Three Middle East experts weigh in on the situation in Iran, and what the United States should do about it. Versions of the first two comments were originally posted to a private listserv and are reprinted here with permission:

F. Gregory Gause III:

I know that it is way early, and we have to see how things develop, but let's assume that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the clerical elite get away with the power grab. What does Washington do? Put the outreach to Iran on hold?

I'll start with a provocation: I think that the diplomatic outreach should continue as it started. It would be great if there were real democracy in Iran and the United States did not have to deal with the execrable incumbent president. But American interests here are not about Iranian domestic politics. They are about Iran's role in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli arena, and the nuclear program.

I acknowledge that it would be much easier to come to some understanding on these issues with a different, more representative Iranian government. But it looks like we might not get that. So the United States might as well try to engage the incumbents in order to see if it can get some kind of deal on at least some of these issues that will help avoid a confrontation down the road.

America deals with all sorts of governments whose domestic arrangements are, to put it mildly, less than compatible with American ideals. (The Saudis are Exhibit A.) I think that's how to deal with Iran.

F. Gregory Gause III is professor of political science at the University of Vermont and author of Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States.

Wayne White:

As a former advocate of robust engagement with Iran, I will throw my two cents into the discussion suggested by Greg Gause, if somewhat hesitantly at this early stage of what is unfolding in Tehran.

I would have preferred to wait to see the full extent of the evidence (or lack thereof) concerning what appears to be a relatively more determined and forceful power grab in Tehran before doing so, but what real harm is there in airing some of my concerns -- concerns that incline me toward an admittedly rather tentative conclusion at variance with that of my friend Greg Gause?

In order to have an effective dialogue, the other party must have a certain measure of credibility. One must be able to trust that such a dialogue is being conducted in reasonably good faith, not just a far less promising "going through the motions" affair. If we have witnessed an unprecedented, bare-knuckled power grab overseen by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, what does that tell us about his inclinations about meaningful compromise on the nuclear issue?

In Iran, there always has been, of course, some separation between domestic and foreign affairs, as with many largely authoritarian governments. Yet, it could be that Khamenei is considerably more hard-line on the nuclear issue than was previously thought. I realize that his motivations for engaging in what many say now has been unusually interventionist behavior to keep Ahmadinejad in office almost certainly would have been domestic, but can we exclude the possibility that the nuclear account played into this as well -- or other issues that could well come up in a more generalized dialogue with Iran?

As a result, I question the prudence of simply plowing ahead on engagement as if nothing has changed the potential state of play between Tehran and Washington (if our worst fears pan out about what has happened in Iran). One reason, albeit certainly not the only one, that I have been a strong advocate of dialogue is to avert an Israeli attack on Iran. Because of that factor alone, many readers might be unmoved by what I've tapped out above.

However, whereas I had no qualms about engagement before -- even had Ahmadinejad been largely legitimately elected -- I now do have a measure of hesitation (pending, of course, a full accounting of what has transpired concerning the election). Unless the shock in so many quarters over the election's outcome turns out to be largely the result of wishful thinking on the part of those who yearned to be rid of an Ahmadinejad presidency (me included), I do not believe the equation remains necessarily unchanged regarding engagement.

Should the worst interpretation of the election and its aftermath turn out to be true, even I might conclude in time that those adverse developments are still outweighed by the need for engagement. At the moment, though, I am experiencing some hesitation about simply waving aside what we may have witnessed in Iran and moving forward toward serious negotiations with such a government.

Wayne White is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and was head of the State Department's Iraq intelligence team from 2003 to 2005.

Trita Parsi:

Few doubt that the results presented by the interior minister are rigged. In fact, there are increasing questions as to whether the votes were ever even counted. If this were really a landslide in favor of Ahmadinejad, where are those 63 percent of the people right now? Shouldn't they be celebrating their victory on the streets?

Clearly, the anti-Ahmadinejad camp has been taken by surprise and is scrambling for a plan. Increasingly, given their failure to get Khamenei to intervene, their only option seems to be to directly challenge -- or threaten to challenge -- the supreme leader.

