I'm beginning to think that the real Obama effect is the process by which any issue, international or domestic, comes to be discussed primarily in terms of how it relates to the president.

I'm glad Obama publicly stated his support for the protesters in Iran today. It was the right thing to do. But I don't really anticipate either action significantly changing the dynamic of the situation in Iran. It's not as if the demonstrators were waiting for Obama to tell them they are "on the right side of history.” And the Iranian government obviously doesn't really care much about winning Obama's approval.

When Fox News's Major Garett asked Obama "What took you so long?", I had to wonder what he (or John McCain) thinks would have transpired differently if Obama had made a similarly strong-worded statement a week ago. 

I haven't yet seen any indication that the Iranian opposition really wants Obama to say more. Mousavi's international spokesman may have criticized Obama in an interview with FP last week for comparing Mousavi to Ahmadinejad, but he never said that more vigorous support would be welcome, despite how some others have characterized the statement.

The heads of a number of states, including France, Germany, and Canada, have already publicly questioned the elections results and voiced support for the protesters, but I haven't seen any examples of opposition leaders or protesters mentioning this support. 

On the other hand, the argument of Obama's defenders that stronger support would imperil the protesters seems a little unconvincing as well. Iran's leaders have never lacked for pretexts under which to blame foreign meddling for internal dissent. The government was blaming the U.S. for interfering in this election before Obama had said a word. I'm not sure I understand why they're any more or less likely to crack down or make concessions based on what the U.S. president says. 

The fact of the matter is that the United States doesn't have a whole lot of diplomatic leverage or ability to influence what's going on in Iraq right now. The Obama administration still has to face the question of whether the likely fraudulence of Ahmadinejad's victory should change the approach to nuclear negotiations, but that seems like a question that can be addressed down the road. This latest round of the engagement vs. confrontation debate is becoming becomign increasingly tiresome and less pertinent to events outside the beltway. 

(For the record, inviting Iranian diplomats to a White House Fourth of July party is a terrible idea. The White House might not be able to talk the regime out of abusing their own people, but that doesn't mean they should have them over for barbecue.) 

Carnegie Endowment Iran analyst Karim Sadjadpour sends along an update to his Q&A with CFR:

Q. In light of Khamenei's firm speech Friday indicating he was not going to support a new election, what do you think will happen? Do you think the opposition will have to retreat?

First, it was expected that Khamenei's first response would be very firm, that's his modus operandi as a despot: Never compromise in the face of pressure, it only projects weakness and invites more pressure.

Khamenei is [a] shrewder politician than Ahmadinjedad. Whereas Ahmadinejad has a penchant for alienating even hardliners, Khamenei reached out and for now seemingly co-opted some of those that seemed to be previously be sitting on the fence, namely Speaker of the [P]arliament Ali Larijani and Mohsen Rezai, both of whom are tremendous opportunists.

The weight of the world now rests on the shoulders of Mir Hossein Mousavi. I expect that Khamenei's people have privately sent signals to him that they're ready for a bloodbath, they're prepared to use overwhelming force to crush this, and is he willing to lead the people in the streets to slaughter?

Mousavi is not Khomeini, and Khamenei is not the Shah. Meaning, Khomeini would not hesitate to lead his followers to "martyrdom", and the Shah did not have the stomach for mass bloodshed. This time the religious zealots are the ones holding power.

The anger and the rage and sense of injustice people feel will not subside anytime soon, but if Mousavi concedes defeat he will demoralize millions of people. At the moment the demonstrations really have no other leadership. It's become a symbiotic relationship, Mousavi feeds off people's support, and the popular support allows Mousavi the political capital to remain defiant. So Mousavi truly has some agonizing decisions to make.

Rafsanjani's role also remains critical. Can he co-opt disaffected revolutionary elites to undermine Khamenei? As Khamenei said, they've known each other for 52 years, when they were young apostles of Ayatollah Khomeini. I expect that Khamenei's people have told Rafsanjani that if he continues to agitate against Khamenei behind the scenes, he and his family will be either imprisoned or killed, and that the people of Iran are unlikely to weep for the corrupt Rafsanjani family.

Whatever happens, and I know I shouldn't be saying this as an analyst, but my eyes well when I think of the tremendous bravery and fortitude of the Iranian people. They deserve a much better regime than the one they have.

