French President Jacques Chirac used his Bastille Day interview to criticize Israel's response as "totally disproportionate." Yet in a speech earlier this year, Chirac announced that France was prepared to nuke any country that sponsored a terrorist attack against its interests. In the interview Chirac also declared: "But I have the sentiment, if not the conviction, that the Hamas, the Hezbollah could not have taken these initiatives completely alone. And therefore, that there is support somewhere from this or that nation." So, logically he couldn't call even an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran and Syria disproportionate. Unless that is, there's one rule for France and one for everybody else. Guess those French principles aren't so universal after all.

As Carolyn pointed out this morning, the CW is that China gave North Korea the OK to fire off its missiles. North Korea is totally dependent on China, and so the Bush administration clearly - and reasonably - thinks it's up to the Chinese to put Kim back in his box. Earlier today, Christopher Hill, the State Department's North Korea point man, commented: "We need China to be very, very firm with their neighbors and frankly with their long-term allies, the North Koreans, on what is acceptable behavior and what is not acceptable behavior."

Whenever the Chinese are being difficult, you can bet your bottom dollar that the idea of getting Japan to go nuclear will be floated. Indeed, David Frum, of axis of evil fame, goes even further today, suggesting that we should also remind the Chinese that Taiwan could be a nuclear power too. Now, if the mere sight of Koizumi serenading Bush with a little Elvis was enough to make the Chinese give the North Koreans the nod, one can only imagine how they would react to the prospect of Japan - let alone Taiwan - going nuclear.

The world is waiting with bated breath to see how the Iranians respond to the package of nuclear incentives offered up by the West. You may know how Ahmadinejad stands on the right to build nukes, but Ahmadinejad is hardly holding all the reins. In this week's List, FP takes a look at the men around the Iranian president - both friends and rivals - who jostle for influence in the quest to decide whether the Islamic Republic goes nuclear.

Condi Rice’s announcement that the United States will speak to Iran if it suspends enrichment is a major, although not complete, victory for her and the State Department. It is also a sensible move that makes it far more likely that the Western coalition will hold together as European worries that America is rushing to war will be assuaged.

If there is no Western split, Putin is going to be far more cautious about being obstreperous. Although, it does seem extremely odd that Bush didn’t speak to the other troublesome Permanent Member of the Security Council before the announcement—he spoke to the Japanese for crying out loud, but not the Chinese? The NSC, though, tells us that they expect there to be a call between Bush and Hu this afternoon.

I really don’t see the downside to talking to Tehran. And don't bet on the Iranians stopping enrichment, so all this could be academic. As long as the United States makes clear that it still wants to see democratic change in Iran and that it has not forgotten people like Ramin Jahanbegloo, just talking won’t legitimize the regime. Indeed, talks actually give America a chance to get across to the Iranian people that their beef is with the regime - not the people - and that they don’t object to Iran having nuclear power, but nuclear weapons. Also what Rice outlined today doesn’t take the military option off the table.

To finish on a totally flippant note, has anyone else noticed how "allies" is to Rice as "nuclear" is to Bush?

A lot of folks, particularly conservatives, see the India nuclear deal as part of a smart, larger strategy of containing China. The Carnegie Endowment's Ashley Tellis, a brilliant scholar who played a role in facilitating the deal, does a good job of nixing that narrative in his recent Senate testimony (pdf):

[T]he Administration’s policy of developing a new global partnership with India represents a considered effort at “shaping” the emerging Asian environment to suit American interests in the twenty-first century.

This should not be interpreted as some kind of thinly veiled code signifying the polite containment of China, which many argue is in fact the Administration’s secret intention. Such claims are, in my judgment, erroneous. A policy of containing China is neither feasible nor necessary for the United States at this point in time. Further, it is not at all obvious that India, currently, has any interest in becoming part of any coalition aimed at containing China. Rather, the objective of strengthening ties with India is part of alarger—and sensible—Administration strategy of developing good relations with all the major Asian states.

Clausewitz not withstanding, Edward N. Luttwak wrote the book on strategy. "Crazy Eddie," as some who know him call him, has an excellent article in the forthcoming May issue of Commentary, "Three Reasons Not to Bomb Iran -- Yet." It's a call for temporary containment, based on the assumption that the regime in Tehran is burning itself out.

[T]here is no reason to attack prematurely, because there will be ample time to do so before it is too late—that is, before enough fissile material has been produced for one bomb."

Might as well carve those words into the headstone sitting atop the Bush Doctrine's grave. This is the new, dominant post-Iraq mindset.

There is thus no indication that the regime will fall before it acquires nuclear weapons. Yet, because there is still time, it is not irresponsible to hope that it will."

Critics will accuse Luttwak of underestimating the regime's staying power. The Drez, for one, already has. But, given that we are looking at a nuclear time table in Iran that is somewhere on the order of five to 10 years, Luttwak's call for reasoned restraint seems, well, reasonable.

I would be remiss if I failed to post on the argument made by Ray Takeyh and James Dobbins in Monday's FT. The key take-away is that Tehran is having an internal debate and we should know that only issuing threats (military and economic) gives the "good guys" in that internal debate very little to work with. We need to tout the upside of abandoning their pursuit of the bomb and submitting to scrutiny and safeguards, they say.

In order to achieve its counter-proliferation objectives, the US must build the other side of the equation by explaining the benefits Iran would derive from abandoning the same nuclear option that India, Pakistan and Israel have successfully chosen. Only an array of incentives will allow Iran’s leaders to justify suspending the programme in the face of nationalistic public opinion, aroused in no small degree by continual US threats.

I know, it's hard to stomach incentives for an oppressive regime. Like Dick Cheney, I'd rather defeat than negotiate with bad guys. But even Bush ended up holding his nose and offering North Korea incentives.