North Korea Nuclear Test

Hyping North Korea's nuclear threat

Tue, 05/26/2009 - 4:17pm

North Korea derives satisfaction from international condemnation. Time for a more nuanced approach.

By Donald G. Gross

Let's be honest:  North Korea's nuclear test on Sunday does not, as U.S. President Barack Obama put it, "pose a grave threat to the peace and stability of the world" much beyond the threat that North Korea posed on Saturday -- the day before it conducted the test. And hyping the test, as Obama did in his White House statement, actually makes matters worse.

To understand why, think back to your schoolyard days. The bullies who tried to rule the playground became more powerful if their victims grew upset. This time, North Korea is the menace, and the strong U.S. rhetoric only brings satisfaction to that country's misguided leadership. Raising the stakes increases Pyongyang's diplomatic leverage and makes it even harder to eliminate North Korea's nuclear program. The United States is giving this bully exactly what it craves.

North Korea has had a proven nuclear weapons capability since October 2006, when it carried out its first nuclear test. Back then, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pyongyang possessed enough nuclear material to build six to eight nuclear bombs. North Korea has not added to its nuclear stockpile since its first test, thanks to the hard-nosed diplomacy pursued in the second Bush term through Amb. Christopher Hill, who persuaded Pyongyang to disable its reactor at Yongbyon.

It is understandable that some Obama advisors would like the young president to appear tough and resolute. But one of the lessons the Bush administration learned, after difficult years of dealing with North Korea, is to respond to Pyongyang's brinkmanship with calm and quiet determination. This is the one diplomatic approach most likely to give pause to Kim Jong Il and his generals -- and the Obama administration would do well to give it a try.

The greater the threat North Korea appears to pose, the more satisfaction it gives that country's leadership and the more diplomatic leverage it confers on the cabal in Pyongyang. They see nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the country's severe economic failure, extreme poverty, and inability to feed its own citizens. The sad truth is that the people of North Korea are the foremost victims of their leaders' nuclear policies.

Let's imagine what might happen if, instead of showing patient disapproval, the Obama administration gets drawn into a game of chicken with Pyongyang. Signaling that a U.S. military response is "on the table" would merely further North Korea's strategy of brinkmanship. Threatening bombing or a naval blockade could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy -- if it becomes necessary to act to preserve U.S. "credibility."

But making good on military threats wouldn't work, in any case. After talking with his security advisors, President Obama will discover, if he hasn't already, that the United States does not have any good military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear program. Quite the contrary:  U.S. military action could trigger war on the Korean peninsula, putting at serious risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans, not to mention American troops.

What to do?

Energizing the Six Party nuclear talks and pursuing vigorous bilateral diplomacy to advance a creative negotiated settlement with North Korea is not just the best option, it is also the only real way to preserve stability in Northeast Asia -- the shared goal of the United States and its closest allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, as well as China and Russia.

Rallying the U.N. Security Council to condemn Pyongyang is a necessary step, but going down the road of simply isolating and imposing further sanctions on North Korea will not achieve the results the U.S. seeks. Pressure on North Korea needs to be coupled with other diplomatic measures that strengthen Pyongyang's sense of security (independent of nuclear weapons) and help reverse its economic decline.

To persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear capability, the United States and the international community must take away that country's best weapon: fear. Through careful calculation and skillful diplomacy, the world can overcome the menace by proving that Pyongyang's desire for security, respect and economic growth are best achieved through other, less hostile means.

Donald G. Gross is former counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.  He currently serves as adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, a research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Photo: Joshua Roberts-Pool/Getty Images

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On North Korea's nuclear and missile tests

Tue, 05/26/2009 - 3:23pm

By Stephen M. Walt

North Korea's nuclear and missile tests are hardly good news, but they don’t justify going into full panic mode. We already knew that North Korea had a nuclear weapons capability, and though this latest test seems to have been slightly more powerful than the initial one, it doesn’t imply a qualitative shift in the strategic environment. North Korea's defiance is annoying, perhaps, but it’s not like the act of testing a nuclear weapon tells us something new about their regime. And let's not forget that the United States has tested a nuclear weapons 1030 times (plus another 24 joint tests with Great Britain), while Pyongyang has tested exactly twice.

The other reason not to get too bent out of shape is that there is little we can do about it. We've been worried about North Korea’s nuclear program for decades, and the Clinton adminstration seriously considered a preventive strike against North Korea’s nuclear facilities back in 1993-1994. But they ultimately refrained, because our allies in the region were opposed to it and because the risks of an attack were deemed too great. The Bush administration was critical of Clinton’s emphasis on diplomacy and took a tougher line at first, but that approach didn't stop North Korea from testing in 2006 and may even have encouraged them. In the end, the Bush team also recognized that it had no good coercive options and ended up going the diplomatic route too.

