Azerbaijan plans to nearly double its military expenditures for the coming year, according to an announcement by the Azerbaijani finance minister yesterday. Much of this money will be directed towards "modernizing the Azerbaijani military." Is this a prelude to a renewed round of fighting with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh?

Tensions have been heating up along the border between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, with a number of skirmishes in the past few months that have left soldiers from both sides dead. And peace negotiations, which are supposed to be mediated by Russia, the U.S. and France, don't seem to be going anywhere.

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a brutal war over Nagorno-Karabakh War from 1998 to 1994. In the end, the territory was declared independent (Yerevan's preferred outcome) and subsequently was cleansed of ethnic Azeris and re-populated with Armenians from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan lost around 10 percent of its territory.

But that war took place just as the Soviet Union was coming apart, when both countries were fledgling Soviet republics. Things might look a little different this time around. Azerbaijan's GDP is around $46.13 billion, compared with Armenia's $11.92 billion. Baku enjoys good relations with all of its neighbors, including Russia, Iran, Georgia, and Turkey, as well as foreign powers like the United States and China. Armenia, meanwhile, is a lot less loved. Relations with Georgia are tepid and with Turkey they're non-existent. Armenia does, however, host Russian military bases (and they produce a lot of brandy for the Russian market).

Of course, it's possible, even likely, that nothing will happen in the South Caucasus any time soon. But if it does, it looks like Azerbaijan will be ready.

It hasn't attracted a whole lot of attention yet, but Russia's announcement this week of the arrest of militant leader Ali Taziyev, better known as Emir Magas could be a devastating blow to the insurgency in the North Caucasus. Magas was officially second-in-command behind the better-known Doku Umarov in the hierarchy of rebels aiming to establish an Islamic emirate in the Caucasus.

Past FP contributor and Bishkek-based International Crisis Group analysts Paul Quinn-Judge explains that Magas is actually a more significant target:

[W]hile Doku has become largely a figurehead in recent years – the last link with the old generation of independence fighters and a symbol of the war’s transformation into a religious struggle  –  Magas was a frontline commander, a highly successful military planner and an astute organiser. He was one of the commanders of the bloody attack on Nazran in 2004. He is sometimes alleged to have taken part in the hostage taking at Beslan later that year. He claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in June 2009 that badly injured the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and in the period between these events he united virtually all the small semi-autonomous groups of Islamic fighters under the command of the North Caucasus Emirate. This is an achievement that seems to have eluded his predecessor, Shamil Basayev.

The guerrilla movement was quick to confirm that Magas had been captured, and did not try to hide the gravity of the development. A long commentary on the Ingush jihadist site hunafa drew parallels with the early losses of Mohamed’s followers.  It described the capture as a “severe test” for the movement and for Magas. “May Allah give him strength,” the site said. 

Magas has been taken to Moscow for questioning. 

Big news today in the world of geographical absurdities. Abkhazia -- which wants to be a country -- has been officially recognized by the Pacific island of Nauru -- which is barely a country. Nauru now joins the motley group of Nicaragua, Venezuela, and of course Russia in recognizing the breakaway Georgian region. Recognition didn't come cheap, though:

Nauru, an eight-square-mile rock in the South Pacific with about 11,000 inhabitants, was no pushover, according to the influential Russian daily newspaper Kommersant. In talks with Russian officials, Nauru requested $50 million for “urgent social and economic projects,” the newspaper reported, citing unnamed Russian diplomats.

That's about $3,500 $4,500 per Nauruan. This was just the latest of the ill-fated island's get-rich-quick schemes:

Nauru, the world’s smallest republic, has been desperate for income since its most important resource, phosphates formed by centuries of bird droppings, is nearly exhausted. The island has tried housing refugees for Australia and investing millions in a West End musical. (It bombed.)

Recently, it has begun to dabble in foreign-policy hardball. In 2002, Nauru severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, coincident with a reported pledge of $130 million from China. Three years later, it switched again, prompting a Chinese official to grumble that the islanders were “only interested in material gains.”

