Say hello to your diplomatic future

What should we make of this week's events in Russia? I asked Dmitri Trenin, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center (Carnegie is FP's parent organization) and the author of the excellent Getting Russia Right, to weigh in:

In the end, Putin's surprise turned out to be no surprise. Dmitri Medvedev, first tipped as the heir apparent last year, is the chosen successor. Putin, however, is not leaving, and succession is incomplete. Medvedev's immediate announcement that he will make Putin his prime minister has solved the big mystery of Putin's own employment after 2008, but has raised questions about the new configuration of power in Russia.

VLADIMIR RODIONOV/AFP/Getty

Without changing its basic law, Russia is acquiring a new form of government. Nikolay Petrov, my colleague at the Carnegie Moscow Center, calls this nouveau regime "regency." All power in the land is still formally vested in the presidency, but at least for the immediate future, the new president will share it with his predecessor and patron. It would be preposterous to expect Putin to start competing with his protégé, as some analysts fear. It would also be wrong to see Medvedev as a mere front for Putin, or else a stand-in figure whose only function would be to fill a brief interlude between Putin's second and third terms. He might, conceivably, have to resign prematurely, but if that happens, it will be due to an emergency or failure, not part of any Putin plot. Putin is primarily interested in the stability of the system that he has built and in the continuation of the policies he has laid down. To ensure both, he has to become a playing coach. Most likely, Putin will let his successor gradually grow into the top job, all the while providing Medvedev with the support, cover, and protection he will need in spades.

Nothing in Russian politics is certain. Presidential succession remains a high-risk operation, undertaken only because the alternatives are worse. Not everyone has been pleased with Putin's choice, and not everyone will wish Medevdev well. Yet, Russia has moved a little bit closer to backing the constitutional norm of presidential rotation with the force of political tradition, and thus eventually turning the presidency itself into more of an executive function than a sacred mission. Putin's premiership might also confer some lasting prestige to the country’s second-most important office, and result in the delimitation of competence between the Kremlin and the cabinet. Finally, United Russia, the newly elected Duma's dominant force, and yet woefully devoid of public politicians, would benefit from greater attention from its leader Putin.

If Putin's choice sticks, and is duly ratified in a national election next March, this will probably be a good thing for Russia, under the circumstances. Russia's business community has hailed Medvedev's nomination as a potential boost for more liberal economic policies. As Gazprom's chairman, Medvedev can hardly be called an ultra-liberal, but he broadly favors economic modernization. One hopes that, as a lawyer, he also understands the importance of the rule of law. As someone responsible over the last two years for the "national projects," i.e. the socially oriented programs on housing, health, education, and agriculture, he is as well briefed as anyone on Russia's towering social problems. He is also called decent and honest by the people who know him, a rare and somewhat dubious quality in the cynical and ruthless world of post-Soviet politics.

The choice of Medvedev is also likely to be good news for the rest of the world, assuming other G-8 leaders embrace Medvedev as a legitimate colleague. This will require much effort and more than a little patience. Yet, a new president who feels welcome will be far more likely to prevent a further deterioration of Russia's relations with the West than one who is spurned as a tyrant's frontman.