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Reader poll: Should Obama go to Iraq?
Submitted by Blake Hounshell on Thu, 05/29/2008 - 1:19pm
Yes
69% (200 votes)
No
22% (65 votes)
Don't know
8% (24 votes)
Total votes: 289









no
Of course there are much better ways of learning what is really going on in Iraq than being part of a theatrical production, the way McCain was. There is no lack of qualified people who have spent months in Iraq learning what is going on that Obama could talk to. Talking to them, both in public and, perhaps even more so, in private, would produce much more accurate information than would be available in a staged production.
It is true that to be successful in politics a person has to cater to people at all levels, and there is no shortage of people who demand the theatrical.
However, I would prefer that Obama be serious about learning what is going on there. I would prefer that he make a big deal out of talking a lot with people who have spent much time there. And I think he could make a big deal out of what the soldiers who have served two or more missions there think about someone coming there for a few days and claiming that he has learned as much as they have. He would need to find a way to talk to Iraqis, but not cherry-picked ones. But doing that with armed guards all around is not likely to produce authentic opinions. He would do better to talk long distance to Iraqis who have been approached by individuals such as reporters or others who have gained the confidence of Iraqi people.
There is no question that McCain is playing games when he says he would like to go along with McCain to teach him some things. They could both remain in the U.S. while McCain "taught" Obama why "the voice of experience" made the following gross misjudgments:
“And I believe that the success will be fairly easy” and “There's no doubt in my mind that... we will be welcomed as liberators.” [3/24/03]
“I think we could go in with much smaller numbers than we had to do in the past... I don't believe it's going to be nearly the size and scope that it was in 1991.” [9/15/02]
“There's not a history of clashes that are violent between Sunnis and Shias. So I think they can probably get along.” [4/23/03]
“Overall, I think a year from now, we will have made a fair amount of progress if we stay the course.” [12/8/05 (Exactly one year before violence in Iraq peaked)]
"But there’s no doubt in my mind that we will prevail and there’s no doubt in my mind, once these people are gone, that we will be welcomed as liberators." [3/24/03]
"We're not going get into house-to-house fighting in Baghdad" [CNN Late Edition, 9/29/02]
And then he had the arrogance and gall to say:
"We have not told the American people how touch and difficult this task would be… they were led to believe this could be some kind of day at the beach." [CNN, 8/22/2006]
Shortly before he was fired for making the statement General Shinseki said, with great prescience, that we would need several hundred thousand troop in Iraq because "We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of georaphy that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence."
What did McCain think: "I have no qualms about our strategic plans," he told the Hartford Courant in a March 5 article, just before the invasion. "I thought we were very successful in Afghanistan."
Yes, I think McCain could teach Obama a lot, about how to get things wrong. Very wrong.
GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence.
Somehow the following did
Somehow the following did not appear in my recent comment:
That is how General Shinseki saw the need. How did McCain see it? "I have no qualms about our strategic plans," he told the Hartford Courant in a March 5 article, just before the invasion. "I thought we were very successful in Afghanistan."
Question: is "success" in Iraq the same as "success" in Afghanistan?