For a time, Nauru was also a major money laundering center used by the Russian mafia. 

For more on the strange and sad tale of the world's smallest -- but fattest -- country, check out this amazing segment from NPR's This American Life. 

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Having read the report's conclusions, these are all basically correct. The authors do state explicitly that "Operations started with a massive Georgian artillery attack" on the night of Aug. 7 and that this attack was not justifiable under international law. They also say that Georgian claims of a Russian military incursion prior to this attack are not "sufficiently substantiated." Point for the Kremlin, but from that point on the Russians don't look very good.

The report rejects Russian claims of genocide by Georgia against Russian civilians, accuses the Russian military of allowing human rights abuses, including widespread rape, by South Ossetian forces against Georgian civilians, states that Russian troops "continued their advances for some days after the August ceasefire was declared," and finds that while their initial military reponse was justified, they went "far beyond the reasonable limits of defence" by moving into Georigan territory. In an interesting passage, the authors write:

In a matter of a very few days, the pattern of legitimate and illegitimate military action had thus turned around betweeen the two main actors Georgia and Russia.

The report also describes provocative Russian acts in the lead-up to the war, including "the formalising of links with the breakaway territories, the granting of Russian passports to their populations, and declarations about using the Kosovo precedent as a basis for the recognition fo South Ossetia and Abkhazia".

Another important passage:

"This Report shows that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus soleley on the artillery attack on Tskhinvaliin the night of 7/8 August and on what then developed into the questionable Georgian offensive in South Ossetia and the Russian military action. ...It must also take into account years of provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats and acts of violence both inside and outside the conflict zone. It has to conside, too, the impact of a great power's coercive politics and diplomacy against a small and insubordinate neighbour, together with the small neighbour's penchant for overplaying its had and acting in the heat of the moment without careful consideration fo the final outcome, not to mention its fear that it might permanently lose important parts of its territory through creeping annexation."

In retrospect Russia's excessive use of force during the conflict seems not just brutal but politically stupid. Through years of pressure, the Kremlin had goaded Saakashvili into an ill-advised attack that provided the Russian miltiary with cover to consolidate control over the breakaway regions. If they had stopped there, Russia could have (somewhat credibly) painted Georgia as the aggressor and (much less credibly) justified their incursion as a humanitarian intervention.

Thanks to their attacks on non-disputed Georgian territory, their complicity in human rights abuses by South Ossetian forces, and their violations of the ceasefire, it's hard to see Russia as anything but a bullying aggressor. And with Saakashvili still in power and the underlying political dynamics basically unchanged, it's hard to see what they gained from it.

DMITRY KOSTYUKOV/AFP/Getty Images

RFE/RL reports that an Azerbaijani music fan was questioned by his country's National Security Ministry after voting for rival Armenia's entry in this year's Eurovision song contest:

"They wanted an explanation for why I voted for Armenia. They said it was a matter of national security,” Nasirli said. “They were trying to put psychological pressure on me, saying things like, 'You have no sense of ethnic pride. How come you voted for Armenia?' They made me write out an explanation, and then they let me go."

A total of 43 Azeris voted for the Armenian duo Inga and Anush, and their song, "Jan-Jan."

Nasirli, like others, used his mobile phone to send a text message expressing his preference, little imagining his vote would eventually result in a summons from national security officials. (By contrast, 1,065 Armenians voted for the Azerbaijani team, apparently without consequence.) 

The funny thing is, Nasirli's motives were actually patriotic:

Nasirli said he preferred the Armenian entry because it sounded "more Azeri" than his country's own submission, a duet featuring Arash, a pop superstar born in Iran and based in Sweden:

"I voted for Armenia to protest the fact that Arash was representing Azerbaijan. Also, the Armenian song was closer to Azerbaijani style than Arash's song,” Nasirli said. 

Here are the two entries so you can judge for yourself.