A friend who wishes to remain anonymous e-mails from Tehran:

It's been nearly a week of nighttime riots and daytime protests. At
night things seem to have quieted down just a bit here, although I
should say that I'm not going all over the city looking for a fight
after dark. This is mostly due to the checkpoints everywhere. The
checkpoints that I've seen so far are not run by the police at all –
they're basij -- one of the few militia groups that run around the
country "keeping things (Islamically – the way the IRI likes it)
safe." It's true that a lot of the young men who get pulled into the
basij do it for the 'benefits' like getting into college and finding a
job and maybe even because all their friends are doing it, but times like this seem to really put one's commitment to the test. A few blocks before the checkpoint traffic is directed over to one lane and you are instructed to drive past a number of men who are oftentimes camouflaged and usually have batons and occasionally a machine gun.

If you’re lucky one of these men will ask you where you’re going and what you’re doing and where you’ve been, and if you’re really lucky, he’ll tell you to pull over, whence you’ll be asked by a fatter man the same questions. If you’re really, really lucky you’ll then have your car searched, while you stand aside and see how long your luck will last.

The past two nights the car I was in made it to stage two, i.e. the second man -- older and fatter -- who repeats the same questions, but our luck ended there and we were told to go along. I don’t know if it helped that all four of us were on the verge of shitting ourselves from fear and shouting out our excuses, but we weren’t searched.

If you’re having trouble picturing what this is like, imagine this: an
America where the neo-cons are running things and, after an election where they don’t like the results and the ensuing unrest in the country, they call upon the most right-wing, conservative, crazy men to make sure the streets are safe. These men are given uniforms, batons, shields, guns, and authority. Some are told to stay at a certain position; others are told to drive around with their friends on their motorcycles in big, noisy packs. This is fairly similar to what’s going on here – only these guys are way hairier.

If you think this sounds both ridiculous and terrifying, you’re right.

Just to reinforce that last point, let me tell you what happened to a friend of a friend last night. He and his wife were driving home when they came across a checkpoint and were told to pull over. A boy not older than thirteen and dressed in camouflage then came over and asked the man who was driving for his documentations for his car. The man told him to go get someone older because he wasn’t about to have to prove his ownership of the vehicle to a middle-school-aged child. A few minutes later an older basiji came over and asked for the documents, and then asked the man to open the trunk. He found a poster of Mousavi and started giving the driver trouble and asking him why he has this poster. He responded by saying that it was from before the election and, anyway, since when was it a problem to have a poster of a presidential candidate who declared the not-president less than a
week ago? After a short argument and torn poster the man was told to go on his way. Pretty lucky considering what could have happened.

Anyway, tonight, unlike the previous two nights, mobile phones worked past 6:00pm (with the exception of text messaging, of course). There have been two more huge rallies during the day in support of Mousavi in Tehran and Saturday there is supposed to be another one. Tomorrow everyone is to stay in. As for the nighttime street chaos - two nights ago in the western part of the city apparently all hell broke loose and people blew up a few cars and tore up sidewalks to throw at the militias who ran away.

No one seems to know how long this will go on for or what the end
result will be. The optimists think it will lead to definite changes,
while the pessimists are waiting for the government to crackdown hard and start killing. The next few days should be quite telling.

And here's an earlier dispatch from June 17:

This is a protest. No slogans. No shouting. Be quiet. This was the only noise that I heard yesterday -- June 16th -- on Valiasr Street in Tehran. The crowd wasn’t as large as the prior day where perhaps a million people gathered between Azadi and Enqelab
Squares, but it was significant. It filled the street for over a couple kilometers and brought traffic and business to a total standstill; thousands of people and not a single scream or one person shouting slogans. Those are to be saved for the rooftop, at night from 10:30 -- 12:00.

I don’t know what media there is saying, but there is a marked
difference between these protests and what goes on at night. The
burning of tires, clashes with the Basijis, and general destruction
that has taken place isn’t what these people are going for.

Everyone that I spoke with condemned that and most of them questioned who the real perpetrators of it have been. Even the official televised news denies that the people who have broken bank windows and burned cars are real supporters of Mousavi. Of course, this is immediately before they tell everyone that Obama and the presidents of most European countries support the rioters, who are enemies of the state.

