Monday, December 14, 2009 - 2:39 PM
Popular protests continue to occur in Iran, raising new doubts about the future of the clerical/Revolutionary Guard regime. Because predicting if or when a given regime will fall is difficult-to-impossible, nobody really knows where this is all headed. Nonetheless, it seems clear that popular discontent with the current government is widespread and unlikely to go away anytime soon, unless somebody is foolish enough to attack them militarily, thereby generating a new surge of national unity and giving the regime an excuse to crack down even more.
This situation got me thinking about the implications of regime change there, and I'll confess that I end up somewhat torn. I'll bet a lot of foreign policy experts think it would be a good thing if the current Iranian regime were replaced by a genuine democracy, and preferably by one that wasn't overly theocratic. A more accountable and less ideological regime would be better on human rights grounds, and many people also assume that such a government would be less interested in the nuclear option, less hostile to Israel, less supportive of groups like Hezbollah, and on the whole less of a threat to other U.S. interests (such as Persian Gulf oil).
I'm not so sure. On the one hand, I agree that the current regime is chaotic, corrupt, and deplorable on human rights grounds (though far less brutal than some governments with which the United States has had close relations). The regime's treatment of women is deplorable and the crackdown following the bogus election last summer is indefensible, and its support for groups like Hezbollah is hardly consistent with U.S. interests. Judged on purely human rights grounds, a more democratic and/or liberal government would clearly be preferable.
But we should not assume that far-reaching political change in Iran would eliminate all sources of conflict between Iran and the United States (or the West). It would have little effect on the nuclear issue: Iran has been seeking nuclear energy (and possibly nuclear weapons) ever since the Shah, and election "runner-up" Mir Hossein Mousavi supports the government's demands to control the full nuclear fuel cycle and has openly criticized President Ahmadinejad's initial support for an proposal to have France and Russia convert Iran's LEU stockpile into safe fuel for Tehran's research reactor. Iran was a more expansionist power under the Shah than it has been as an "Islamic Republic,", and the Shah also supported insurgent groups in other countries when he thought it suited Iranian interests. Nor were earlier Iranian governments beacons of tolerance and support for basic human rights. Persian nationalism and Iranian national pride remain powerful forces within the country as well, which means that a truly democratic Iranian regime would be pressed to defend Iran's regional interests as vigorously as its power permits.
Moreover, the realist in me warns that a more responsive, efficient, and less ideological government in Tehran might challenge the United States in ways that nobody has yet considered. Why? Because a more effective and intelligent government would be able to mobilize Iran's considerable latent power potential much more effectively than the clerical regime has.
In terms of power potential, Iran is the only state in the Persian Gulf with the latent capacity to dominate the oil-rich Persian Gulf, especially now that the ill-fated U.S. invasion in 2003 has shattered Iraq's military power and political cohesion and enhanced Iranian influence in Baghdad. Iran's population (65 million) far exceeds Iraq (28 million), or Saudi Arabia (22 million Saudis), and Iran's GDP ($306 billion) -- despite poor economic decision making, endemic corruption, and foreign embargoes-is nearly four times larger than Iraq ($84 billion) and not far behind Saudi Arabia ($446 billion). Iran has large oil and gas reserves, a young and fairly well-educated population, some decent universities, and a favorable geographic position. If Iran ever began to realize its latent potential, therefore, it would be an even more formidable player in the region than it is today.
Imagine, for example, a political shift that brought to power the Iranian equivalent of a Deng Xiaopeng. Imagine that this new government adopted smarter economic policies, a far-sighted development strategy, and a more adroit diplomatic posture. Instead of an Iranian leadership that gives stupid and counterproductive speeches questioning the Holocaust, imagine an Iranian leader who conducted an adroit public relations effort designed to show how reasonable Iran was being in the face of "unjustified" U.S. pressure. In other words, imagine an Iran that no longer suffered from self-inflicted wounds, and that focused on converting its latent power potential into real capabilities.
My point is that we often forget that we have been dealing with an Iran that is much less powerful than we are, and much weaker than it would have been under more effective leadership. Those who press for "regime change" in Iran assume that this would produce a government whose policy preferences were more in line with ours, and that the major conflicts that now exist between Tehran and Washington would quickly evaporate. Maybe so, but it might also produce a more effective and capable government that could defend Iranian interests more effectively, even when they clashed with ours.
In particular, bear in mind that a key goal of U.S. grand strategy has been to prevent any single power from dominating the oil-rich Persian Gulf. In other words, the United States has sought to maintain a balance of power in the region and make sure that there is no "regional hegemon" there. By contrast, Iran would undoubtedly prefer an imbalance of power in its favor, which is precisely the sort of situation the United States opposes.
This is not to say that American-Iranian rivalry is inevitable no matter who is in power in Tehran (or Washington), or that Obama's efforts to reopen dialogue with Iran's current government is misplaced. It is rather to suggest that reform (or even revolution) in Iran is not a magic bullet that will suddenly cause all sources of friction to disagree, and to raise the possibility that a smarter and more capable Iran might turn out to be more of a challenge than the government we are dealing with today.
So be careful what you wish for. (Now there's a good realist precept!) The triumph of the "Green Movement" in Iran might be desirable on purely moral grounds, but there is little reason to suppose that it would solve all (or even most) of our problems in the region. And that's all the more reason to resist the temptation to interfere within Iran itself: haven't recent events taught us that toppling foreign governments can lead to lots of unintended and undesirable consequences?
