Since yesterday's item on Chas Freeman, more commentators have sallied forth to attack and defend President Obama's controversial pick to run the National Intelligence Council.

In today's Wall Street Journal, Gabriel Schoenfeld of the Witherspoon Institute says that Obama wants to place "a China-coddling Israel basher in charge of drafting the most important analyses prepared by the U.S. government." He argues that Schoenfeld's views on China should worry us as much as his thoughts about Israel and ties to Saudi Arabia:

On the massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989, Mr. Freeman unabashedly sides with the Chinese government, a remarkable position for an appointee of an administration that has pledged to advance the cause of human rights. Mr. Freeman has been a participant in ChinaSec, a confidential Internet discussion group of China specialists. A copy of one of his postings was provided to me by a former member. "The truly unforgivable mistake of the Chinese authorities," he wrote there in 2006, "was the failure to intervene on a timely basis to nip the demonstrations in the bud." Moreover, "the Politburo's response to the mob scene at 'Tiananmen' stands as a monument to overly cautious behavior on the part of the leadership, not as an example of rash action." Indeed, continued Mr. Freeman, "I do not believe it is acceptable for any country to allow the heart of its national capital to be occupied by dissidents intent on disrupting the normal functions of government, however appealing to foreigners their propaganda may be."

The Daily Beast's Ashley Rindsberg explains another political strike against Freeman, his past business dealings with the bin Laden family:

As chairman of Projects International Inc., a company that develops international business deals, Mr. Freeman asserted in an interview with the Associated Press less than a month after September 11 that he was still “discussing proposals with the Binladen Group—and that won't change.”

In the same interview, Freeman also contested the notion that international companies who had business with the bin Laden family should be “running for public-relations cover,” noting that bin Laden was still “a very honored name in the kingdom [of Saudi Arabia]”, despite its family tie to the Al-Qaeda leader.

The New Republic's Martin Peretz adds his take, calling Freeman "bigoted and out of touch."

The Nation's Robert Dreyfuss defends Freeman here calling the campaign against him "scurrilous":

If the campaign by the neocons, friends of the Israeli far right, and their allies against Freeman succeeds, it will have enormous repercussions. If the White House caves in to their pressure, it will signal that President Obama's even-handedness in the Arab-Israeli dispute can't be trusted. Because if Obama can't defend his own appointee against criticism from a discredited, fringe movement like the neoconservatives, how can the Arabs expect Obama to be able to stand up to Israel's next prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu? 

My co-blogger David Rothkopf also takes up the issue, noting that while he vehemently disagrees with Freeman's views on Israel, Saudi Arabia, and China, his continued willingness to utter uncomfortable truths to power make him the perfect pick for Obama's intelligence briefer:

Part of the reason he is so controversial is that he has zero fear of speaking what he perceives to be truth to power. You can't cow him and you can't find someone with a more relentlessly questioning worldview. His job will be to help present the president and top policymakers with informed analysis by which they can make their choices. His intellectual honesty and his appreciation for what is necessary in a functioning policy process is such that he will not stack the deck for any one position. He wouldn't last five minutes in the job if he did.  (And Denny Blair, the wise and canny Director of National Intelligence wouldn't tolerate it.) Further, the chairman of the NIC does not directly whisper into the president's ear in a void. He helps prepare materials that will become the fodder for active debate among a national security team that is devoid of shrinking violets.  

FP's Laura Rozen is also following the Freeman debate closely. Stay tuned to "The Cable" for more details as they emerge.

David Silverman/Getty Images News

A number of reports out of Asia today add precious little clarity to what is becoming a growing international story: Israel's alleged bombing on September 6 of nuclear materials of North Korean origin in Syria. First, South Korean and Japanese officials mysteriously said that the next round six-party talks to end North Korea's nuclear program, which had been scheduled for September 19, are being delayed. Japanese officials told the Associated Press they did not know why Pyongyang delayed the talks. However, AFP reported that South Korean officials said the talks were pushed back because the Chinese had yet to deliver 50,000 tons of fuel, as they agreed to do in February. An unidentified South Korean foreign ministry official said:

It appears the North's refusal is a simple protest against something it is not happy with, rather than to squeeze more out of the others.

