Friday, September 19, 2008 - 12:01 AM
Everyone agrees on one thing: For the last year plus, the death count in Iraq has been on the decline. Iraq is slowly calming after five years of turbulence, to say the least.
Was it the troop surge that did the trick? Was it Gen. David Petraeus and his awesome counterinsurgency tactics?
A creative study released today by the University of California, Los Angeles, says no. The researchers' alternative hypothesis is disconcerting: Ethnic violence cleared Baghdad's most troublesome neighborhoods of occupants before U.S. soldiers ever had the chance.
Using free satellite imagery from the Department of Defense, researchers tracked electricity use in Iraq before, during, and after the surge took place. Electricity use (as measured by visible night-light) in Baghdad fell, notably in certain outlying neighborhoods where incidents of ethnic violence were documented by The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq.
"If the surge had truly 'worked,' we would expect to see a steady increase in night-light output over time," says Thomas Gillespie, one of the co-authors, in a press release. "Instead, we found that the night-light signature diminished in only certain neighborhoods, and the pattern appears to be associated with ethno-sectarian violence and neighborhood ethnic cleansing."
The authors note that in the same time period, electricity use increased in cities outside of Baghdad where the surge (as well as the same intensities of ethnic violence) was largely absent. The authors believe it is unlikely that a decimated power grid alone generated their results, since personal generator use is popular in Iraq's capital city.
Despite the eerily apparent correlation between maps of ethnic violence and maps of electricity use, there are several questions to clarify before the survey is crowned as truth. Feel free to suggest others in comments.
First, it would be interesting to overlay yet another map depicting the intensity of the surge by neighborhood. If the authors' theory is correct, one would expect the areas with electricity decrease to be easier to patrol since they had already been violently cleansed of their troubles.
Likewise, is it possible that the surge itself led to the decrease in electricity use? If the neighborhoods in question were also hot spots for the surge, soldiers could have damaged infrastructure accidentally during patrols, residents could have fled, or loss of life is conceivable in military confrontation. Whatever the explanation, this would yield an equally disturbing interpretation: the surge actually diminished residents' quality of life and access to power rather than causing an improvement.
Finally, there is no mention of the reported security improvements in areas such as Anbar Province, where casualties have also dropped off significantly. More satellite data -- if and when it is available -- might shed light on what happened outside the capital.
Without more on the ground accounts, it is difficult to say just how earth-shattering the findings released today are or aren't. Certainly, there has been a staggering amount of ethnic violence, the extent of which is still trickling out with the more than two million refugees now living abroad.
For those who fled, the calm -- if it is real -- has truly been a separate peace.
What I'd really like to see, though, is a breakdown of the current ethnic complexion of Baghdad by neighborhood in comparison with the violence levels now, and the ethnic profile before the invasion in comparison the levels of violence at their peak.
I don't have any solid numbers to match it against, but my current theory is that in many neighborhoods the violence has dropped simply because the minorities who used to live there have all been killed or driven away. This jives well with observed decrease in electricity use in those neighborhoods if their homes aren't all being reoccupied.
If this is indeed the case, then the decrease in the level of violence around Baghdad from apocalyptic to merely awful represents not the success of current strategies, but the total and irreversible failure of past ones.
Sadly, I fear the misconception that the surge was successful is pretty much invincible in American politics now. Too many people have a vested interest in this myth.
As a member of the Army Officer Corps who is serving in the area studyed, I can see no correlation to the facts supporting the aurthors arguement with my time on the ground.
It is unfortunate that all the sacrifice on part of the Iraqi security forces and my fellow Soldiers that political pundits in academia still persist to publish nonsense to make them selves feel better. I can't make you belive things are better in Iraq. All I can tell you that post surge, the areas you show are better due to hard won gains on the ground, not secritarian violence. To be sure secritarian violence did and at low levels continues to happen, but it can in no way explain the dramatic change in the security situation.
The "surge", Sons of Iraq, and increased intellegence capibilites are what caused the security turn around. As for "the electricty patterns", I guess ou need to see the effected areas to know why electricity in Iraq is a poor indicator of any thing, but I guess you need what the aurthors of the study don't have and that is "time on the ground" to dettermine that"
Aurther of this comment performed over 280 missions west of the Tigris in Urban baghdad. Served as a PSD PLT LDR, worked in the Joint Mangement Projects Office of a Brigade Combat Team, and is currently the Executive Officer of a company, and certianly knows more about the effected area than the aurthors of this study.
The general understanding of the situation at the time was that Baghdad was not receiving the amount of power needed because it was being consumed by the outlying provinces. The shortages were aggravated in June 2006 and beyond as a huge number of the extremely high voltage lines feeding Baghdad from both the North and South were cut or toppled. The positive results of the surge were not fully realized until early 2008. The snapshot of lower light levels on Dec 16, 2007 could have been the result of supply/infrastructure issues rather than depopulation, notwithstanding an acknowledged increase in IDPs and refugees over the course of that year. As the article states,
"Of course, it could all be a question of differential electricity supply rather than
ethnic cleansing and an associated reduction in population density in different neigh-
borhoods." This was, in fact, the case.
Where the authors claim, "There is no evidence, however, that anything much
about this situation changed very much over the period in question. It was much the
same in 2005 as in 2007", they are overlooking the (or unaware of) the highly constrained electricity supply to Baghdad following the mayhem of power line destruction in June 2006.
CDR Robert 'Edge' Gillett, USN
Electricity Sector Leader, Apr 2007 - Mar 2008
MNF-I, Energy Fusion Cell
@ J.C. and NavyEdge: Thanks for your service and contribution to this discussion.
Gee, I hate it when practitioners on the ground have hard data that refutes the scholars in the ivory tower. It just makes the latter's ruminations seem so insignificant.
"UNHCR estimates more than 4.7 million Iraqis have left their homes, many in dire need of humanitarian care. Of these, more than 2.7 million Iraqis are displaced internally, while more than 2 million have fled to neighbouring states, particularly Syria and Jordan. Many were displaced prior to 2003, but the largest number has fled since. In 2006, Iraqis became the leading nationality seeking asylum in Europe." -- June 2008, Global Trends Report (UNHCR website)
The Iraqi refugee population is only bested by the Sudanese refugee population -- which hardly can be called any type of success. In a recently released report, Iraqis now feel safe enough to move within their own neighborhoods but roughly 2/3 of the population feel that it is dangerous to travel to other neighborhoods and regions of the nation. All this after seven years of war.
Sure, the US replaced our former SOB without a true understanding of the ethnic history or tensions in the region -- but at what point does the US make an honest assessment that the "banana republic" foreign policy it has imported to the Middle East has set the cause of true people-powered governance **as best defined by the Iraqis (and Iranians) themselves without the erosive influence of the military-petrochemical complex** onto a very dark and bloody road?
These assessments do not have anything to do with anecdotes or perspectives which are based on singular experiences. This is simply the big picture, which only can be seen through cold, hard fact. What has transpired in Iraq and Afghanistan -- those are the wages of war, folks. That the US can itemize every death of our own, while only make estimations about the deaths of Iraqis and Afghans is telling.
Let's not kid ourselves that everything ends happily ever after when there are finite resources to be exploited, and "never again" has an asterisk next to it when the most debased governments are our friends.
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