Here's where the powerful chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Mousavi supporter Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, comes in. Only this assembly has the formal authority to call for Khamenei's dismissal, and it is now widely assumed that Rafsanjani is quietly assessing whether he has the votes to do so or not.

It may be that the first steps toward challenging Khamenei have already been taken. After all, Mousavi went over the supreme leader's head with an open letter to the clergy in Qom. Rafsanjani clearly failed to win Khamenei's support in a reported meeting between the two men Friday, but the influential Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, who heads the vote-monitoring committee for Mousavi and fellow candidate Mehdi Karroubi, has officially requested that the Guardian Council cancel the election and schedule a new vote with proper monitoring.

The implications for Washington's agenda, meanwhile, could be extensive. Although the United States is pursuing diplomacy with Iran in its own self-interest, electoral fraud (or the perception of fraud) complicates this strategy. And if political paralysis reigns in Iran, valuable time to address the nuclear issue through diplomacy will be lost. The White House's posture thus far is a constructive one -- while it cannot remain indifferent to irregularities in the elections, it must be careful never to get ahead of the Iranian people and the anti-Ahmadinejad candidates.

Finally, the Iranian-American community is deeply concerned about the situation. Sporadic protests have been taken place worldwide, including in Washington, D.C. Last week's campaigning -- with unprecedented debates, genuine grassroots mobilization, and major voter participation in the elections -- raised hopes that Iran was moving in a democratic direction, but the developments of the past 24 hours have dramatically changed the mood in the community.

Trita Parsi is founder and president of the National Iranian American Council and author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the U.S.

Update (2):

Joe Cirincione weighs in:

This is not the election result anyone but Iranian and Israeli hardliners hoped for. But all is not lost. While the Iranian leadership remains the same-at least for now-trends in the country and the region may still help President Obama's strategy to contain and engage Iran.

Post election, the Obama administration faces the same diplomatic challenges with Iran as before -- chief among them containing Iran's nuclear program. While Mir Hossein Mousavi, the reformist hope, might have been able to reverse the fierce nationalistic politics Mahmoud Ahmadinejad injected into the Iranian nuclear issue, the ultimate arbitrator of Iran's policy is neither man, but the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 

As Carnegie Endowment scholar Karim Sadjadpour notes, "We should be clear about what we're dealing with.  Just as we deal with Assad's Syria and Mubarak's Egypt, we now have to deal with Khamanei's Iran." 

Despite the unfortunate result, the process of engagement must continue and the illusion of quick military or coercive options rejected. We do not negotiate with countries as a reward, but as a normal part of statecraft. The new challenge is to balance support for reformist and democratic movements in Iran with strategic diplomacy with Iran's leaders.

Senior administration officials struck the right chords with their comments over the weekend. "The administration will deal with the situation we have, not what we wish it to be," said one senior official. The task remains the same -- we must engage Iran in order to contain its nuclear program and channel its regional ambitions.

Obama's pragmatic approach should follow three simultaneous tracks: bilateral and multilateral talks over regional issues of common concern (Iraq and Afghanistan, chief among them); formal P5+1 talks with the other Security Council members and Iran on the nuclear program; and bilateral discussions on the broader US-Iranian relationship. 

Contrary to what critics may argue, this does not imply caving in or giving away the store. This is hard-headed strategic diplomacy that has worked in the past to convince other countries to end nuclear. There are three developments that offer some promise that such an approach could succeed with Iran. 

First, the election has exposed deep fissures in Iranian society and deep distrust of the ruling regime. Despite their triumphalist rhetoric, Iran's leaders must be troubled by the growing opposition to their dictatorial rule.  The BBC reports that the situation inside Iran "is becoming unpredictable and potentially explosive." There is no telling where this could lead. Even if the protests subside, pragmatists among the elite may now push for greater accommodation with the West -- including compromise on the nuclear program -- in order to open trade and relieve the national economic distress that fueled Mousavi's unlikely rise.