News of the delay was unexpected, given Kim Jong Il's recent cooperative moves. It's also suspicious, as the most likely reasons for a delay would seem to be related to the charge North Korea was providing nuclear assistance to Syria. That connection was disputed by Joseph Cirincione here, but the story continues to gain traction in the British press, with detailed new reports over the weekend alleging the North Korea-Syria axis. On Saturday, U.S. nuclear negotiator Chris Hill didn't directly address the allegations, but told reporters the plan in any case was to press ahead with the six-party talks. On Sunday, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates neither denied nor confirmed the allegations, but said that the U.S. was watching both North Korea and Syria closely.

Then on Monday morning, Seoul's foreign minister dismissed any nuclear connection between North Korea and Syria. Granted, this could be an effort by the South Koreans to salvage the talks the progress made in the last year, and the upcoming summit between the two Koreas. But given the sensational quality of the reports—clandestine air strikes, dumped fuel tanks on the Turkish border, secret nuclear caches and such—this story is not likely to disappear.

AFP/Stringer

There's so much going on in Dafna Linzer's WaPo piece today about U.S. intel on Iran, it's hard to know where to start. First, there's the incredible admission by the State Dept. that a junior foreign service officer was tasked with finding Iranians the United States can slap with sanctions for having connections to the country's nuclear program.

The junior officer's intel-gathering method: Googling "Iran and nuclear" and then passing on the names that come up. Then there's the territorial cat-fighting going on between State and the CIA, which refuses to check the Googled names against their own intel because they don't want to give up their trade secrets.

That left the State Dept. in the unenviable position of recommending to the U.N. Security Council on Friday that 12 Iranians found to have some tenuous connection to the nuclear program (again, because they came up in a Google search) be hit with sanctions. The CIA wouldn't help, but someone told Linzer that:

None of the 12 Iranians that the State Department eventually singled out for potential bans on international travel and business dealings is believed by the CIA to be directly connected to Iran's most suspicious nuclear activities.

Good work, everyone. There's nothing that says "intelligence reform" less than relying on Google searches and refusing to share information between organizations. The Google thing really cracks me up. If the folks at State trust Google so much, perhaps they should check out what a search for "failure" gets them.

The U.S. intelligence community has taken a beating in some quarters for its National Intelligence Estimate (pdf) on Iran's nuclear program, which was released to the public last December. CFR.org recently got a hold of Thomas Fingar, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the body that produced the NIE in question.

Fingar says they would have framed the NIE differently had they known it was going to be made public:

There's been talk that the Iran NIE was narrowly written, excluding the civilian capabilities, excluding ballistic missile testing or capabilities, and I wonder if you can respond to those claims. And to follow, do you think it was poorly written? Would you have done it differently if you could?

No, we dealt at length with the centrifuge enrichment, and dealt with the missile program. It was not a narrowly crafted [document] — people are reacting to a two-and-a-half-page summary of a 140-page document with almost 1,500 source notes. And believe it or not, you can't fit the whole book on the book jacket. Was it badly written? The [still classified] estimate itself is very well written. The key judgments, knowing what we do now about the way in which they were spun, perceived, used by folks when released — if we thought for a minute they would be released, which we didn't, we would have framed them somewhat differently. The judgments would be the same. But we would have framed them somewhat differently that says: “Dear readers [not] following this: You can't have a bomb unless you have fissile material, [and] the Iranians continue to develop fissile material. A weapon is not much good if you can't deliver it—they have a missile-development program. But you don't have a bomb unless you can produce a device and weaponize it. That's what's stopped."

Read the whole thing.

