Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a new agreement this week called Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues (pdf). "Outstanding Issues" refers to the handful of past and current issues with Iran's nuclear program that the IAEA has not been able to resolve to its satisfaction.

Essentially, the agreement lays out a logical order for addressing these issues and begins to set a timetable for doing so. The IAEA is to submit all outstanding questions in writing by September 15, 2007, and Iran will then respond to each in a defined sequence.

The agreement is a mixed bag, from a U.S. perspective. On the upside, the IAEA appears to have resolved its outstanding questions on Iran's plutonium experiments, the first such resolution in four years. And clarifying publicly the issues that remain to be addressed, as well as setting out which should be resolved first, will be helpful as the diplomatic process moves forward.

But the agreement also has its downsides, some of which David Albright and Jacqueline Shire of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) pointed out (pdf) yesterday. They worry that the text's reference to "closing files" could block reconsideration of crucial issues, if new information came to light after a particular issue was "closed." Albright and Shire also note that the timetable for the process has been drawn out at least until late 2007, and possibly even to early 2008.

However, ISIS's press release does not mention a worrisome undercurrent running through the entire agreement. Basically, Iran is putting the burden of proof on the IAEA to show that its nuclear activities are not peaceful. The underfunded, understaffed Agency would benefit greatly from a political push to reverse this state of affairs; member states themselves should be responsible for providing such proof.

A recent report by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center suggests one way of achieving this: "country-neutral" rules regarding noncompliance, which would go into effect automatically if the IAEA cannot reach consensus on the compliance of a suspected proliferator. Such rules would trigger certain consequences if consensus is not reached, regardless of the country being scrutinized, and would give much stronger incentives for countries like Iran to actively work at dispelling worries about their nuclear programs. If this role reversal could be achieved, Iran and its ilk would have much more difficulty buying time or avoiding sanctions by manipulating the IAEA.