Don’t listen to anything that that tells you that the green movement here wants to get rid of the Islamic part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. From what I can tell, people want reforms and change – not upheaval. They don’t buy the numbers that the government has fed them from the election and they’re not about to stop and step aside. I don’t know how long this will go on, but I don’t think it’s about to stop soon.

Those who have questioned the legitimacy of this movement seem to conveniently overlook the fact that the state is doing all it can to shut everyone up. Yesterday, in addition to blocking SMS messages – which has been going on since Friday – all mobile phone service in Tehran was cut off until the morning. BBC Persian is completely jammed and even with a filter breaker it’s very difficult to get a decent internet connection. If you’re wondering where the pictures are, this is the reason.

Since Twitter started getting coverage for its role in the goings-on in Iran, commentators have expressed concern over which Twitter feeds are fake, and whether Twitter could be used to spread disinformation. The unofficial Twitter watchdog Twitspam has a list of "fake Iran election tweeters," and their feeds make for fascinating examples of reverse propaganda in action.

Their techniques have different approaches and levels of subtelty. Some simply make up silly stories, like one user's claim "BREAKINGNEWS: Ahmedinejads plane take off from Russia 2 hours ago & lost over BlackSea! Does he know how to swim? confrmation?" or another's insistence that "Mussavi concedes, pleads halt to protest." Others take a more egotistical approach, such as this user generously volunteering to become the leader: "Saturday - small groups organized by "ERAN SPAHBOD RUSTAM" will attack government buildings and basij.women,children stay home." Finally, some Tweeters, in their rush to spread violence, seem rather unclear as to correct grammatical usage of Arabic words: "Get a mask and gloves - lets intifada tonight on the streets of Teheran - My group will barricade one street. Make your group 2. kick ass"

The most pernicious fake Twitter user, though, has been Persian_Guy, who's not only provided fake news ( "Mussavi overheard: 'We don't need a black man's help, that's humiliating, at least not arab.'") and calls for violence (""non-Iranian Arabs waving Hamas/Hezbollah flags around the protests. Kill Arabs now, they are scums!"), but has even brought Twitter into the fake narrative. According to this user, "Twitter's staff are ecstatic by what's happening in Iran, "We're so glad there's chaos in Iran, finally Twitter is 'useful.'"" Somehow, I doubt that will endear him to his fellow Tweeters.

David Paul Morris/Getty Images

I see that a number of people are still throwing up their hands, unsure if the Iranian election was really fraudulent.

Give me a break, folks. It's true that Ahmadinejad is popular. But he's just not that popular. There's no need to throw up our hands and say, "Aw shucks, it's all too complicated and we'll never know if he really got 24 million votes." This was fraud on a massive scale.

The Guardian is now reporting that many towns in Iran reported turnout figures in excess of their population:

In the most specific allegations of rigging yet to emerge, the centrist Ayandeh website – which stayed neutral during the campaign – reported that 26 provinces across the country showed participation figures so high they were either hitherto unheard of in democratic elections or in excess of the number of registered electors.

Taft, a town in the central province of Yazd, had a turnout of 141%, the site said, quoting an unnamed "political expert". Kouhrang, in Chahar Mahaal Bakhtiari province, recorded a 132% turnout while Chadegan, in Isfahan province, had 120%.

Ayandeh's source said at least 200 polling stations across Iran recorded participation rates of 95% or above. "This is generally considered scientifically impossible because out of every given cohort of 20 voters, there will be at least one who is either ill, out of the country, has recently died or is unable to participate for some other reasons," the source said. "It is also unprecedented in the history of Iran and all other democratic countries."

The claims are impossible to verify, but they are consistent with comments made by a former Iranian interior minister, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, who said on Tuesday that 70 polling stations returned more completed ballot papers than the number of locally eligible voters.

But even if we can't verify such reports, common sense ought to suffice to persuade us that Ahmadinejad and co. cheated. As one Iranian intellectual put it, "A president that has received 24 million votes doesn't need to imprison hundreds of people and cut all lines of communication."

Most Iranians seem to grasp this point intuitively. Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American journalist and author of The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, explained at an event yesterday why the rigging has Iranians so upset. "The vote is the one thing Iranians still had," he said, saying that presidential elections -- within the parameters set by the Guardian Council -- had generally been considered fair until now. "There's a rage that comes from that."