Second, the continued pursuit of nuclear weapon capability carries risks for Iran. An Israeli military strike is one, but more ultimately menacing may be the reaction of Iran's Muslim neighbors. In the past three years, over a dozen Middle Eastern states have suddenly expressed interest in their own civilian nuclear programs, including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is not about reducing their carbon footprint, it is a hedge against Iran. Iran's leaders have an interest in ending this nascent nuclear arms race before it is faced with multiple, nuclear-armed adversaries.

Third, Obama's Cairo speech demonstrated the renewed appeal of American ideals and began to rebuild ties to the Muslim world damaged by the brutal and unnecessary invasion of Iraq. Obama can back up his words with deeds through bold cuts in U.S. and Russian arsenals to show that the is serious about the global elimination of nuclear weapons, with serious efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with support for the democratic aspirations of all Muslim people, and with the continued withdrawal from Iraq and new campaigns against violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan that do not rely primarily on military attacks. If he can take these steps, Obama could undercut the appeal of Ahmadinejad's brand of anti-Americanism in the greater Middle East.

The patience and balance that Obama has show thus far in his Iran approach must continue. There was never any indication that the president thought this was going to be quick or easy. The Iranian nuclear program built up a fierce momentum in recent years thanks to Bush's bungled efforts to overthrow the regime. It will take some years to slow and reverse this deadly direction.

Joseph Cirincione is President of Ploughshares Fund and author of Bomb Scare:  The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons.

UPDATE: FP's David Rothkopf weighs in. "Since governments rather than general populations control nuclear programs, shouldn't the recent events give us reason to reconsider our recent drift toward acceptance of Iran's nuclear aspirations?," he asks.

Photo: AFP/Getty Images

After a very exciting week, it appears increasingly likely that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will once again be Iran's president. 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei apparently just pronounced the election results -- deemed suspect by Iran analysts -- a "divine assessment." And his word is final.

Mir Hossain Mousavi, the challenger, has been unyielding in declaring the official results a farce. He insists he's the winner. "I'm warning I will not surrender to this dangerous charade. The result of such performance by some officials will jeopardize the pillars of the Islamic Republic and will establish tyranny," he said, in a statement cited by Reuters.

But just a few thousand of Mousavi's supporters defied government orders and protested in Tehran Saturday. Security forces sent them packing and threatened arrests. Meanwhile, Mousavi's press conference was mysteriously canceled, and there are unconfirmed reports that he was told in no uncertain terms to concede defeat.

And here's where "anyone but Ahmadinejad" probably isn't enough. People may be willing to form a human chain in the streets and wear green when such activities are sanctioned by the regime in the context of an election campaign. But are any but Mousavi's most ardent supporters willing to risk arrest, or even death, to see him elected? I tend to doubt it. The man just isn't that inspiring.

This is Iran, of course, and therefore anything could happen. According to some reports, Mousavi has called on his supporters to rally Saturday evening. But my gut tells me that it's game over.

As Rand's Alireza Nader put it, "The power of the traditional ruling elite -- men such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani -- has been effectively challenged by Ahmadinejad and his supporters, including top-ranking and fundamentalist members of the Revolutionary Guards."

This was hardball, and Ahmadinejad and Khamenei [appear to have] won.

As for the Obama administration's efforts to engage Iran, this is a huge setback. Because now, the U.S. will be dealing with a government that just stole an election, and used violence and threats of violence to enforce the results it wanted. Or, if the opposition does mobilize, there could be months of paralysis while the nuclear clock keeps ticking.

UPDATE: Several Iran hands emailed to say that I'm calling this way too early. As one of them put it, "Remember we haven't heard [from] Rafsanjani at all yet, or Khatami."

Of course, I'm not 100 percent sure that it's over. But the early signs don't look good for the Mousavi camp. Why weren't they able to put more people into the streets?

I have to admit that I'm rooting for Mir Hossain Mousavi in tomorrow's elections, if only so that Fred Armisen can play both presidents. Check this out:

"Ahmadi bye-bye." That's one of the chants that supporters of Iranian presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi were yelling Monday when they decked out in green and formed a stunning human chain along a 12-mile-long arterial road that runs through Tehran.

