South Asia

New York Times journalist David Rohde's account of his kidnapping and subsequent escape from Taliban militants affiliated with the Haqqani network in North Waziristan region of Pakistan makes for riveting reading. It's an amazing story, and one has to admire Rohde's fortitude and survival instincts during his seven-month ordeal.

Read all of it, but I just have one comment about this bit from the epilogue:

My suspicions about the relationship between the Haqqanis and the Pakistani military proved to be true. Some American officials told my colleagues at The Times that Pakistan's military intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, turns a blind eye to the Haqqanis' activities. Others went further and said the ISI provided money, supplies and strategic planning to the Haqqanis and other Taliban groups.

Pakistani officials told my colleagues that the contacts were part of a strategy to maintain influence in Afghanistan to prevent India, Pakistan's archenemy, from gaining a foothold. One Pakistani official called the Taliban "proxy forces to preserve our interests."

Meanwhile, the Haqqanis continue to use North Waziristan to train suicide bombers and bomb makers who kill Afghan and American forces. They also continue to take hostages.

We'll see how long this relationship holds, but if you need any convincing that the ISI at least tacitly allows the Haqqani folks to do their thing unmolested, consider this: To get to South Waziristan, where the Pakistani Army is engaged in a fierce battle with the Pakistani Taliban around the Makin area, which is dominated by the Mehsud tribal grouping, some units had to drive through North Waziristan. In fact, they drove right through the center of Miram Shah, the regional capital and Haqqani stronghold where Rohde made his escape -- and there was just one isolated IED attack along the way.

What does that tell us? At a minimum, it tells us that the powers that be in North Waziristan are being very cooperative and not coming to the Mehsuds' aid. And supposedly, the Haqqanis and their local allies, led by another Pakistani Taliban leader named Hafiz Gul Bahadar, have explicitly pledged not to interfere. The Pakistani military has struck a number of much-criticized peace deals with Bahadar over the last few years, and some say the security establishment in Rawalpindi is all too happy to keep this relationship alive so long as the Haqqanis and Bahadar only launch attacks in Afghanistan, not at home.

American officials have been hinting in recent weeks, however, that the Pakistani military is simply tackling one challenge at a time -- the Mehsuds -- and the Haqqanis may be next on their hit list. That's certainly what AfPak envoy Richard Holbrooke and Amb. Ann Patterson seem to be telling Frontline, though one can detect a little daylight between the two U.S. diplomats. In Holbrooke's words, the Pakistanis "are quite clear in their own minds that Haqqani poses a threat to both Afghanistan and Pakistan." Patterson says, "[W]e're working with them on these, and I think they increasingly see these [other] groups as a threat as well" -- but Pakistan is not willing to turn on them yet.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is still conducting airstrikes in North Waziristan, which is still teeming with foreign militants and where it's widely thought that Osama bin Laden has hidden out at one point or another during the last few years. This is definitely a story to watch.

As I mentioned before, a lot more could have gone into this week's list of Ted Kennedy's little-remembered foreign-policy achievements. One more example is his role in the creation of Bangladesh. In 1971, the government of Pakistan, with the support of the Nixon administration, sent troops into what was then called East Pakistan, in order to contain a secessionist movement. This created a massive refugee crisis as millions streamed across the border to India.

Although the situation got little coverage in the United States, Kennedy, who had a lifelong interest in refugee issues and was eyeing a run against Nixon, traveled to inspect the situation:

On his return, he issued a scathing report to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Refugees. The report, "Crisis in South Asia," spoke of "one of the most appalling tides of human misery in modern times."

"Nothing is more clear, or more easily documented, than the systematic campaign of terror -- and its genocidal consequences -- launched by the Pakistani army on the night of March 25th," he wrote.

"All of this has been officially sanctioned, ordered and implemented under martial law from Islamabad. America's heavy support of Islamabad is nothing short of complicity in the human and political tragedy of East Bengal."

The Nixon administration maintained its stance. But Kennedy's focus on the mass killings came as everyday Americans began to share in the outrage. For instance, Beatle George Harrison's Concert for Bangladesh, the first benefit event of its kind, was staged to further highlight the plight of Bangladeshi refugees.

Besieged, the U.S. Congress pushed through a bill to ban arms sales to Pakistan.

Kennedy received a hero's welcome in Dhaka in 1972, just after Bangladesh gained independence. Yesterday, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina recalled Kennedy's role, saying, "The people of Bangladesh will remember his contribution forever."

