ALI AL-SAADI/AFP

Mark Bowden, who we interviewed for last week's Seven Questions, has a fascinating cover story (sub req'd) in the latest Atlantic Monthly giving the inside story of how the U.S. military caught al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as told by the interrogators of a dedicated unit set up by Special Operations Command in 2005.

The title of Bowden's article, "The Ploy," refers to the gambit used by interrogator "Doc," to get Abu Haydr, a high-ranking al Qaeda affiliate captured in April 2006, to give up information that eventually led to Zarqawi's whereabouts:

We both know what I want,” Doc said. “You have information you could trade. It is your only source of leverage right now. You don’t want to go to Abu Ghraib, and I can help you, but you have to give me something in trade. A guy as smart as you—you are the type of Sunni we can use to shape the future of Iraq.” If Abu Haydr would betray his organization, Doc implied, the Americans would make him a very big man indeed.

By playing on Abu Haydr's vanity and creating the impression that he, too, was secretly eager to help save Iraq from Shiite depredations, Doc got his captive to spill the beans, bit by bit. By June, Abu Haydr was singing like a canary:

He explained that Rahman, a figure well-known to the Task Force, met regularly with Zarqawi. He said that whenever they met, Rahman observed a security ritual that involved changing cars a number of times. Only when he got into a small blue car, Abu Haydr said, would he be taken directly to Zarqawi.

And that was the key piece of information that led to the U.S. air strikes that killed the al Qaeda leader on June 7, 2006. It's clear from the article that the U.S. military is eager to show that it now has clean hands; no torture, quasi torture, or abuse was used to get Zarqawi (just the threat of sending prisoners to Abu Ghraib!). Also clear: Icing Zarqawi didn't ultimately change much in Iraq.

Wired's Matthew Cole has discovered that Google Earth is the place to go for the inside scoop on where U.S. intelligence agencies think the al Qaeda leader might be hiding. Cole explains:

After Google recently updated its satellite images of parts of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, much of the region still looked blotchy — the kind of low resolution that persists in coverage of, say, upstate New York. But several small squares (they stand out as off-color patches from 680 miles up) suddenly became as detailed as the images of Manhattan. These sectors happen to be precisely where the US govern­ment has been hunting for bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Turns out, Google gets its images from many of the same satellite companies — DigitalGlobe, TerraMetrics, and others-that provide reconnaissance to US intelligence agencies. And when the CIA requests close-ups of the area around Peshawar in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, Google Earth reaps the benefits (although usually six to 18 months later). 

Of course, any shots of an emaciated, 6'6" man dressed in white and sporting a long beard will be long out of date. But it's fun to look around one of the wildest places on Earth nonetheless.

AFP

It seems like a stupid question, doesn't it?

Of course al Qaeda has a strategy, right? Al Qaeda masterminds have published long tracts spelling out the latest master plan for the glorious victory of the jihad. The best known of these is al Qaeda #2 Ayman al-Zawahiri's rambling Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, which urges the global jihad to shift its focus from the "near enemy" (Arab regimes) to the "far enemy" (America). Zawahiri's goal was to get jihadists from Morocco to Indonesia to push the Great Satan out of the Islamic world so that the region's governments would lose their main protector. Other jihadi theorists may have since become more influential, but the basic "far enemy first" approach remains unchallenged, according to experts.

Beyond that, however, there's actually very little consensus on the details of al Qaeda's strategy in counterterrorism circles, just as there is no widespread agreement as to what motivates terrorists, or even what they might attack next. A recent RAND study tried to get at this last problem:

Each year, the federal, state, local, and tribal governments spend billions of dollars protecting the United States and U.S. property against acts of terrorism, with human, military,and capital resources allocated in ways that reflect the value and vulnerability of each venue to be protected. Yet those buildings, institutions,and icons perceived as being of utmost value to the United States may not be perceived as such to its potential attackers; the country, in other words, may be protecting its buffalo when really it is the goats that are at risk.

(This is an optimistic reading of how Homeland Security dollars are really allocated, but DHS is the client and you don't bite the hand that feeds ya.) The authors then go on to surmise that since al Qaeda is "a goal-driven organization," we should be able to divine its likely points of attack.