There are two reasons why our hands are largely tied. First, we don’t have extensive economic ties with North Korea, so we can't pressure them by threatening to cut off aid, trade, or investment. Second, using military force to disarm or topple Kim Jong Il's regime or to impose a full economic blockade could unleash an all-out war on the Korean peninsula. All-out war could do considerable damage to Seoul, which lies within artillery range of the border, and the sudden collapse of the North Korean state could create a massive humanitarian problem and make it more likely that some of its nuclear materials would escape reliable custody. These considerations explain why China and South Korea generally oppose stronger sanctions on North Korea, even when they are upset by Pyongyang's actions.

So the best response is to remain calm, and stop talking as if this event is a test of Obama's resolve or a fundamental challenge to U.S. policy.  In fact, the tests are just "business as usual" for North Korea, and it would better if the United States "under-reacts" rather than overreacts. Instead of giving Pyongyang the attention it wants, the United States should use this incident as an opportunity to build consensus among the main interested parties (China, Russia, South Korea, Japan) and let China take the lead in addressing it. Above all, the Obama administration should avoid making a lot of sweeping statements about how it will not "tolerate" a North Korean nuclear capability. The fact is that we've tolerated it for some time now, and since we don't have good options for dealing with it, that's precisely what we will continue to do. 

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The nuke whisperers...

Tue, 05/26/2009 - 2:16pm

By David Rothkopf

On Monday, North Korea's rogue regime detonated a nuclear weapon that they asserted packed the punch of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Immediately afterward the United Nations Security Council leapt into action, convening to determine whether or not the world should either a.) Send the country to bed without its supper or b.) Give it a time out. Analysts consider this a major escalation in UN efforts to get North Korea to quit its nukes. Earlier this year, for example, following North Korea's test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Security Council only just dared to assert that they were "disappointed" in Kim Jong Il, following up the statement with a long withering glance in the direction of the Korean Peninsula.   

While it must be acknowledged that due to North Korea's history of famine, isolation, and decades of suffering that even these stern measures from the Security Council are unlikely to be very effective, they themselves represent a major step forward from other recent responses by the international community to the threat posed by the rapid proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (Based on the tough tactics involved, not unlike those involved in disciplining an unruly child, reality television watchers have come to the conclusion that the UN's non-proliferation efforts are now being overseen by none other than Jo Frost, better known as television's Super Nanny. Although others speculate that given the UN's purposeful but comparatively gentle approach, their approach owes more to certain prominent animal discipline experts than to Nanny Frost. This in turn has led to calling the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon "the Nuke Whisperer.") 

Still, the world is getting tougher. For example, prior to this new steely-spined initiative from the UN, the response of the world's leading powers to proliferation threats have been even less confrontational -- hard as that may be to imagine. Pakistan's development of nuclear capabilities was, in fact, followed by the embrace of the United States, more Chinese missile technology, and billions in international aid. India got its own special nuclear deal from the United States and the response to Iran's nuclear aspirations has been a global effort to make their efforts as stress-free as possible. Most recently, this has meant responding to every belligerent Iranian step with new efforts to give them more time for the developing their weapons (while cautioning Israel not to bother them.) Indeed, the primary United States response to recent, escalating Iranian threats has actually been to seek a thaw in the relationship.  

In fact, a cynical observer (or anyone with a brain) might conclude that nothing enhances a country's international standing like the acquisition or threatened acquisition of nuclear weapons. At least, that is, until the stirring actions of the past day at the UN. In fact, U.S. UN Ambassador Susan Rice and her colleagues at the Security Council have vowed to follow up their expressions of disappointment on Monday with the drafting a new resolution to replace the one violated by North Korea Monday. (Silly me.  When I was a boy, I thought you needed a deeply buried concreted bunker lined with lead to protect against a nuclear attack. Who knew press releases were enough?)

President Obama himself stepped to the microphones Monday to lend the force of his words to the onslaught of wind being directed at North Korea.  This was particularly timely given that only two weeks ago, the U.S. special envoy for disarmament talks with North Korea was quoted as saying "everyone is feeling relatively relaxed about where we are at this point in the process." Obama condemned North Korea's actions, saying that they were not the way for the country to achieve either "security or respect." (Sounds like Jo Frost wrote his remarks, too.)