Many Iranians are fed up with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- the man who has presided over a crumbling economy and damaged Iran's international standing. They head to the polls Friday to select one of four candidates, and if the outcome is "Ahmadi bye-bye," the most-likely new president would be Mousavi, a relative unknown until recently.

FP has an Iran package to keep you in the know. Check it out:

Iran's Presidential Wannabes: Meet the four men vying to lead the Islamic Republic and learn where they stand on foreign policy and domestic politics.

Iran's Potato Revolution: Former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi has spent the past two decades out of the public eye, pursuing his interests in architecture and painting. Now he's the man most likely to dethrone Ahmadinejad.

Who's Winning Iran's Google War? To understand Iranian politics, ask a search engine. Over the past 90 days, Farsi-language Google searches for "Mousavi" have increased 1,300 percent.

Iran's New Revolution: Candidate Mousavi may have less charisma than Michael Dukakis, but the rock star has Iranian youth screaming.

Ahmadi Bye-Bye in Iran? A photo review of the best moments from Iran's wild campaign.

Photo: Majid/Getty Images

So, it turns out that Lebanon's ruling pro-Western coalition managed to hang on to power, defeating a rival coalition that includes Hezbollah.

The editors over at HuffPo appear to credit this development to Obama's Thursday speech, blaring these headlines:

The Obama Effect? Pro-Western Majority Declares Victory Over Hezbollah In Lebanon

Early Test Of President's Efforts To Forge Middle East Peace

I hate to burst the bubble, but there's simply no evidence yet that Obama had any impact on the outcome. As Paul Salem explained Friday for FP, there were plenty of indications - such as the fact that it only ran 11 candidates -- that Hezbollah didn't really want to win and give up its cozy seat in the opposition. And further, it was Hezbollah's coalition partner, the mostly Christian Free Patriotic Movement, that seems to have underperformed expectations. In any case, the AP story on HuffPo flatly declares, "Obama's speech did not resonate in the election campaign."

Nor should we breathe a sigh of relief just yet. Now comes the ugly business of negotiating ministries, and it's likely that Hezbollah (whose power is measured in more than just parliamentary seats) will again demand a veto in a cabinet of "national unity" -- to the extent that such a thing exists in fractured Lebanon. It could be months of agonizing negotiations before a new government is formed.

The good news, of course, is that the Hezbollah-FPM coalition didn't win, which could have led to ugly recriminations, or worse, if the ruling Sunni-Druze-Christian alliance didn't accept the results. But I don't think we can chalk these results up to any "Obama effect" just yet, if ever.

UPDATE: Elias Muhanna weighs in:

Far more decisive, in my opinion, seems to have been: (1) the high turnout of Sunnis in Zahle — many of whom came from abroad — coupled with a low turnout of Christians; (2) strong feelings of antipathy towards Hizbullah by the Christians of Beirut who voted decisively for March 14th’s list in the district of Achrafieh; (3) some rare rhetorical blunders by Nasrallah in the past couple of weeks, calling the events of May 7th “a glorious day” for the resistance.

JOSEPH BARRAK/AFP/Getty Images

The AP's recent report about Iranian reformist presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi paints an optimistic picture, describing enthusiastic voter outreach campaigns and other exercises of political freedom the country isn't typically known for. This is all very promising—both for Iran and the United States. But the report misses some fundamental points.

Roughly 46 million Iranians will be eligible to vote on June 12. According to Mousavi's campaign manager, the chances of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad losing the race shoot up to 65 percent if voter turnout exceeds 32 million. By contrast, he says, the odds of a regime change plummet to just 35 percent if voter turnout is limited to 27 million or fewer. Might this election hinge on five million voters?

If his calculations are correct, a best-case scenario for Mousavi would have to count on 70 percent of eligible voters showing up to the polls. That's an astronomical number, considering how badly turnout in recent years has been slumping.

Still, keep your eyes out for a surprise—this presidential race is fast becoming one of the most energetic and competitive in the nation's history.