As I was reading the study, I was reminded of a famous quote from a Lou Reed song, "Some Kinda Love": "Between thought and expression there lies a lifetime." That is to say, just because al Qaeda has a written plan of action doesn't mean they're able to operationalize it. The real world is much more complicated than a piece of paper, and sometimes you just have to take the opportunities that come your way. So, in looking for patterns in the 14 terrorist attacks it studied, RAND may be prescribing a level of rationality where there is none. By the end, the authors have come to the same basic conclusion:

Thus, while a study such as this might shed light on what the adversary may be thinking, and the consequences of such thoughts, it cannot be used to rule out an attack of one form or another. The next attack may well take place in Ohio even if there are reasons to believe that Ohio (or most of the other 50 states) is not particularly favored for an attack.

Isn't that comforting?

Speaking of Osama Bin Laden—children, avert your eyes. Here's Haaretz relaying a passage from Uri Dan's new biography of Ariel Sharon:

Speaking of George Bush, with whom Sharon developed a very close relationship, Uri Dan recalls that Sharon's delicacy made him reluctant to repeat what the president had told him when they discussed Osama bin Laden. Finally he relented. And here is what the leader of the Western world, valiant warrior in the battle of cultures, promised to do to bin Laden if he caught him: "I will screw him in the a**!" 

That's according to an unprecedented new survey of Iranian public opinion by WorldPublicOpinion.org and Search for Common Ground:

Their servers appear to have crashed, so I'll just point out this item that appears to conflict with the overall finding that Iranians are "very concerned about the danger of terrorism, reject attacks against civilians overwhelmingly and share strongly negative views of Osama bin Laden":

It is important to note, however, that slim majorities of Iranians feel that some Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians are justified and view Hamas and Hezbollah favorably.

ABID KATIB/Getty Images

GAZA CITY, GAZA - JANUARY 10: Palestinian shopkeeper Tareq Abu Dayea stands next to George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden action figures in his store. The figures come complete with nylon hair and various scale weapons.

These aren't the first action figures of their type to go on the market, but at least they're more tasteful than the Saddam hanging doll on sale in Connecticut.

As if we needed another reminder of just how critical the situation in Somalia has become, Al-Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri will reportedly release a statement calling on Muslims to fight for victory there. The statement is expected shortly, according to ABC News.

Zawahiri's statement, combined with recent comments by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi that his troops plan to be out of Somalia within a matter of weeks, underscores the urgent need for an international peacekeeping force in the beleageured country.

Following the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, terrorism expert Loretta Napoleoni filed a compelling ForeignPolicy.com exclusive disputing the contention by U.S. intelligence that his successor as leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (aka Abu Ayyub al Masri and at right). She wrote,

... Zarqawi's death has given rise to a new round of propaganda, this time over his successor. U.S. military leaders, under pressure to demonstrate both that they know the identity of Zarqawi's heir and that the link between the insurgency and al Qaeda remains strong, are once again skillfully spinning the facts.

Whoever Muhajir may be, he has reportedly released a message today celebrating the defeat of Republicans in the U.S. elections. The CIA is currently verifying the authenticity of the tape, which taunts the beleaguered administration,

We call on the lame duck [Bush] not to hurry his escape the way the defense secretary did... we haven't had enough of your blood yet... We will not rest from our Jihad until we are under the olive trees of Rumieh and we have blown up the filthiest house — which is called the White House.

News reports this morning that the Pakistani military had leveled a madrassa without the help of U.S. forces seemed suspect. For starters, why go after such a politically sensitive target as a madrassa if no "high profile targets" were inside, as Pakistani officials insisted there were not.

Now it turns out there may have been good reason to be suspicious. Over at The Blotter, Alexis Debat is reporting that the madrassa raid was not only carried out by a U.S. Predator drone, but that Ayman al-Zawahiri was the target.

Maybe taking out Al Qaeda's Number Two was supposed to be the October surprise? Debat reports that Pakistani intelligence sources say they have Zawahiri "boxed" in a 40-square-mile area in Afghanistan, and he should be dead or captured in the next "few months."