Even as North Korea was dominating the headlines Monday, the Associated Press reported that a secret Israeli analysis asserts that Iran is being supplied with uranium for its nuclear program by Venezuela and Bolivia. While it might be supposed that Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Bolivia's Evo Morales are cannily trying to ride Iran's coat-tails to international political relevance, this story does suggest that perhaps...just maybe...the current outbreak of indignation among the world's great powers might have to be prelude to something all of them have been reluctant to consider thus far: meaningful action.

If the Israeli report is substantiated, can the United States continue to trade with Venezuela and Bolivia? Can we let their companies have access to our markets? Shouldn't they be penalized in a meaningful way...in fact, in every way that the Iranians or other proliferators are...or ought to be? 

Rueful joking aside... and truly, nothing is less funny than this failure of the international community to confront and contain the greatest threat the world faces...when you look at what is happening in North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and  the other countries involved in the rapid expansion of the world's trade in nuclear technologies, components and fuel, it may just be that the single greatest test the Obama administration faces is finding a successor policy to the current and recent posture on WMD proliferation...which can only be described as supine. Thus far, all that has been produced is a thin gruel of empty words. But gradually and unmistakably, the president is being tested...prodded...poked at...by enemies who would like to see what it will take to provoke action and whether the United States can manage to lead other countries in a unified effort or whether multilateralism under Obama will continue to be a euphemism for impotent posturing.

JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images

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How to quarantine the spreading cancer of North Korea

Tue, 05/26/2009 - 1:34pm

By Philip Zelikow

An appropriate policy toward North Korea should quarantine and limit the threat the state can pose to the United States and its allies. U.S. diplomacy, properly conceived, should always have had two goals. First, to offer -- in good faith -- a genuine opportunity for the North to make a constructive strategic choice for the future.  Second, to strengthen U.S. and allied ability (political as well as military) to defend themselves if the North made a different choice.

Some people tend to emphasize only the diplomatic track; others only emphasize the defensive measures. The key point, which former Secretary Rice and former Deputy Secretary Zoellick understood very well, was that the first track is a necessary enabler for the second one. So in 2005, the United States reinvigorated the Six Party process to make the first track real. And in 2005, the United States took steps that effectively destroyed a Chinese bank in Macau, the Banco Delta Asia, illustrating America's readiness to pursue the other track as well.

This dual strategy heightened tension, culminating in North Korea's nuclear test of 2006. Yet the international response in 2006 displayed unanimity and firmness that had not been seen since 1953, evident in UN Security Council resolution 1718. The result was a fresh diplomatic opening, a promising agreement in February 2007, and a further test of North Korean intentions, one so specific and unequivocal that the results were bound to be revealing.

North Korean behavior in 2007 was indeed revealing. Despite some great pictures for CNN, North Korea failed adequately to account for its past nuclear trade, including possible transfers of enriched uranium to Libya and possible transfers of nuclear fuel (as well as much other help) to Syria. Although the known plutonium production facility was temporarily disabled, possible uranium enrichment facilities remained. Of course, the possible Libyan and definite Syrian choices were made in the past. But it was (and is) essential for the United States and its allies to develop some reasonable understanding of how that proliferation path worked -- and was funded -- to have adequate confidence that the path is gone.

Thus, during 2007, the United States and its allies could conclude that they would not be able to achieve a critical, realistic objective: a verifiable cap on North Korea's capacity to build nuclear weapons and produce weapons-usable nuclear material. Such a concrete objective would have been worth the candle -- a good prelude to a further, comprehensive phase of Korean diplomacy that would include the attainment of complete denuclearization, as required by UNSC 1718 and as pledged by North Korea in 1992, 2005, and 2007. Attainment of even that preliminary objective was in even greater doubt, though, given the evidence of 2007.

Nonetheless, the United States helped construct a further agreement (Beijing, October 2007) to keep the diplomatic process afloat rather than move it to a new phase. Why? I don't know. Today's Wall Street Journal editorial listed me as first, ahead even of Chris Hill and Condi Rice, in persuading President Bush to make the October 2007 decision to keep that diplomatic track alive and take North Korea off the terror list. That rank ordering in supposed infamy is especially bizarre, since I had left the administration at the end of 2006. (Perhaps someone wanted to sling something at me because of my stance on terrorism issues, and this was the only available clod of mud.)

The pros and cons of the October 2007 decision are hard for me to judge. I'm certainly inclined to give President Bush and Secretary Rice the benefit of doubt. Perhaps the moves to destroy the plutonium facility seemed so encouraging; the uranium enrichment concerns seemed wispy; and forcing the North to admit a past it could not acknowledge would seem merely backward-looking and punitive, rather than future-oriented and constructive.

