Five ways Iran is not like North Korea

Thu, 06/26/2008 - 8:38am

You're going to hear a lot in the coming days, I expect, about how the "North Korea model" can be applied to negotiations with Iran. Forgive me for raining on the parade here, but there are some important differences that we need to keep in mind.

  1. Iran is not on the brink of mass famine.
  2. Iran has enormous oil and gas resources; North Korea is in desperate need of imported fuel oil and has few legitimate sources of foreign exchange.
  3. Iran can stir up trouble in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Gulf, and the Palestinian territories.
  4. Iran has the ability to launch sophisticated terrorist attacks all over the world; North Korea did not.
  5. Iran's nuclear program has broad support in a regime where decision-making is diffuse and opaque; Kim Jong Il had much more lattitude to make the big decision to come in from the cold.
It's also worth noting that North Korea is keeping the nuclear weapons it has already produced, whereas Iran is still in the enrichment and research phase. It's by no means clear the regime has decided to go for the bomb, as opposed to latent nuclear capacity.

I'm not saying the United States shouldn't engage Iran, but just trying to point out that the Islamic Republic is a much tougher nut to crack.
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What "Latent" nuclear capacity?

Considering that the Iranians have repeatedly made nuclear compromise offers that would address any theoretical threat of nuclear weapons proliferation -- such as creating multilaterial enrichment facilities on Iranian soil, a suggestion widely endorsed by international experts and the IAEA's Pellaud Committee -- then it is inaccurate to characterize Iran as "either seeking bombs or the latent capacity to get them" Of all the nations that have an independent nuclear fuel cycle, Iran has done the most to ensure that its nuclear program cannot be used to make bombs. Among other differences between Iran and N Korea: Iran has signed the Additional Protocol, implemented it for 2 years at which time it also suspended enrichment, and has offered to ratify it onces its nuclear rights are recognized -- and according to the IAEA, Iran has allowed inspections in excess of even the Additional Protocol requirements too. And there's still no evidence of any nuclear weapons program found.

well, that's not entirely accurate

The United States has accused Iran of seeking nuclear weapons in the past, and the IAEA has indicated it is not satisfied with Iran's answers on this front. I believe Iran is seeking to walk right up to the line, hence "latent nuclear capacity."

Yes, it is quite accurate.

The US can "accuse" all it wants - the facts however speak for themselves. Note that any country with a nuclear program can be accused of seeking a "latent" weapons "capacity" so the charge is meaningless. Brazil, Argentina, Holland... all have "latent" weapons capacities. Note that Brazil has refused to even sign the Additional protocol, unlike Iran. And the latest IAEA report specifically states in paragraph 5 for example, that the centrifuges are all operating under IAEA safeguards, "continue to be operated as declared", and have been the subject of 14 surprise visits. The same report further states quite specifically that the IAEA has found no evidence to back up the allegations from the US about a weaponization program.

agreed

add to all that the fact that iran's supreme leader has denounced nuclear weapons and issued a fatwa against them. iran doesn't want nukes; it wants nuclear power. iran might be sitting on top of a sea of oil and gas, but its refining capabilities are pure shit and it has to import fuel. as the US and its allies keep tightening the screws, they put iran's energy security in jeopardy and thus necessitate an acceleration of iran's nuclear program. the world is going to have to deal with a nuclear iran, whether they like it or not. the current bellicose rhetoric from the west is completely unproductive and paving a path to another ill conceived pre-emptive war that i fear can not be stopped at this point.

Talk to Iraq

The points made are valid, but the big question is, do they mean we shouldn't talk to Iran? The author seems wishy-washy about the answer to that. He's not saying that we shouldn't talk to Iran, but he is also not saying that we should. The fact that the Iran situation is scarier than the North Korea one seems to me to mean that the need to talk to Iran is greater. When the author talks about raining on the parade, does he mean that having a parade is useless? If so, I disagree. It doesn't make much sense to me to imply that there is more reason to talk to a nation that already has nuclear weapons than there is to talk to a nation that does not yet have them. The opposite seems to me more reasonable.

yes, the United States should engage

But I think we should be realistic about what those talks will produce. And let's remember that from Iran's perspective, it makes a good deal of sense to get the bomb.

Iran says it does NOT need the bomb

The Iranians say it most certainly does not make sense from their perspective to get the bomb, which is why they've offered to place limits on their nuclear program in excess of their legal obligations to further ensure that they can't secretly make bombs (for example, by opening their enrichment program to foreign participation.)

Specifically, this is what they say:

Iran today is the strongest country in its immediate neighborhood. It does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests. In fact, to augment Iranian influence in the region, it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors, who have historically been concerned with size and power disparities. On the other hand, Iran, with its current state of technological development and military capability, cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region of the Middle East. Moreover, such an unrealistic option would be prohibitively expensive, draining the limited economic resources of the country. In sum, a costly nuclear-weapon option would reduce Iran's regional influence and increase its global vulnerabilities without providing any credible deterrence.

(See: An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight about Iran's Nuclear Program-

By Iran's Permanent Mission to United Nations in New York Published as advertisement in New York Times on November 18, 2005)

Six ways

You forgot the sixth way that Iran's nuclear program is different from North Koreas: Iran's nuclear program is operating fully in accordance with the NPT and is subject to IAEA safeguards -- the last IAEA report said that it was the subject of 14 surprise inspections too. Now, why do you suppose such an important point was missed?

6th way

You forget the 6th way Iran's nuclear program differs from North Koreas: Iran's nuclear program proceeds in full compliance with the NPT and is subject to IAEA safeguards.

Sixth way

You forgot to mention the sixth way that Iran and N. Korea are different: North Korea violated the NPT, constructed nuclear weapons and withdrew from the NPT Iran continues to be in full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with no evidence of a nuclear weapons program ever existing, and has even offered to place limits on its nuclear program that exceed its legal obligations to ensure that it can't even theoretically be diverted to weapons. Now, why leave that out?