(Hat tip: Douglas Muir of A Fistful of Euros)

A NATO source tells Eurasianet that Azerbaijan is now more likely to join NATO than Ukraine or Georgia:

"Earlier, the perception in both Brussels [North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] headquarters] and Baku was that Georgia should integrate into NATO first and Azerbaijan should follow," the source said. "However, the situation has changed and it might be that in the year to come Azerbaijan will become the frontrunner. Baku may enter NATO earlier than Ukraine and Georgia."

After Georgia’s 2008 war with Russia, "[m]any NATO member-states believe that . . . it is simply impossible to provide membership to Georgia," the source continued.

Ukraine’s domestic divisions over NATO and political turmoil have reduced its membership chances, he said. "It is unclear who will represent the Ukrainian government in six months or a year and what its position on NATO membership will be."

By comparison, Azerbaijan appears a bastion of stability. Among its other "strong advantages" are the country’s "strong cultural links" with NATO member Turkey and its strategic importance for the planned Nabucco and TGI (Turkey-Greece-Italy) gas pipelines, projects which "will deepen Western support [for] Azerbaijan in the coming years," according to the source.

Interestingly, a large part of the reason Azerbaijan is now in a better spot for NATO membership is that its government never lobbied particularly hard to join. Ukraine and Georgia, where this has been a long-standing priority, invited both Russia and internal critics to try to prevent them from joining.

For a number of reasons explained in the article, Azerbaijan still has a long way to go before it can join, but it does seem as if the best way for ex-Soviet countries to join Nato might be to act like they don't actually want to. 

Almost exactly a month after the Russian government declared the anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya had ended, a suicide bomber killed three people at a checkpoint in Grozny. He had been attempting to reach the interior ministry building. Another bombing killed three people in a village in Southern Chechnya earlier this week:

The BBC's Richard Galpin in Moscow says it is rare for Muslim rebels to be able to carry out an attack in Grozny, and a suicide bombing is even rarer.

It would appear to be a message from the separatists that the conflict is not over and that they remain a force to be reckoned with, our correspondent says.

Thanks to improvements in law enforcement, Georgia's criminals are all heading north to Russia, according to President Mikheil Saakashvili. And he's just fine with that:

Our main export to Russia is not wine, but 'thieves in law" and other criminal elements," Saakashvili said at the opening ceremony of the new building of the Georgian Interior Ministry in Tbilisi on Tuesday.

Today, Georgia has almost gotten rid of organized crime and criminal ringleaders thanks to the police, who are not corrupt like they used to be, he said.

The three men accused of playing a role in the 2006 murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya were acquitted today. While it would be great to see Politkovskaya's killers brought to justice, that clearly wasn't going to happen at this trial anyway. None of the three Chechen men on trial were accused of actually killing the journalist, who was known for her fearless and critical coverage of Russia's war in Chechenya. The L.A. Times' Megan Stack wrote shortly before the verdict:

There is a pervasive sense that the trial is tangential, that the evidence is patchy and that the Russian government has only skimmed the edges of the crime rather than dug at its roots.

Conspicuously missing from the cramped courtroom is anyone accused of pulling the trigger or ordering or paying for the slaying. Lawyers say evidence has linked the crime to the FSB, domestic successor of the KGB, but has failed to reveal how far up the ranks of intelligence services the plan to kill Politkovskaya reached.

Whether these men played a role or not, a conviction in this "chaotic, confused and even farcical" trial would probably have actually set back the campaign to find and prosecute the actual killers. Politkovskaya's newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, is currently conducting its own investigation. That one may aim a little higher.

BORYANA KATSAROVA/AFP/Getty Images

Georgia and its pipelines may be central to plans to bypass Russia as Europe's main gas supplier, but the country may soon be partially dependent on Russia for its own power supply.

Georgia has sold a partial management stake in the hydroelectric plant that supplies almost half the country's power to a Russian state-controlled energy firm for $9 million. The plant straddles the border between Georgia-proper and the Russian-occupied territory of Abkhazia. Even though Russia is now paying for electricity that Abkhazians and nearby Russians were already using for free and Georgia will maintain ownership, Georgian opposition leaders smell hypocrisy:

Salome Zurabishvili, leader of the opposition Georgian Way party, sharply criticized the move. “The government is a traitor, which says, on the one hand, that Russia is an occupier, and on the other hand makes deals with the same country.”