John Robb over at Global Guerillas has an interesting theory: The power outage across much of Pakistan over the weekend is an obvious sign that Musharraf's grasp on power is slipping. Why? Because these kind of infrastructure attacks are tactics straight out of the global guerilla playbook - strike at basic needs and work up. According to Robb, Musharraf is in "survival mode" and no doubt believes that his life is in danger (there have been a number of assassination attempts in recent years), but he has far more to fear from these infrastructure attacks - the ones that "fragment Pakistan's society and economy" - because it's these that will drive him from power. They're the same tactics that insurgents have used in Iraq. If this wasn't worrisome enough, here are a few of Musharraf's recent decisions that are putting U.S. strategy in the region at risk:

• Autonomy to rebels. After the loss of a reported 3,000 troops, Pakistan has ceded the tribal areas of Waziristan (population: 800,000) to pro-Taliban local rule. Weapons will be returned, outposts will be abandoned, and compensation will be paid.
• Safe haven for the Taliban. Pakistan has cut a ceasefire with the Taliban's Mullah Omar. Pakistani troops will no longer hunt down the Taliban (and likely al Qaeda) in Pakistan. This ceasefire also prevents US/NATO troops from crossing the border to pursue Taliban forces.
• Exporting guerrillas to gain good-will. 2,500 Taliban and al Qaeda militants have been released from Pakistani jails (under the stipulation that they will leave Pakistan).

The editorial pages of global news outfits weighed in yesterday on the anniversary of 9/11, and they didn't have very positive things to say about U.S. foreign policy. 

China's English People's Daily Online says U.S. foreign policy, "highjacked" by neo-conservatives, has increased the threat of terrorism worldwide by transforming Iraq into a "hotbed of training ground of terrorist activities." (sic) Their recommendation: evaluate the United States' "double-standard policy in the Middle East," which is "the major source of the increasing anti-US sentiment and terrorist activities."

In The Moscow Times, Alexei Bayer also criticizes the global war on terror (GWOT), writing: "George W. Bush's administration swallowed al-Qaida's bait hook, line and sinker."  Instead, he argues, the United States would have been better off ignoring terrorist "provocation" and not treating the conflict as a war, considering the age of terrorism - in the vein of the British in Northern Ireland - a time of "troubles."

Hassan Nafaa in Egypt's Al-Ahram Weekly discusses how GWOT "became a war on Arabs and Muslims," saying that the United States conflated a war that should have been focused solely on al Qaeda.

"We're now approaching the five-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks -- and the families of those murdered that day have waited patiently for justice. Some of the families are with us today -- they should have to wait no longer." So said George W. Bush at lunchtime today.

Of course, the man most responsible for 9/11 won't be tried since he's not been caught yet -  and won't be anytime soon if Pakistani Major-General Shaukat Sultan's comments are anything to go by. He told ABC News yesterday that as long as Osama bin Laden "is staying like a peaceful citizen, one would not be taken into custody." The Pakistanis are now playing major damage control. But when you add this to the recent deal where Pakistani troops withdrew from sections of the border with Afghanistan, you begin to think that Musharraf may have outlived his usefulness.

As for bin Laden, he might not be in Pakistan after all. Lawrence Wright, author of the Looming Tower, speculated on the indispensable Chris Matthews show that he's actually in Yemen. But, then again, his argument turned on the fact that if you can't find something after five years of looking, it's probably not there. Sultan's comments suggest the Pakistanis might not have been looking too hard.

On Monday, for the first time ever, a U.S. federal court provided online access to nearly all the exhibits submitted in a recent criminal case. The case? United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui. Several of the exhibits are still classified and under seal (including one entitled "schizophrenia video" submitted by the defense), but there are nearly 1,200 other documents, videos, and photographs available - everything from Moussaoui's report cards from 1975, photographs of the inside of a flight simulator, and "1 box cutter". There's also the "substitution for testimony" from several terror detainees, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks. I'm guessing that releasing all of the exhibits is kosher despite Moussaoui's pending appeal of his life sentence, but it just makes every armchair attorney out there able to now render an opinion on whether he should be able to withdraw his guilty plea.

It's not often that U.S. policymakers get inside the brains of top terrorists, but the translation of an online book available on jihadist Web sites is providing just such an opportunity. The Management of Savagery, authored by an Al Qaeda insider, is a detailed look into the operational and strategic aspects of Al Qaeda's global jihad against the United States.

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released the first English translation of the text from Arabic this week. Comparing the strategies outlined in the book to current world events will yield few surprises. The book calls on jihadis to portray America as the invader by confronting the United States abroad (especially in Iraq) and infers that the invasion of Iraq was exactly what Al Qaeda wanted. The strategy does not include major attacks on U.S. soil in the near future because such attacks have the potential to alienate Al Qaeda's sympathizers and boost the moral position of the United States.