Guess it wouldn't be a proper rally without Ché:

Also found this one strangely unsettling:

Found these and many more great images on Hamed Saber's Picasa gallery.

(via Twitter of course.)

The ongoing tumult in Iran over the country's election results got another jolt of international attention today, as members of the Iranian soccer team wore green wristbands to their World Cup qualifying match with South Korea — in a show of support for opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi.

AFP/Getty Images

The Iranian regime's crackdown is proceeding apace, with new detentions of reformist leaders and new restrictions on journalists and social networking tools.

As always, treat unconfirmed report with caution. This from the Guardian:

There were also unconfirmed reports that Mohammad Asgari, who was responsible for the security of the IT network in Iran's interior ministry, was killed yesterday in a suspicious car accident in Tehran. Asgari had reportedly leaked evidence that the elections were rigged to alter the votes from the provinces. Asgari was said to have leaked information that showed Mousavi had won almost 19m votes, and should therefore be president.

The article also notes that Isfahan's prosector general -- who seems like a real peach -- warned that the penalty for organizing protests could be death. "We warn the few elements controlled by foreigners who try to disrupt domestic security by inciting individuals to destroy and to commit arson that the Islamic penal code for such individuals waging war against God is execution," he said.

Also of note: Ayatollah Khamenei reportedly referred to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's "elected president," which tells you as much as you need to know about the integrity of this recount business.

And here, via NIAC, is an intriguing nugget from Reza Aslan:

Some of my sources in Iran have told me that Ayatollah Rafsanjani, who is the head of the Assembly of Experts — the eighty-six member clerical body that decides who will be the next Supreme Leader, and is, by the way, the only group that is empowered to remove the Supreme Leader from power — that they have issued an emergency meeting in Qom.Now, Anderson, I have to tell you, there’s only one reason for the Assembly of Experts to meet at this point, and that is to actually talk about what to do about Khamenei. So, this is what I’m saying, is that we’re talking about the very legitimacy, the very foundation of the Islamic Republic is up in the air right now. It’s hard to say what this is going to go.

Are we approaching a point where political information is processed so fast that an event happens, information elites weigh in to shape the discourse surrounding it, the conventional wisdom is communicated to Congress, and elected leaders formulate reactions based on public opinion... all before most of even the formerly plugged in members of the public ever learn what on earth is going on, or have a chance to form an opinion? Is anyone who works at a company that blocks their Facebook feed going to be meaningfully disadvantaged in the political process? Egalitarian concerns aside, are the information elites going to set a course, ossify as they always do in their opinions, and influence the nation's course too hastily? Are we on course for a kind of political singularity?

In short, no.

Let's remember that those of us who are obsessively following Iranian Twitter feeds and refreshing NIAC, Andrew Sullivan, Nico Pitney, and The Lede are kind of freaks. And the truth is, we don't really need to know all of the details we're sorting through when we do -- we're just fascinated by what is going on in Iran and want to stay on top of the news. For most folks, the Nazila Fathi/Michael Slackman stories offer plenty of rich information and context, while filtering out details.

Given the agency's, er, controversial past in the country, the best thing the CIA can do for the cause of regime change in Iran right now is probably to stay as far away as possible. But CQ's Jeff Stein reports that the U.S. intelligence community is looking to take advantage of this week's situation:

Iran's political crisis provides the CIA with an opportunity to provoke the defection of Iranian military, intelligence and diplomatic representatives abroad.

(After the Soviet Union crushed the "Prague Spring" in 1968, Czech officials defected in droves to the CIA.)

How it handles a similar scenario now, and the possible windfall of inside information on the Iranian leadership and its nuclear program, will be far more beneficial than clumsy attempts to manipulate the protests sweeping Tehran.    

The big Iran news today is that the Guardian Council, the clerical body that oversees elections and is controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has agreed to recount certain ballots disputed by Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign.

This is, of course, a ruse -- a delaying tactic meant to divide the opposition by peeling off its most moderate members. Mousavi wants a complete annulment of Friday's official results.

Also of note: Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani -- who has congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his "victory" -- blamed the interior ministry for the recent attacks on students at Tehran University.

Hossein Ali Montazeri -- Iran's most prominent "dissident ayatollah" -- is now telling the protesters to use peaceful means to express their grievances. I'm not sure how influential Montazeri, once thought to be Khomenei's heir, really is today, but his opinion surely carries some weight. There's still no word from Rafsanjani. [UPDATE: Translation of Montazeri's statement.]