Iran's Al-Kawthar TV aired a TV drama earlier this month called Remember Your Dreams, or Guantanamo, which purports to show how photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo were made public by a fictional Gitmo detainee. The storyline, as best as I can understand it, goes a little something like this:

Innocent man is detained at Gitmo. Innocent man (a doctor with Doctors Without Borders, no less) is horrifically abused by maniacal U.S. Army major. Sample exchange:

Mustafa Nasser [in Arabic]: "I have the right to an attorney, or at least treat me according to the Geneva Convention."

Major Rosenthal: "The Geneva Convention is implemented on prisoners of war, and not on dirty terrorists like yourself, who are responsible for the destruction of the Twin Towers."

Detainee is pitied by kindly U.S. female translator, but she cannot save him from the brutality of the major.

Doctor: [Standing over detainee] After going on his food strike, he became very weak, so he fell on the back of his head and broke his skull....What about we watch the baseball game tonight?"

Major Rosenthal: "Not on that TV set in your room."

So far, lots of liberties taken, but they're playing to their audience, right? Well, the action quickly goes from the realm of sadly possible to the realm of "what the..?". The rest of the plot is a tad hard to follow from MEMRI's translation of selected scenes, but it seems to go something like this: Kindly U.S. translator smuggles abuse photos out of Gitmo, Army major (who is apparently a corporate security kingpin of some kind whose online password is "satan") engages in a shootout in Beirut with the detainee (who has since been released), there's a random Lord of the Rings reference, and someone rapes an Islamic woman for no reason. Confused? Me, too. Have a look for yourself.

JOHN D MCHUGH/AFP/Getty Images

Canadian troops may have finally stopped handing off detainees to the Afghan authorities. That policy—always suspect from a human rights perspective—was the product of twin realities. First, NATO states such as Canada hated the optics of handing detainees to the Americans, what with Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo still on people's minds. Second, the Canadians, British, and Dutch troops fighting in southern Afghanistan had no desire to get into the detention business themselves.

The solution? Shuffle off detainees to the Afghans and pretend that the treatment they're getting is better than they'd get with the Americans. The policy protects delicate European sensibilities but does little to safeguard prisoners or to help NATO get good intelligence on Taliban activities (though I have been told by people in the know that captured Taliban fighters occasionally "fall off" NATO trucks and end up in American hands).

The issue of prisoners in Afghanistan has always struck me as a nettlesome problem that could easily become an important opportunity. My suggestion? Create a jointly run NATO/Afghan detention center in Kandahar or some other locale in southern Afghanistan. Use the detention center to simultaneously train Afghan police and interrogators (which we're doing anyway) and to hash out a common NATO policy on detention that can ease suspicions within the alliance while producing at least some actionable intelligence.

Thus far, American obstinacy and European fecklessness have scuppered common sense solutions. It's well past time to work together.

Answer: Anyone. The Washington Post is reporting that over the weekend the White House and its House allies successfully watered down an earlier version of the military commissions bill to include a less restrictive description of how the government could designate civilians as "unlawful enemy combatants."

The [unlawful enemy combatant] definition applies to foreigners living inside or outside the United States and does not rule out the possibility of designating a U.S. citizen as an unlawful combatant.

That means that anyone the government decides "has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States" [ital mine] or its military allies can be detained indefinitely. In other words, a U.S. citizen in the United States. And they've successfully defined the "battlefield" as anywhere and everywhere. Plus, if Congress writes and passes it, it's unlikely the Supreme Court would step in and declare the definition unconstitutional. I'm less enthused by this military commissions compromise by the minute.   

Rolls Royce

Earlier, this year, I attended Jane's U.S. Defense Conference, an annual event packed with security analysts and the defense contractors who love them. One of the more interesting topics discussed was the trend of Western militaries relying increasingly on commercial—rather than exclusively military—supply chains. In practice, this means that, say, U.S. combat vehicles include more and more parts that are manufactured by firms that aren't strictly "defense contractors." In some cases, it can mean that such vehicles even share parts with commercial, non-military cars, trucks, and planes.