Yet there were large downsides of keeping the process afloat with the October 2007 Beijing agreement, and they grew, especially as the Beijing agreement proved hollow. The uranium enrichment issues had been spotlighted by the new evidence on Libya and Syria ties and did not seem to be getting addressed. The coalition-building benefits with South Korea were diminishing, especially as the South Korean people repudiated the policy direction of the late president Roh Moo-hyun. The already-strained relations with Japan had to carry a heavier burden of mistrust. The bonds with China remained strong, but there was a danger of short-sightedness. As China effectively took on more responsibility as North Korea's protector and guarantor in the diplomacy, Chinese action or inaction on this topic could become another potential issue in an utterly vital connection: Chinese relations with Japan.

In any case, the United States definitely went the extra mile in its diplomacy. Now Washington can credibly offer coalition leadership in developing appropriate defensive measures of all kinds.

1. Sanctions?  It would be nice to enforce fully the ones already on the books in UNSC 1718.

2. Instead what is needed is international action by interested parties to redress the violation of UNSC 1718 with suitable defensive measures under Chapter VII. Either the UN should expressly authorize that, or note that this will happen, or the Security Council should remain silent. It set the international norm in 2006 and did so under Chapter VII.  The norm has been violated. Unless a further resolution is suitably empowering, silence might be best. The Security Council should not limit what can be done by specifying it.

3. The United States must now treat the North Koreans as having crossed the "red line" of proliferating nuclear material and, based on our analysis of how they did this, do everything possible to disable this capability.

4. Also, as I wrote in this space a few months ago, the United States should take necessary preparations with its allies to limit North Korean development of the ballistic missiles they could marry with their nuclear (or biological or chemical) payloads.

5. Keep in mind that all of this is a curtain-raiser for the Obama administration's still too-be-determined policy on Iran.

Certainly any measure that confronts North Korea carries risks of escalation. The North Korean government made the decision to act beyond its borders.  The United States should prepare with its allies to address these risks. Evidence of that preparation is the best way to reduce the risk. And our Chinese and Russian friends can judge for themselves how best to manage the risks they see arising from this cancer across the Yalu.

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From Pyongyang to Tehran, with nukes

Tue, 05/26/2009 - 11:41am

North Korea's tests are not the scary part. It's the country's collaboration with Iran.

By Siegfried S. Hecker

International condemnation of North Korea's underground nuclear test Monday resonated the world over -- just in time for Pyongyang to defiantly test two short-range missiles. After the U.N. Security Council condemned Pyongyang's long-range rocket launch on April 5, the country walked away from all previous nuclear agreements and threatened to restore normal operation of the Yongbyon nuclear plant, reprocess spent fuel rods to extract plutonium bomb fuel, pursue a light-water reactor, conduct nuclear tests, and launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kim Jong Il and company seem intent on pushing the limits of international patience, and raising the stakes with each provocation. But how worried should the world be? That is, what is North Korea actually capable of doing?

Concern over North Korea's tests is warranted. Pyongyang is on a well-planned trajectory to enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities -- something that officials made very clear when I visited the country in February. North Korea had slowed down the disablement of its nuclear facility, Yongbyon. It then launched a multistage rocket and walked away from the nuclear talks. Pyongyang is strengthening its "deterrent" threat by building more bombs, and possibly more-sophisticated ones at that.

But it is what North Korea did not threaten that should give us greatest concern: expanded nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. The two countries' abilities and needs are highly complementary, and past collaboration tells us that the diplomatic channels may be as well.

North Korea shut down Yongbyon in July 2007, but began to restart the facility last month. The country has now restored the reprocessing facility and has begun extracting roughly 8 kilograms of plutonium from spent fuel. Although Yongbyon will not be able to complete reprocessing for four to six months, the anticipated increase in plutonium is what has allowed it to conduct this week's nuclear test. Without the additional plutonium, Pyongyang was limited to 26 to 50 kilograms, or roughly four to eight bombs' worth. Its small nuclear arsenal was likely also primitive; its first nuclear test in 2006 was only partially successful. Hours before the test, Pyongyang informed China that it would conduct a test at 4 kilotons, but it achieved less than 1 (by comparison, the bomb at Nagasaki yielded an explosion of 21 kilotons). It appears the North Koreans scaled back their original design to 4 kilotons to avoid a massive breach of the test tunnel.