Finally, I'm sad to learn that reformist cleric Mohammad Ali Abtahi has reportedly been arrested. I've been reading his blog sporadically for years, but it seems to be offline now. Abtahi, a former Khatami deputy who backed Karroubi in these elections, was frequently quoted in the Western press.

It will be interesting to see what happens during today's dueling demonstrations, and whether Mousavi's call for a general strike is being observed. State media has called on Iranians to protest against "outlaws," and Mousavi is reportedly telling his supporters not to demonstrate today. Still, that's what he said yesterday -- and people came out in droves anyway. It's not clear to what extent he controls this movement.

One ominous sign that Ahmadinejad thinks he has this situation under control? He went ahead with a planned trip to Russia despite the unrest back home. I see that he met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Perhaps the two of them compared notes on how to steal an election?

VLADIMIR RODIONOV/AFP/Getty Images

Looks like it's not over yet in Iran. Wow:

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images

Three Middle East experts weigh in on the situation in Iran, and what the United States should do about it. Versions of the first two comments were originally posted to a private listserv and are reprinted here with permission:

F. Gregory Gause III:

I know that it is way early, and we have to see how things develop, but let's assume that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the clerical elite get away with the power grab. What does Washington do? Put the outreach to Iran on hold?

I'll start with a provocation: I think that the diplomatic outreach should continue as it started. It would be great if there were real democracy in Iran and the United States did not have to deal with the execrable incumbent president. But American interests here are not about Iranian domestic politics. They are about Iran's role in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli arena, and the nuclear program.

I acknowledge that it would be much easier to come to some understanding on these issues with a different, more representative Iranian government. But it looks like we might not get that. So the United States might as well try to engage the incumbents in order to see if it can get some kind of deal on at least some of these issues that will help avoid a confrontation down the road.

America deals with all sorts of governments whose domestic arrangements are, to put it mildly, less than compatible with American ideals. (The Saudis are Exhibit A.) I think that's how to deal with Iran.

F. Gregory Gause III is professor of political science at the University of Vermont and author of Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States.

Wayne White:

As a former advocate of robust engagement with Iran, I will throw my two cents into the discussion suggested by Greg Gause, if somewhat hesitantly at this early stage of what is unfolding in Tehran.

I would have preferred to wait to see the full extent of the evidence (or lack thereof) concerning what appears to be a relatively more determined and forceful power grab in Tehran before doing so, but what real harm is there in airing some of my concerns -- concerns that incline me toward an admittedly rather tentative conclusion at variance with that of my friend Greg Gause?

In order to have an effective dialogue, the other party must have a certain measure of credibility. One must be able to trust that such a dialogue is being conducted in reasonably good faith, not just a far less promising "going through the motions" affair. If we have witnessed an unprecedented, bare-knuckled power grab overseen by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, what does that tell us about his inclinations about meaningful compromise on the nuclear issue?

In Iran, there always has been, of course, some separation between domestic and foreign affairs, as with many largely authoritarian governments. Yet, it could be that Khamenei is considerably more hard-line on the nuclear issue than was previously thought. I realize that his motivations for engaging in what many say now has been unusually interventionist behavior to keep Ahmadinejad in office almost certainly would have been domestic, but can we exclude the possibility that the nuclear account played into this as well -- or other issues that could well come up in a more generalized dialogue with Iran?

As a result, I question the prudence of simply plowing ahead on engagement as if nothing has changed the potential state of play between Tehran and Washington (if our worst fears pan out about what has happened in Iran). One reason, albeit certainly not the only one, that I have been a strong advocate of dialogue is to avert an Israeli attack on Iran. Because of that factor alone, many readers might be unmoved by what I've tapped out above.

However, whereas I had no qualms about engagement before -- even had Ahmadinejad been largely legitimately elected -- I now do have a measure of hesitation (pending, of course, a full accounting of what has transpired concerning the election). Unless the shock in so many quarters over the election's outcome turns out to be largely the result of wishful thinking on the part of those who yearned to be rid of an Ahmadinejad presidency (me included), I do not believe the equation remains necessarily unchanged regarding engagement.