"Rezwan" of Global Voices has a great roundup of Bangladeshi blogger reactions to Kennedy's death, including "Unheard Voice," which posts Kennedy's original report to Congress.

Yesterday's New York Times obit of Kennedy devoted one paragraph to his international contributions, saying he "had less impact on foreign policy than on domestic concerns." That's probably true. But considering the impact Kennedy had in Chile, Bangladesh, South Africa, and Northern Ireland as well as the not-insignificant role he played in the debates over Vietnam and Iraq, this says more about the size of his overall legacy than anything else.

Photo: Ted Kennedy in Dhaka in 1972. From Flickr user faria!

Last week in the Washington Post, Michael O'Hanlon lamented the inability of the U.S. military to get "boots on the ground" in peacekeeping operations in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. O'Hanlon, who served in the Peace Corps in Eastern Congo, made the case that an all-volunteer military force trained for peacekeeping could help overcome the current overstretch of the military and the U.S. hesitation to deploy peackeeping troops for fear of public outcry when, as in Somalia in 1993, casualties could result:

The notion is this: Ask for volunteers to join a peace operations division for two years. They would begin their service with, say, 12 weeks of boot camp and 12 weeks of specialized training and then would be deployable. They would receive the same compensation and health benefits as regular troops, given their age and experience. Out of a division of 15,000 troops, one brigade, or about 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, could be sustained in the field at a time.

This type of training would be modeled after standard practices in today's Army and Marine Corps. To be sure, soldiers and Marines in regular units usually go beyond this regimen to have many months of additional practice and exercise before being deployed. But the peace operations units could be led by a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs -- perhaps some of whom would be drawn back to military service after leaving...

The dangers of deploying such units to missions such as the one in Congo, would be real, but the risks would be acceptable. First, those volunteering would understand the risks and accept them. Second, in most civil conflicts such as Congo's, possible adversarial forces are not sophisticated. Soldiers in the new division would not need to execute complex operations akin to those carried out during the invasion of Iraq or current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They would largely monitor villages and refugee camps, inspect individuals to make sure they did not have illicit weapons, and call for help if they came under concerted attack.

I agree with O'Hanlon's major point that it can be difficult for peacekeeping operations to succeed without active U.S. support. Most current missions are undermanned and underfunded, even for their already very limited mandates. I also think the volunteer idea has potential, but my hangup is the idea of creating a separate track within the military that has less training. Wouldn't it be better to ask for volunteers from within the armed forces and give them additional peacekeeping training?

To get a perspective on this proposal from the kind of person who might volunteer, I called my friend Marcus Williams, who at the last minute this spring chose to withdraw from his planned Peace Corps deployment in West Africa and instead apply to Officer Candidates School for the U.S. Marines.

Interestingly, Marcus cited peacekeeping and development as one of the reasons he hopes to join the Marines. "Arguably the Iraq war and Afghanistan are right now peace keeping missions. So it becomes kind of hard to define where people are deploying," he said. He added that for better or worse, working on development from within the military means you get resources that Peace Corps volunteers simply do not. 

The proposed short training period and separation from the normal military also worried Williams, who graduated from Stanford in four years with both a degree in International Relations and a Masters in African Studies:

If you had people volunteering and there was less training involved, there's this sort of vision of the idealistic African advocate who's in college or going to college and may not have the serious commitment it takes to serve in the armed forces. They're going to end up in the field and not be a very effective unit. When it comes down to it you have to follow orders and accept very seriously that you might die.

Williams pointed out that for the Marine Corps, Officer Candidates School itself is almost 12 weeks and for those who choose to join afterward another six months or so of basic training is required. 

Ultimately, Williams argued, if the U.S. wants to get serious about supporting peace-keeping operations in places like the DRC, that would be great, but U.S. troops aren't necessarily the key.

I think that if the U.S. were really committed to these peacekeeping operations we wouldn't be focused on getting U.S. boots on the ground. The cost of the Ghanaian peacekeeper on the ground is much less and if the U.S. peacekeeper is going to literally receive less training, it seems like it would be better to support other troops.

If the U.S. really wants to help, he said, it should focus on its comparative advantages:

flying helicopters, intelligence, communications operations. I'm thinking most of the peacekeepers in Sudan. They had boots on the ground but they didn't have any real logistics.