The test this week, however, was more successful, producing a yield that I estimate at 2 to 4 kilotons based on currently available seismic measurements and estimates of the test site geology. This test will enhance Pyongyang's confidence in its arsenal and may be an important step toward miniaturizing warheads to fit on its missiles. Still, the size of North Korea's nuclear arsenal will remain restricted by its limited plutonium inventory. Fully capable nuclear-tipped missiles will require further tests, so the sequence of this week's provocative steps foreshadows more of the same.

For now, North Korea will remain somewhat trapped by its minimal plutonium supply. To make more, Pyongyang would have to restart its Yongbyon reactor. It will take approximately six months to prepare fuel for the reactor and to rebuild the cooling tower that the country destroyed last June as a symbolic gesture. Once fueled, the reactor will produce 6 kilograms of plutonium, roughly one bomb's worth, per year for the next decade or so. Pyongyang is not currently capable of ramping up plutonium production from there. The threat to develop its own light-water reactor is not a great concern for plutonium production, but it does likely signal that North Korea will now seriously explore uranium enrichment capabilities. But it would take many years for Pyongyang to develop the uranium route to the bomb.

Of course, there is a terrifying way that North Korea could overcome its limitation while simultaneously helping another nuclear aspirant: It could work with Iran. Pyongyang lacks uranium centrifuge materials, technology, and know-how; Tehran has mastered them. Pyongyang has practical uranium metallurgy capabilities; Tehran has little. Pyongyang has its own nuclear test data; Tehran does not. Pyongyang knows all facets of plutonium technology; Tehran has little more than a plutonium-producing reactor under construction. Pyongyang helped Tehran establish a missile capability; now, Tehran's crash missile-test program and Pyongyang's long-range rocket tests could prove mutually beneficial.

Preventing escalation of nuclear and missile cooperation is critical to avoid destabilizing Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The urgency of this threat is underscored by North Korea's recent covert construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria and its extensive ongoing cooperation in missile technology with Iran. At least in its nuclear reach, Pyongyang isn't quite as isolated as it seems.

Siegfried S. Hecker is codirector of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and director emeritus of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Photo: JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images

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The best possible response to the North Korean nuclear test

Tue, 05/26/2009 - 8:55am

By Daniel W. Drezner

I think the Obama administration has come up with a novel way of dealing with the North Koreans -- get everyone to talk about something else. 

Half-seriously, this is not a bad idea, because I'm not sure that anything else is going to work better (beyond my modest Britney Spears proposal).  For this decade, the following facts have held: 

  1. North Korea wants to be able to trade its nuclear program for security guarantees and cash -- and then be able to do it again a few years later.
  2. The leadership in Pyongyang is perfectly willing to starve its own population rather than concede a smidgen of autonomy.
  3. No one is entirely sure about the internal politics of the DPRK elite.  This includes China, by the way. 
  4. None of the actors in the region want North Korea to collapse.  China and Russia likes the buffer, Seoul doesn't want to pony up the cash for reunification, and Japan (and China) doesn't want a unified Korean peninsula. 
  5. None of the actors in the region really want North Korea to proliferate either, but that's less important than a collapsing North Korea.  Proliferation is Somebody Else's Problem -- i.e., the Middle East rather than Northeast Asia. 
  6. So, oddly enough, the ideal short-term solution for the region is for the continued existence of the DPRK regime, the absence of any new nuclear activity, and some kid of "strategic ambiguity" regarding North Korea's nuclear status. 
  7. The alternatives to the repeated short-term carrot strategy are even less appealing.  There is no viable military option unless everyone is comfortable with the destruction of Seoul; there is no viable sanctions option unless China decides to cut off the energy tap, and they'll only do this if they're sure it won't lead to a stream of North Korea refugees entering Manchuria. 

The one thing that seems different this time around is that North Korea is really pulling out the stops this time to strip away the "pleasing illusion" that the U.N. Security Council will do something.  Paradoxically, this might actually goad China and Russia into doing something -- sanctions that might increase the likelihood of a DPRK collapse but also increase the likelihood of Pyongyang altering its behavior before that happens. 

If I, rather than my boss, were advising the Obama administration on this issue, the one other deliverable I would aim for in response to this latest provocation would be to get China to join the Proliferation Security Initiative.  China has resisted this for a whole bunch of reasons unrelated to North Korea.  If Beijing were to reverse course, it would make it much easier to engage in interdiction activities along North Korea's coast.  It would also signal to Pyongyang that, yes, there actually are some serious costs to thumbing one's nose at the U.N. Security Council.   

Am I missing anything?   

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