Mohammad Khatami isn't running for president of Iran, but the former president still seems to be constantly in the headlines these days. President Ahmadinejad recently attacked his predecessor for bringing shame on the country. RFE/RL reports:

 

The president told Iran's state radio that Khatami’s 2005 visit to France was one of the saddest days of his life, because Khatami "had to climb several flights of stairs" in the Elysee Palace to reach Jacque Chirac, the then French president.

Ahmadinejad said he found it “insulting” to Iranians.

Oh snap! But Khatami wasn't just going to take that of course:

Khatami fought back, writing in the "Hayate Nou" daily, saying that the real insult was thrown during Ahmadinejad’s trip to Columbia University in New York in 2007, when Ahmadinejad was introduced to the audience as a “cruel and petty dictator.”

As for the Elysee Palace incident, Khatami wrote that actually Chirac had descended a few flights of stairs -- breaching official protocol -- to greet him.

Between this and last week's Azeri-gate, it certainly seems as if Ahmadinejad's supporters are trying their best to keep the focus on Khatami rather than the opposition who's actually running, Mir Hussein Moussavi. It does make sense that it would be easier to attack Khatami, who is in fact quite popular and well-known in the West, as a sell-out of the Iranian revolution that Moussavi, who was a favorite of Ayatollah Khomeini and in many ways on the conservative end of the Iranian political spectrum. 

Khatami certainly has a right to defend himself from Ahmadinejad's petty attacks, but the best way for him to help the candidate he supports (who does seem to be gaining some momentum) may be to lay low for a bit. 

Getty Images

Reuters reports the fairly incredible stat the one fifth of the 5,500 candidates in India's national election are facing criminal charges. That's quite a bit higher than the previously published estimate of 70, but not entirely unbelieveable given that 128 of India's 543 Members of Parliament are already facing charges.

A man urinates on April 25, 2009 in the toilets of the Sodoma bar in central Reykjavik where photographs of the former bankers who left their country after the financial crash have been stuck on the urinals. AFP PHOTO OLIVIER MORIN.

Someday very soon, a graduate student is going to have a field day with the gender dynamics of Iceland's transfer-of-power.

Most commentators on yesterday's elections in South Africa have used words like "landmark" or "historic" to describe the vote. And yes, perhas as the fourth democratic vote in the country's post-apartheid history, the elections still deserve the title.

But the big news that the ANC's lead is down slightly from previous years (from 70 percent to about 65 percent) should not be read too carefully as a change. As Raenette Taljaard points out in her Think Again: South Africa on FP, the near-one-party state that has entrenched the ruling African National Congress (ANC) shows no signs of fading. In fact, if anything, those structure of power and patronage are more entrenched than ever. 

What is perhaps more interesting is the boost in voter turnout -- at a high 77 percent. The speaks not just to an enthusiasm for democracy. It also indicates just how polarizing this election became. Jacob Zuma, now almost assured to be President, drives crowds towards him and way from him, on the one side eager for Zuma's promises to speed the slow pace of change for the impoverished majority, and on the other fearful that his impudence and possible corruption could see South Africa look a bit too much like other, less proserpous, African neighbors. 

In short, South Africa is in for a telling few years. If Zuma doesn't live up the high expectations of the working class voters who support him, he may resort to less savory techniques of patronage to stay in power. Then again, if he's able to improve the lives of the average citizen even a bit, it will be welcome.

ALEXANDER JOE/AFP/Getty Images

Gathering over 50 percent of the vote, Moldova's Communist Party (PCRM) won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections on Sunday. Interestingly, until this election Moldova was the only state in Europe where clinging to the Communist brand remained politically expedient. In fact, since Moldova declared independence in 1990 the PCRM has never relinquished power. However, today's violent protests have shown that over the last decade a socio-political chasm between young and urban voters and the elderly and rural has split Moldovan society.