Does all this mean O'Hanlon's idea should be written off? Absolutely not, Williams said, it just needs some careful thought. "I think you'd have a lot of people interested in volunteering," he said.

ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP/Getty Images 

Via Joe Cirincione's Twitter feed, comes this intriguing story from the Press Trust of India. Kamuran Pathmanathan who took over leadership of the Tamil separatist group LTTE after the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, only to be arrested a few weeks later, has made a startling claim:

In a startling disclosure, the detained LTTE chief Kumaran Pathmanathan has told investigators that the rebels had tried to acquire nuclear weapons and know-how to be used against the Sri Lankan army.

A media report has said that Pathmanathan who was recently arrested in South East Asian country has told interrogators that his organisation had tried to acquire nuclear weapons and technology from western countries.

"LTTE had been the first terrorist outfit that had tried to obtain nuclear power. Had they been successful in obtaining nuclear power, it would have flowed into the hands of other terror organisations too", the Nation newspaper said quoting military analysts.

It sounds like it could just be jailhouse boasting but it should be interesting to see if there's follow-up. 

So says Joshua Foust, writing on the World Politics Review blog:

Democratic elections usually rest on a few basic principles: a free and fair vote, an uncoerced selection of candidates, and an agreement by all parties to abide by the results. Afghanistan doesn't quite qualify for any of these.

Though not disputing the strategic importance in determining who will be in charge of the government, Foust makes a pretty convincing case that the elections aren't shaping up to look much like what most democracy promoters would have hoped:

*Take the idea of a free and fair vote. Pajhwok, an internationally-funded independent Afghan news service, has an entire news page set aside for incidents of voter intimidation -- and I don't mean by the Taliban (more on them later). It runs the gamut from the government arresting supporters of Abdullah Abdullah, to police killing Nuristanis for asking for enough ballot boxes to cast their votes.

*The government is building up "tribal security" forces modeled on the arbakai, a traditional tribal militia. Only, these forces are going to be different from all the other forces that have come before, will be given better weapons, and will not be subject to the disarmament and de-mobilization programs that have stood down other informal militias. In other words, they are flooding the country with guns to try to create security for the election.

*Shortly before the registration deadline passed, Gul Agha Sherzai -- the former-warlord governor of Nangarhar Province who had taken to American newspapers to make the case for his impending presidency -- abruptly withdrew his own nomination amid rumors of a deal cut with Hamid Karzai.

*Speaking of deals, what's "free and fair" about Karzai de-exiling a man like Abdul Rashid Dostum -- the Uzbek warlord who faces allegations of America-sponsored mass killings in 2001 -- to deliver the Uzbek vote?

The sudden return of Dostum and his quick endorsement of Karzai did seem particularly dirty. Karzai's government, after all, had exiled Dostum, and he was one of the stronger competitors to Karzai--though still very far off--in the 2004 election. At this point though, there is little anyone can do to protest. The elections must go on. Right?

Assuming the elections are not disrupted by violence, a related question will be how much progress, if any, Afghanistan has made since 2004. Is it more democratic, if not a democracy? 

For more from Joshua Foust, watch him discuss U.S.-Afghanistan policy with New America fellow and AfPak Channel blogger Michael Cohen. 

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images

Bollywood fans in India's northern city of Allahabad burned a U.S. flag and shouted anti-American slogans to protest treatment of Bollywood star Shah Rukh Khan (seen at right). Khan was stopped and held for questioning as he entered the U.S. in Newark, NJ. 

U.S. customs officials say that the questioning was standard procedure, that the delay lasted only 66 minutes and that it was made worse by the fact that the actor's bag was lost by the airline. In India, however, the perceived offense was much greater, the AP reports:

"Shocking, disturbing n downright disgraceful. It's such behavior that fuels hatred and racism. SRK's a world figure for God's sake. Get real!" actress Priyanka Chopra said on her Twitter feed.

The federal information minister, Ambika Soni, angrily suggested that India adopt a similar policy toward Americans traveling to India.

Khan, visiting the U.S. to celebrate Indian Independence day at a parade in Chicago, is also working on a new film called "My Name is Khan" about racial profiling of Indian muslims in the U.S. as potential terrorists. 

Perhaps grateful for the unexpected marketing boost, Khan later said he did not want an apology. But he added that his patience with American customs was wearing thin (he said this is not the first time something similar has happened) and that he might seek to spend more time in countries that know their Bollywood stars on sight:

"Post-9/11, one could understand and one did not complain. But this time it was a bit too much. I have travelled to other countries. I never faced any problem in the UK where I am treated like a state guest. They escort me to the car."