This can be cheaper for American taxpayers and more efficient for the military, but it comes with risks. Consider this: The London Times reports that hackers based in China recently tried to break into the IT systems of Rolls Royce, which manufactures engines for British, U.S., and NATO combat platforms and in fact claims to be the "number two military aero engine manufacturer in the world." Notably, Rolls Royce engines are to power the advanced Joint Strike Fighter, the U.S. Air Force's new baby. There are obvious implications for the military balance of power here. China's jet fighters are getting better, but they're still behind. But manufacturing airplane engines is notoriously difficult, and the Chinese are no doubt eager to learn trade secrets from Western firms.

And Rolls Royce could be just the tip of the iceberg. Internet security firm McAfee reports that China is foremost among 120 countries that are experimenting with cyber warfare capabilities. And firms that supply parts to Western militaries obviously represent fat targets for Chinese snoops or saboteurs. Rolls Royce has supplied the British Royal Air Force for many years, so presumably it is no stranger to the security game; but when it comes to more recent entrants, do we really know how secure these supply chains are?

Are you concerned that some crazy nation might fire a nuclear weapon at the United States? Maybe Iran or North Korea? The Pentagon isn't.

In fact, the Pentagon is so sure that the United States is safe from nuclear attack, it's closing down its fortified airspace and missile defense bunker, commonly known as Cheyenne Mountain, over the next two years. Located deep inside a mountain outside Colorado Springs, Colo., Cheyenne Mountain was built in the 1960s. It is capable of withstanding a nuclear blast and is equipped for medium-term subterranean living, with such features as a 6 million gallon water reservoir and air filters that cleanse incoming air of nuclear particles.

But the Pentagon believes the Mountain is no longer necessary. NORAD commander Adm. Tim Keeting says U.S. intelligence "leads us to believe a missile attack from China or Russia is very unlikely." Of course, this the same intelligence that told us Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. So just in case, the Pentagon intends to keep the mountain on "warm standby."

This is a move only the Pentagon could make. Since 9/11, it has spent some $700 million renovating and updating Cheyenne Mountain, and moving the 1,100 people who work inside the Mountain out will cost tens of millions more.

AELX WONG/Getty Images News

Famed investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, who has a new piece in the New Yorker, had some very interesting things to say in an interview with Der Spiegel last week. Topics ranged from Hitler to the First Amendment in the United States, but his most interesting comments were on Iran and Iraq. On how much the West knows about Iran's nuclear program:

A lot. And it's been underestimated how much the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) knows. If you follow what (IAEA head Mohamed) ElBaradei and the various reports have been saying, the Iranians have claimed to be enriching uranium to higher than a 4 percent purity, which is the amount you need to run a peaceful nuclear reactor. But the IAEA's best guess is that they are at 3.67 percent or something. The Iranians are not even doing what they claim to be doing. The IAEA has been saying all along that they've been making progress but basically, Iran is nowhere.

On Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's status inside Iran:

The reality is, he's not nearly as powerful inside the country as we like to think he is. The Revolutionary Guards have direct control over the missile program and if there is a weapons program, they would be the ones running it. Not Ahmadinejad.

On the "surge" in Iraq:

The Surge means basically that, in some way, the president has accepted ethnic cleansing, whether he's talking about it or not. When he first announced the Surge in January, he described it as a way to bring the parties together. He's not saying that any more. I think he now understands that ethnic cleansing is what is going to happen.

Unlike a lot of journalists, Hersh will publicly state what's he thinking, even if it shows political bias. What he said might not be that surprising, but it's telling because it provides an indication of what some journalist think about what's going on in the Middle East. It should be noted, however, that Hersh himself has admitted to fudging the truth a bit. So take what he says with a large grain of salt. 