Even though this seems like a decent deal for Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili's government had to expect to take a hit from the public. It may be a sign that while top Georgian officials continue to decry the Russian occupation of their territory, in reality they're learning to live with it.

RIA-Novosti reports:

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin named on Thursday a mountain peak in the Caucasus in honor of Russian spies.

The former president's office has said that the one-time KGB agent signed a resolution to name the Sugan Ridge mountain peak the Peak of Russian Counterintelligence Agents.

It's not a catchy name, but the mountain is in North Ossetia near the Georgian border, so it may be an appropriate one. 

Georgia may be returning to a fragile state of normalcy, but U.S. bloggers are just getting warmed up. Salon.com's Glenn Greenwald recently blasted the presidential candidates and the media for perpetuating the false claim that Russia attacked Georgia "unprovoked." That provoked this response from Russian-born Cathy Young of Reason who rightly points out that the coverage in the U.S. media has been a bit more nuanced than Greenwald's neocon caricature, but perhaps goes too far in comparing him (and fellow liberals) to the "Cold War-era leftists [who] pleaded for a more understanding view of the Soviet Union."

Greenwald fired right back, comparing conservative Russia hawks to those who equated opposition to the Iraq war with support for Saddam Hussein. The American Conservative's Daniel Larison also weighed in on Greenwald's side and made this point:

On those rare occasions when [criticism of Georgia] is ever spoken, it has to be hedged about with so many caveats about Moscow’s general perfidy that it loses all of its rhetorical and political force, and if it does not have all those caveats it is denounced as nothing more than an apology for Putin. This obviously undermines the quality of foreign policy debate in this country, as even those who know better avoid speaking out against the absurd establishment policies (in this case, reflexive support for Georgia and its entry into NATO) so that they avoid being ostracized as defenders of foreign authoritarian governments.

Larison doth protest a bit too much here. If he and Greenwald are going to mock the Bill Kristols and Charles Krauthammers of the world for their reflexive Putin-bashing, it behooves them to acknowledge that Georgia is more than the "new, little neocon project," as Greenwald describes it. Is it tedious to repeatedly acknowledge Putin's crimes while criticizing U.S. policy or repeatedly note Russia's role in goading Georgia into overreaction? Sure. But you set a high standard for yourself when your primary criticism of the other side is their tendency to oversimplify.

Some commentators will focus primarily on critiquing U.S. foreign policy, while others will focus primarily on Russia's expansionism and authoritarianism. There's no reason why one should preclude the other and these endless recriminations aren't exactly conducive to developing a realistic Russia policy.

The Washington Post reports today that domestic criticism of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is growing now that wartime freedom of speech restrictions have been lifted. But while a number of opposition figures are hoping to capitalize on the crisis that has weakened the president's political standing, all are wary of being associated with Russia's calls for Saakashvili's ouster.

For this reason, Putin and Medvedev's constant hurling of insults at Saakashvili seems counterproductive. The one thing Georgians of all political stripes seem to agree on is the need to resist Russian domination, and it will be hard for an opposition movement to gain momentum as long as it's suspected of having Russian backing. Saakashvili was using this to his advantage well before war broke out.

If Medvedev really wants to undermine Saakashvili, why doesn't he just invite him up to Sochi for the weekend?

Russia's campaign to win international recognition for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia isn't going as well as they may have hoped. So far only Nicaragua, of all places, has signed on. Belarus and Venezuela were both staunch supporters of Russia during the war with Georgia but haven't yet indicated that they intend to recognize the two regions. Moscow will push its case at a meeting of seven former-Soviet republics today in Moscow.

If you're keeping score for the "new cold war" at home, that's Kosovo: 46, South Ossetia and Abkhazia: 2.