see if Russia really treats Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as free states. After all, there are just
around 100 000 ethnic Abkhaz in Abkhazia and less than
200 000 ethnic South Ossetin in South Ossetia. What will
be the fate of ethnic Georgians displaced be the war?
Will they ever be allowed to return to their homes? And even
if so, will they be granted civic rights?
I think the media narrative that because Georgia "fired the first shot" that it "started the war with Russia" misses an important point: Georgia's first shot started a civil war within its own borders. Russia's response turned it into a war with Russia.
The report could have been much clearer at distinguishing violations of jus in bello rules (war crimes during the conflict) with violations of jus ad bellum rules (governing the initiation of conflict); and in distinguishing the intrastate and interstate aspects of the conflict.
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