An interesting story in Israel's Haaretz newspaper about the recent Israeli air strikes in Syria includes this gem:

The New York Times said Wednesday that likely targets were weapons caches Israel believed Iran was sending to Hezbollah via Syria, a claim dismissed later in the day by the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations.

"This is blah blah. This is nonsense, this is an unfounded statement. It is not up to the Israelis or anyone else to assess what we have in Syria," said Bashar Ja'afari.

Since the Pants Bomber thankfully failed to blow up Nortwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day, the United States has taken a long, hard look at the security failures that allowed him onto the plane -- particularly given that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's own father, a prominent Nigerian banker, had alerted U.S. authorities to his 23-year-old son's radicalization. Increasingly within Washington, there are calls for heads to roll. So, a straw poll: Who's it going to be?

1. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano. In a epic foot-in-mouth moment, she said the "system worked," just after the attack. 
2. Michael Leiter, the director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center. His agency failed to analyze the intelligence that might have stopped Abdulmutallab before he got on the plane. Today, the New York Daily News ran an editorial calling for his firing, noting that he did not return from vacation when the news broke on Christmas Day. It turns out that is untrue, and wagons are circling.
3. The director of the Transportation Security Administration. Alas, the position is unfilled, thanks to Sen. Jim DeMint. The conservative senator is holding up security expert Errol Southers' nomination over concerns he might allow TSA employees to unionize.

If you haven't seen this year's Oscar winner for best foreign language film, The Lives of Others, put it at the top of your Netflix queue. It's a fascinating portrait of East Germany in its twilight and the lengths to which the Stasi, the country's secret police, routinely went in order to maintain control and get ordinary Germans to inform on one another. 

The film has sparked intense international interest in the fates of former Stasi agents, a topic of much obsession in Germany since the fall of the Berlin wall. Don't miss the WSJ's look today at Axel Hilpert, a former Stasi agent who has since made a fortune in real estate. This week, he's renting out one of his luxury resorts ... for the meeting of the G8 finance ministers. 

Here are some sordid details on Hilpert's past in the secret police:

In 1986, Mr. Hilpert delivered a former East German army doctor and his wife into the Stasi's hands, according to an affidavit by a Stasi officer on the case. The couple wanted to escape to the West via Hungary. Mr. Hilpert -- who befriended them over several months -- offered the couple the use of a vacation apartment owned by [a fake company used as a front for the secret police] on Lake Balaton in Hungary. In the apartment, which was bugged, the Stasi gathered the evidence it needed about the couple's escape plans. And it then arrested them. The doctor got a four-year prison sentence, his wife six months.

The couple never even suspected Mr. Hilpert: The wife apologized to him later for the trouble caused, according to the affidavit.

Wired correspondent Sharon Weinberger has a compelling investigative piece in the New York Post about the CIA's quest for Russian helicopters to sneak into Afghanistan before the full-scale U.S. invasion. It's a tale of secrecy, corruption, Siberian cold, and credit card rewards.

Here's a bit of Weinbeger's synopsis at Wired's Danger Room:

As with many “black” programs, the contract had elements of craziness: Contracting officials paid the multimillion-dollar contract on a credit card at a local El Paso bar and then used the credit card rebate to redecorate their office; the team traveled under the guise of being private contractors; and the charter crew transporting the group abandoned the team in Russia in the middle of the night.

Ultimately, a five-year investigation into the mission led to the conviction of the Army official in charge and the contractor who bought the helicopters on charges of corruption. The two men, currently in federal prison, are appealing their convictions.

The full article is a thrilling read.

For more of Weinberger's coverage of questionable helicopter contracting, check out her April piece, "How to get a no-bid contract for Russian choppers." Turns out being a middleman in U.S.-Russian arms deals is pretty lucrative. 

When U.S. taxpayers shell out for these kinds of shenanigans, at least we're getting some entertainment value.

Above, Russian Mi-17s in 2007.

SERGEY PONOMAREV/AFP/Getty Images