Dear Representative Reyes:

Congratulations on your new position as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. With the sorry state of our intelligence community and the continued specter of transnational terrorism (not to mention organized crime, narco-trafficking and nuclear proliferation), yours is an important position and I’m sure you’re enthusiastic about the job. However, I couldn’t help but be more than a little concerned this weekend when I read that you, like so many other U.S. officials involved in counterterrorism, do not know the religious layout of the greater Middle East. Knowing the difference between Sunnis, Shiites and Arab nationalists will not simply make your job easier, it will make it possible. Because I’m sure you’re busy, I took the liberty of writing up a primer for you:

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If Iraq isn’t lacking for problems, it also isn’t lacking for would-be solutions. Now that the much-hyped Iraq Study Group has gone public with its recommendations, FP takes a look at several of the other plans for stabilizing Iraq and the likelihood of their success.

Friday's New York Times article about the plight of Iraqi refugees in Jordan brings back to the forefront one of the United States' most underrated allies in the Middle East. A monarchy that has made wavering steps toward democracy, supported the U.S. wars in Iraq and against al-Qaeda, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and whose population is 50–70 percent Palestinian, Iraq’s western neighbor is on the front lines of multiple conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, Jordan’s interests tend to coincide with those of the United States.

A recent report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) says why: First, Jordan is interested in a stable, united Iraq, one not influenced by the Iranians. As noted by the Times, Iraq's current instability is already threatening the country politically, economically and socially. Jordan cannot afford to see the situation deteriorate further. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims. Jordanians do not want to see their Sunni brethren massacred, but nor do they want to bear the brunt of a sectarian conflict if Iran and Saudi Arabia decided to mix it up in Iraq.

As the President ponders the political fallout from the release of the Baker-Hamilton report, Passport takes a look at what is being said about it across the Middle East:

An editorial at the Iraqi paper Az-Zaman proclaims that the Iraq Study Group has devised the first real  American strategy for handling Iraq, but is generally unimpressed with the contents, particularly with the commission's perceived failure to adequately define a U.S. "victory" in Iraq.

KurdishMedia flags the report's warning that an overly independent Kurdistan would warrant a Turkish invasion, asking "Is Baker a Turk or an American"?

There's no direct mention of Baker-Hamilton at Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency, but the mood there is generally hostile. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad promises to "stand up to the bullying and greed of arrogant global powers," and Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar believes the United States is continuing to spread discord in the region, "[i]nstead of compensating for its past mistakes and revising its strategies and policies."

The Syrian Arab News Agency says that the Foreign Ministry considers the report "positive," but its focus on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights suggests that the price for Syrian help may be high indeed.

As noted in today's Morning Brief, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rejected any connection between the war in Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meanwhile an analysis at the Jerusalem Post predicts that adopting the ISG recommendations would lead to a "Madrid redux," referring to the 1991 multi-lateral peace conference that many on the Israeli right consider to be a greater failure than the subsequent Oslo Accords.

Lebanon’s Daily Star is hopeful. The editors see the report as an opportunity for Bush to "salvage his reputation."

Overall, the Middle Eastern perspective on Baker-Hamilton looks typically bleak. For a round-up of what’s being said in the States, check out Slate's "Reporting Failure" and "Iraq Study Group? BFD!"

Bob Gates was just confirmed by the Senate as the next secretary of defense. The vote was 95-2 in favor; both nays were from Republicans.

Secretary Gates takes the helm at the Pentagon at an unenviable moment: spiraling violence in Iraq, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, and an overstretched U.S. military, not to mention nukes in Pyongyang and centrifuges in Tehran. So, what can we expect from Gates? In a new web exclusive, FP takes a look at how he'll run his $500 billion business.

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Al-Hayat, the leading pan-Arab daily based in London, reports the following tidbit on President Bush's recent pow-wow with Iraqi Shi'ite leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim (my translation):

Al-Hayat learned from American sources that the leader of the "Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution," Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, conveyed a message from Tehran to the American administration calling for recognition of its role in Iraq. He offered to play the role of mediator between the two sides.

I haven't seen this reported elsewhere, but Al-Hayat tends to be reliable. The Iranian-backed Al-Hakim is well-positioned to take advantage of the Iraq Study Group's call for negotiations with Iran. Unfortunately, however, the article says little about the White House's reaction to his offer other than that top officials listened to al-Hakim and are willing to "study the various proposals."

In the press conference this morning, James Baker made a point of emphasizing what the Iraq Study Group (ISG) did not recommend in its report.

Here's what was ruled out:

• Staying the course. Given that the report is subtitled "The Way Forward—A New Approach," this one is a no-brainer.
• Increasing U.S. troop levels. In the words of the ISG report, "increased deployments to Iraq would ... hamper our ability to provide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond to crises around the world," and in any case they are not likely to be much help. Instead, the ISG calls for a five-fold increase in trainers for the Iraqi military and police. Although there may be a transition period as units are shifted from a combat to a training role, the overall number of U.S. forces in Iraq should decline significantly overall by the first quarter of 2008. 
• Partitioning Iraq as recommended in the Biden-Gelb plan. Baker said that "devolution could not be managed on an orderly basis" because the boundaries between ethnic regions are confusing.
• Withdrawing precipitously. A quick exit could lead to a "bloodbath" in Iraq or even "a regional war," in Baker's view.
• Linking the Iranian nuclear program in talks over Iraq. The nuclear issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany," according to the report. Baker noted during the question period that Iran was helpful in Afghanistan. If the Iranians view a stable Iraq as similarly in their interests, they may be willing to come to the table even if they aren't "chomping at the bit" to do so—but their nuclear program should be left out.
• The words "victory" and "civil war." Baker said that these terms had become too "political." Instead of "victory," the ISG report views "success" as the goal. In fact, though "victory" appears three times in the text, in each case it refers to the dark prospect of an al-Qaeda propaganda triumph in Iraq.

It's out. The Executive Summary to the Iraq Study Group report starts grimly: "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved." It continues with a number of recommendations, divided into two approaches, External and Internal. The key points:

External Approach—"Launch a new diplomatic offensive," involving all of Iraq's neighbors, who by definition have an interest in a stable Iraq.

• Use all of the carrots and sticks available to get Iran to halt the proliferation of arms and training to Iraqi combatants, recognize Iraq's territorial integrity, and promote national reconciliation. Negotiations about Iran's nuclear program should remain the responsibility of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany.
• Employing similar pressures, coerce Syria to tighten its border with Iraq. 
• Work to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace that includes the Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians, using direct negotiations "with, by and between" all parties involved (except for those who deny Israel's right to exist).
• Plan for eventual redeployment and increase political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan.

Internal Approach—the future of Iraq is "the responsibility of the Iraqis."

• "[S]ignificantly increase" the number of U.S. troops supporting the Iraqi Army, while the Iraqi government assumes responsibility for Iraqi security and improves its military capabilities, with the intention of an eventual drawdown of U.S. forces.
• Encourage the Iraqi army to achieve "primary responsibility for combat operations" by the first quarter of 2008 (barring "unexpected developments"), at which point U.S. forces would serve as support for rapid-reaction and special operations, and for training, advising, force protection, and search and rescue.
• Notify the Iraqis that although the United States is willing to assist militarily, politically, and economically, it may not do so if the Iraqi government does not make significant steps toward assuming more responsibility.
• To measure the progress mentioned above, set "specific objectives" for achieving national reconciliation, security and governance, expanding on the milestones already offered by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

What do you think about the recommendations? Email your thoughts to Passport.