Should the worst interpretation of the election and its aftermath turn out to be true, even I might conclude in time that those adverse developments are still outweighed by the need for engagement. At the moment, though, I am experiencing some hesitation about simply waving aside what we may have witnessed in Iran and moving forward toward serious negotiations with such a government.

Wayne White is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and was head of the State Department's Iraq intelligence team from 2003 to 2005.

Trita Parsi:

Few doubt that the results presented by the interior minister are rigged. In fact, there are increasing questions as to whether the votes were ever even counted. If this were really a landslide in favor of Ahmadinejad, where are those 63 percent of the people right now? Shouldn't they be celebrating their victory on the streets?

Clearly, the anti-Ahmadinejad camp has been taken by surprise and is scrambling for a plan. Increasingly, given their failure to get Khamenei to intervene, their only option seems to be to directly challenge -- or threaten to challenge -- the supreme leader.

Here's where the powerful chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Mousavi supporter Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, comes in. Only this assembly has the formal authority to call for Khamenei's dismissal, and it is now widely assumed that Rafsanjani is quietly assessing whether he has the votes to do so or not.

It may be that the first steps toward challenging Khamenei have already been taken. After all, Mousavi went over the supreme leader's head with an open letter to the clergy in Qom. Rafsanjani clearly failed to win Khamenei's support in a reported meeting between the two men Friday, but the influential Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, who heads the vote-monitoring committee for Mousavi and fellow candidate Mehdi Karroubi, has officially requested that the Guardian Council cancel the election and schedule a new vote with proper monitoring.

The implications for Washington's agenda, meanwhile, could be extensive. Although the United States is pursuing diplomacy with Iran in its own self-interest, electoral fraud (or the perception of fraud) complicates this strategy. And if political paralysis reigns in Iran, valuable time to address the nuclear issue through diplomacy will be lost. The White House's posture thus far is a constructive one -- while it cannot remain indifferent to irregularities in the elections, it must be careful never to get ahead of the Iranian people and the anti-Ahmadinejad candidates.

Finally, the Iranian-American community is deeply concerned about the situation. Sporadic protests have been taken place worldwide, including in Washington, D.C. Last week's campaigning -- with unprecedented debates, genuine grassroots mobilization, and major voter participation in the elections -- raised hopes that Iran was moving in a democratic direction, but the developments of the past 24 hours have dramatically changed the mood in the community.

Trita Parsi is founder and president of the National Iranian American Council and author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the U.S.

Update (2):

Joe Cirincione weighs in:

This is not the election result anyone but Iranian and Israeli hardliners hoped for. But all is not lost. While the Iranian leadership remains the same-at least for now-trends in the country and the region may still help President Obama's strategy to contain and engage Iran.

Post election, the Obama administration faces the same diplomatic challenges with Iran as before -- chief among them containing Iran's nuclear program. While Mir Hossein Mousavi, the reformist hope, might have been able to reverse the fierce nationalistic politics Mahmoud Ahmadinejad injected into the Iranian nuclear issue, the ultimate arbitrator of Iran's policy is neither man, but the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 

As Carnegie Endowment scholar Karim Sadjadpour notes, "We should be clear about what we're dealing with.  Just as we deal with Assad's Syria and Mubarak's Egypt, we now have to deal with Khamanei's Iran." 

Despite the unfortunate result, the process of engagement must continue and the illusion of quick military or coercive options rejected. We do not negotiate with countries as a reward, but as a normal part of statecraft. The new challenge is to balance support for reformist and democratic movements in Iran with strategic diplomacy with Iran's leaders.

Senior administration officials struck the right chords with their comments over the weekend. "The administration will deal with the situation we have, not what we wish it to be," said one senior official. The task remains the same -- we must engage Iran in order to contain its nuclear program and channel its regional ambitions.

Obama's pragmatic approach should follow three simultaneous tracks: bilateral and multilateral talks over regional issues of common concern (Iraq and Afghanistan, chief among them); formal P5+1 talks with the other Security Council members and Iran on the nuclear program; and bilateral discussions on the broader US-Iranian relationship. 

Contrary to what critics may argue, this does not imply caving in or giving away the store. This is hard-headed strategic diplomacy that has worked in the past to convince other countries to end nuclear. There are three developments that offer some promise that such an approach could succeed with Iran. 