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For Passport readers who haven't yet noticed, FP launched a swanky new AfPak channel today in a team effort with the New America Foundation.

Among the many features, Jean MacKenzie offers a preview of the Afghan elections scheduled for August 20 and a look at the leading candidates. 

According to MacKenzie, who is in Afghanistan working for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, current president Hamid Karzai is still the favorite, but former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah is gaining ground quickly. Additionally, MacKenzie notes, though he is generally thought to be a distant third, former finance minister and World Bank employee Ashraf Ghani (seen above) could play a crucial role if no candidate wins 50% of the vote and the election goes into a runoff. Support from Ghani could give Abdullah a tremendous runoff boost and help him siphon some of Karzai's Pashtun base:

Ghani has the advantage of being Pashtun in a country where the majority of the electorate comes from that ethnic group. Abdullah claims a Pashtun father, but is more closely associated with the Tajiks.

MacKenzie follows up on the Ghani as kingmaker idea in an article for the Global Post. She notes that although Karzai's team has reached out, Ghani is not interested.

Ghani has flatly rejected any position in a Karzai administration. In an earlier interview, at the start of his campaign, he poured scorn on his rival, and on the idea that a CEO would be able to help.

“I find it ironic that the head of one of the most incompetent administrations in our history is simultaneously discussing … having a babysitter,” Ghani told Global Post. “That means he’s a ward, a child who needs to be attended to, who is incapable of governing.”

And just in case there was any doubt who Ghani might lean toward in a runoff scenario where he is not a candidate, here he is today with an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (I wonder if his campaign advisor, James Carville had anything to do with placing it):

Over the past five years President Hamid Karzai has turned Afghanistan into one of the world’s most failed and corrupt states. Instead of leading our country toward democracy, he has formed alliances with criminals. He has appointed governors and police chiefs who openly flout the rule of law. And he has turned a blind eye to a multibillion-dollar drug trade that has crippled growth and enabled the insurgency to flourish.

In a country where reliable polling is non-existant, anything could happen, and the election might not get to a runoff. But if it does, an Abdullah-Ghani alliance could provide some excitement. 

For more AfPak excitement, like a photo history of the war in Afghanistan and a look at the U.S. narcotics policy there, check out the new channel. 

REZA SHIRMOHAMMADI/AFP/Getty Images

Indian writer and top intellectual Ramachandra Guha has a piece in the Hindustan Times with a novel argument for why India's foreign policy seems so dysfunctional: the people making it are just too old. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna and National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan are all in their late 70s. Guha writes:

By way of comparison, consider the ages of those with principal responsibility for foreign policy in other countries. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is 61. British Foreign Secretary David Milliband is 44. His German counterpart, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is nine years older. Also 53 years of age is Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdoom Qureshi. I suspect that the equivalent of our NSA in these (and other countries) is likewise in his 50s or 60s. Age apart, the videshi equivalents of our foreign minister and NSA often also have better credentials in the field.

To work in foreign affairs or national security requires one to be awake at all hours and alert to all possibilities, to be comfortable with modern technology and to be interested even in obscure parts of the world, and, finally, to be willing to travel long distances at the drop of a hat. To be sure, youth by itself does not qualify one to be a good diplomat, foreign policy expert, or strategic thinker. (Consider the callowness of David Milliband). Energy and alertness do need to be accompanied by wisdom and experience. But the latter without the former can be equally unhelpful. A useful rule of thumb may be to get someone more than 50 but less than 70.

At the risk of being accused of ‘age-ism’, one must ask whether the recent misjudgements in our dealings with Pakistan and the United States are completely unconnected with the age of our principal negotiators. For the worrying thing is that the prime minister, the foreign minister and the NSA are all the wrong side of 75. In the rocky ocean of global politics, the Indian ship of State can carry one old man, perhaps even two. But three?

I'm not quite sure that the spring chickens who run Pakistan have quite as much of an intellectual advantage as Guha is suggesting, but his larger point is interesting. While it's generally acceptable to question a politician's youth and inexperience, saying they're too old to handle the responsibilities of the job is a little dicier. (Remember the uproar when Barack Obama suggested that John McCain has "lost his bearings"?)

Why shouldn't Indians to ask whether they really want a 77-year old who's had two bypass surgeries answering the 3 a.m. phone call?

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