It's important to note that the PCRM's platform, based on such Marxist notions as encouraging entrepreneurship, attracting foreign direct investment, and protecting human rights, isn't really all that Communist. Unlike other nominally Communist parties, the PCRM doesn't even pay lip service to Communist principles and openly advocates seeking closer socio-economic relations with Europe. Their key difference with the Liberals is that the Communists are wary of reunification with Romania, a country with which Moldova shares historical and linguistic ties

The wide margin of victory provides the PCRM with a clear mandate to pursue its proposed policy of closer integration with Europe, but as Moldova expert Elizabeth Anderson pointed out, its many years in power has left the Communist Party over-institutionalized and corrupt. The next Moldovan president will have to tread lightly, institute reforms within his own party, and try to build coalitions with the minority parties in parliament. Otherwise, Moldova risks falling into the same kind of vicious cycle that neighboring Ukraine has experienced since the Orange revolution in 2004.

Last week, I blogged that Andrei Lugovoi, prime suspect in the Alexander Litvinenko murder, is running for mayor of Sochi, the Black Sea resort town that will host the 2014 Winter Olympics. [Update: Looks like Lugovoi's out.] But Lugovoi's only one of the 25 fascinating characters (including some Passport favorites) running in what's shaping up to be one of the world's more interesting political contests.

Liberal opposition leader and political sex symbol Boris Nemtsov is running, and got ammonia thrown at him by pro-Kremlin hooligans a few days ago. Ex-KGB oligarch Alexander Lebedev is in the running, as is freemason lodge leader Andrei Bogdanov, who we last met when he was waging a high-profile beef with far-right leader (and Lugovoi's boss) Vladimir Zhirinovsky during his highly suspicious presidential run.

But there's more! Former Bolshoi ballerina Anastasia Volochkova is running, as is porn star Yelena Berkova, and local wrestling promoter Stanislav Koretsky. Then, of course, there's the guy who will most likely win, Anatoly Pakhomov from Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party.

A lot of these candidates have fairly minimal connections to Sochi, which doesn't seem to be a huge problem in Russian politics. Though the Communist Party's candidate did gripe about Lugovoi, "Maybe he vacationed here once.”

So why does every egomaniac in Russia want to be mayor of Sochi all of a sudden? First, the upcoming Olympics makes the race a perfect opportunity for self-promotion. Second, for the slightly more serious candidates, a recent upset in Murmansk, where a United Russia incumbent was defeated in a mayor's race by an independent candidate, has the Russian opposition sensing blood in the water. 

Has the financial crisis broken United Russia's seemingly invincible grip on Russia's regional politics? Let the games begin.

Photos: Getty Images

As Antiguan voters headed to the polls today, the main topic of debate was who, exactly, let billionaire financier and alleged Ponzi-scheme operator Allen Stanford become the driving force behind the country's economy:

The billionaire is one of the island's most prominent citizens and its largest private employer. Hundreds of people work for his two restaurants, one newspaper, cricket grounds, a development company and a three-branch local bank as well as the headquarters of his Stanford International Bank.

Prime Minister Baldwin Spencer, whose United Progressive Party is seeking to retain its majority of 17 parliamentary seats, has said his opponents sought to "literally give away Antigua and Barbuda to Allen Stanford" when the financier brought his offshore bank here from Montserrat in 1990.

Spencer's opponent, Lester Bird, a close Stanford ally, denies the claim — although his Antigua Labor Party was in power at the time.

Tom Shaw/Getty Images

Hugo Chavez: destroyer of Venezuela or savior of the country's poorest? Whichever you believe, after Sunday, it's very possible that Chavez could be around to stay for another 10 or 20 years.

Venezuelans go to the polls Feb. 15 to vote on a referendum over whether to lift term limits for their president and other public officials. Chavez has called the referendum the crux of his self-titled bolivarian revolution. The opposition decries his increasing grip on power.

On the eve of the event, FP is featuring arguments from both sides. Check out Lucy Conger's take on how crashing oil prices could stop Venezuela's international ambitions in their tracks. Meanwhile, in an interview, two pro-Chavez legislators say that the fate of their country depends on Chavez. Off to the polls!

Photo: JUAN BARRETO/AFP/Getty Images