First, the election has exposed deep fissures in Iranian society and deep distrust of the ruling regime. Despite their triumphalist rhetoric, Iran's leaders must be troubled by the growing opposition to their dictatorial rule.  The BBC reports that the situation inside Iran "is becoming unpredictable and potentially explosive." There is no telling where this could lead. Even if the protests subside, pragmatists among the elite may now push for greater accommodation with the West -- including compromise on the nuclear program -- in order to open trade and relieve the national economic distress that fueled Mousavi's unlikely rise.

Second, the continued pursuit of nuclear weapon capability carries risks for Iran. An Israeli military strike is one, but more ultimately menacing may be the reaction of Iran's Muslim neighbors. In the past three years, over a dozen Middle Eastern states have suddenly expressed interest in their own civilian nuclear programs, including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is not about reducing their carbon footprint, it is a hedge against Iran. Iran's leaders have an interest in ending this nascent nuclear arms race before it is faced with multiple, nuclear-armed adversaries.

Third, Obama's Cairo speech demonstrated the renewed appeal of American ideals and began to rebuild ties to the Muslim world damaged by the brutal and unnecessary invasion of Iraq. Obama can back up his words with deeds through bold cuts in U.S. and Russian arsenals to show that the is serious about the global elimination of nuclear weapons, with serious efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with support for the democratic aspirations of all Muslim people, and with the continued withdrawal from Iraq and new campaigns against violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan that do not rely primarily on military attacks. If he can take these steps, Obama could undercut the appeal of Ahmadinejad's brand of anti-Americanism in the greater Middle East.

The patience and balance that Obama has show thus far in his Iran approach must continue. There was never any indication that the president thought this was going to be quick or easy. The Iranian nuclear program built up a fierce momentum in recent years thanks to Bush's bungled efforts to overthrow the regime. It will take some years to slow and reverse this deadly direction.

Joseph Cirincione is President of Ploughshares Fund and author of Bomb Scare:  The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons.

UPDATE: FP's David Rothkopf weighs in. "Since governments rather than general populations control nuclear programs, shouldn't the recent events give us reason to reconsider our recent drift toward acceptance of Iran's nuclear aspirations?," he asks.

Photo: AFP/Getty Images

After a very exciting week, it appears increasingly likely that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will once again be Iran's president. 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently just pronounced the election results -- deemed suspect by Iran analysts -- a "divine assessment." And his word is final.

Mir Hossain Mousavi, the challenger, has been unyielding in declaring the official results a farce. He insists he's the winner. "I'm warning I will not surrender to this dangerous charade. The result of such performance by some officials will jeopardize the pillars of the Islamic Republic and will establish tyranny," he said, in a statement cited by Reuters.

But just a few thousand of Mousavi's supporters defied government orders and protested in Tehran Saturday. Security forces sent them packing and threatened arrests. Meanwhile, Mousavi's press conference was mysteriously canceled, and there are unconfirmed reports that he was told in no uncertain terms to concede defeat.

And here's where "anyone but Ahmadinejad" probably isn't enough. People may be willing to form a human chain in the streets and wear green when such activities are sanctioned by the regime in the context of an election campaign. But are any but Mousavi's most ardent supporters willing to risk arrest, or even death, to see him elected? I tend to doubt it. The man just isn't that inspiring.

This is Iran, of course, and therefore anything could happen. According to some reports, Mousavi has called on his supporters to rally Saturday evening. But my gut tells me that it's game over.

As Rand's Alireza Nader put it, "The power of the traditional ruling elite -- men such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani -- has been effectively challenged by Ahmadinejad and his supporters, including top-ranking and fundamentalist members of the Revolutionary Guards."

This was hardball, and Ahmadinejad and Khamenei [appear to have] won.

As for the Obama administration's efforts to engage Iran, this is a huge setback. Because now, the U.S. will be dealing with a government that just stole an election, and used violence and threats of violence to enforce the results it wanted. Or, if the opposition does mobilize, there could be months of paralysis while the nuclear clock keeps ticking.

UPDATE: Several Iran hands emailed to say that I'm calling this way too early. As one of them put it, "Remember we haven't heard [from] Rafsanjani at all yet, or Khatami."

Of course, I'm not 100 percent sure that it's over. But the early signs don't look good for the Mousavi camp. Why weren't they able to put more people into the streets?