Natanz, Feb. 2006

Last week, the Associated Press reported a setback in Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment technology: 50 newly installed centrifuges had "exploded". 

The Washington Note seized on the explosion as a definitive "reality check" on Iran's nuclear capability. As Paul Kerr points out, though, this incident actually happened last April. Setbacks can be expected in such a technically challenging operation (picture fragile vacuum cylinders—filled with hot gas, spinning faster than the speed of sound, and linked together in cascades—and you'll see what I mean). That same month, the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that Iran would be able to master centrifuge technology (i.e., be able to prevent explosions) within a few months. If the IISS analysts were right, the problem has likely been solved by now.

A centrifuge

The exact number of centrifuges lost also needs to be put into context. As of December, Iran had installed two cascades of 164 centrifuges, as well as several 10- or 20-centrifuge cascades, for a total of 350+ (keep in mind this is the number remaining after the April explosion). The Natanz plant, where these cascades are located, can ultimately hold upwards of 50,000 centrifuges (though 3,000 seems to be the near-term goal). Alongside such large numbers, a loss of 50 seems less momentous, though still a significant setback.

Nevertheless, Iran is still a long way from making large amounts of bomb-grade uranium on its own—even if problems with supply of parts, testing, and implementation of larger cascades are ignored. Some of the installed centrifuges were still being tested late last year, and even with 3,000 operational centrifuges it would take almost a year for Iran to produce enough material for just one bomb. With the roughly 350 known to be installed, it would take over six years.