AFP/Getty Images
Thursday, July 9, 2009 - 11:58 AM

The death of Bela Kiraly earlier this week got me thinking about revolutionary contagion -- i.e., the spread of revolutionary movements across borders -- in the context of the recent turbulence in Iran. Kiraly was the Hungarian military officer who commanded the rebel forces in the 1956 uprising, a rebellion crushed by the Soviet army. He escaped into exile, but made a triumphant return to Hungary after communism fell.
Together with Nikita Khruschchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalinism, the Hungarian Revolution dealt a major blow to communism's ideological appeal. For several decades after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, communism seemed to be an attractive alternative to liberal capitalism and plenty of smart but gullible people succumbed to its allure. Western leaders worried that Bolshevism would spread rapidly in the 1920s and again after World War II, and an exaggerated (indeed, paranoid) fear of communist subversion was the essence of 1950s McCarthyism. But the exposure of Stalin's tyranny and the brutal suppression of revolts in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968) revealed Soviet communism for what it was: a brutal dictatorship that depended on the jackboot of the Red Army to survive or spread.
Marxism-Leninism did take root elsewhere, of course (most notably in China and Cuba), but China quickly broke free of the Soviet orbit and Moscow's other revolutionary clients tended to be weak, fractious, and dependent on Soviet subsidies. The United States enjoyed strong alliances with Western Europe and Japan (the other major centers of industrial power), while the USSR had to prop up its Eastern European satellites and recruit a lot of minor powers like Ethiopia, South Yemen, or North Korea. As a result, America's global alliance network dwarfed the Soviet system on most measures of latent and manifest power. With the benefit of hindsight, communism's eroding appeal was good news for the United States and its allies.
Now consider Iran. Back in 1979-1980, the Islamic Republic seemed to be the vanguard of an emerging wave of Islamic fundamentalism, and the novel combination of democratic structures (including more-or-less free elections) with religious oversight (via Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of velayet-e faqih, or "guardianship of the jurisprudent") seemed like it might be an attractive model for other predominantly Muslim societies. Because Khomeini sometimes portrayed Iran's experience as a model for others and spoke of the necessity of overthrowing "all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes," Iran's neighbors worried that the its revolution might prove contagious. Yet revolutionary Iran has been unable to export its principles elsewhere, and its influence over groups like Hezbollah depends more on material support than on ideological fidelity.
Here's the good news from Tehran. In the aftermath of a stolen election and a harsh government crackdown, the Islamic Republic is an even less attractive model for the many Arabs and/or Muslims who currently seek greater tolerance, openness, and engagement with the outside world. Ahmadinejad, Khamenei, and the Revolutionary Guards are clearly no more tolerant than the ruling elites in places like Syria, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, and they have no new model of governance to offer others. Ironically, Iran's ideological appeal would have been enhanced had Ahmaninejad & Co. run a fair election and permitted the Iranian people to express their preferences without coercive interference, but they didn't do that.
The one remaining tool in Iran's ideological arsenal is anti-Americanism, which still plays well in the region. The United States can defuse that weapon too, if we continue to adjust our policies in ways that are more consonant with our overall interests. Obama's Cairo speech and his more principled position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are steps in the right direction, as is pragmatic engagement with Syria and a gradual shift back to an "offshore balancing" strategy in the Gulf. None of these steps will solve all our problems in the Middle East, of course, but they will make it harder forTehran to score points by criticizing the United States and its allies.
The ability of Iran's current rulers to suppress the current challenge to their rule is both disheartening and unsurprising, but there is a silver lining. By forcing them to reveal their true colors, recent events have further diminished whatever regional appeal the Islamic Republic might once have possessed. If Obama's diplomatic outreach to Iran does not succeed and we are forced to rely on some combination of containment and deterrence, Iran's tarnished image will make that task much easier.
ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images
Wednesday, July 8, 2009 - 2:09 PM

Last weekend's kerfluffle over Vice President Joe Biden's supposed "green light" for an Israeli attack on Iran was perplexing on several grounds. Appearing on ABC's This Week, Biden told interviewer George Stephanopoulos the United States could not "dictate to another sovereign nation what they can and cannot do when they make a determination ... that they're existentially threatened." Some observers saw this as a typical Biden-esque gaffe, while others interpreted his statement as a subtle way to up the pressure on Tehran and as a sign that the administration's position was hardening in the aftermath of the disputed Iranian election. A third view saw Biden's statement as a veiled warning that if Israel chose to act, they would face the consequences on their own.
All this speculation missed the more important features of the situation. First, Biden was in one sense merely stating a truism: Israel is a sovereign nation, and it is inconceivable that United States would physically prevent it from attacking Iran even if we believed (correctly) that it was a stupid move. In the end, international politics is a "self-help" system, and Biden was simply acknowledging that in an anarchic order, all states ultimately depend on their own resources and strategies.
Second, it doesn't really matter if the United States gives Israel a "green light" or not. If Israel were to attack Iran, the United States would be implicated in the attack even if we had told them not to do it. The United States is Israel's main ally and the source of the advanced weapons it would be using to carry out the attack. Despite his current difficulties with the Netanyahu government, President Obama has repeatedly emphasized the special nature of the U.S.-Israeli relationship -- just as his predecessors did -- and he referred to America's bond with Israel as "unbreakable" in his recent Cairo speech. In the eyes of most of the world -- including Iran -- the United States and Israel are joined at the hip.
As a result, the U.S. image suffers whenever Israel does something that others find objectionable -- like building settlements, bombing Lebanon or blockading Gaza -- even in those rare cases where the United States does oppose the actions in question. If we do oppose the use of force against Iran, therefore, top U.S. officials have to say so clearly and repeatedly, and not just whenever the Veep gets careless.
Unfortunately, right now an Israeli attack would appear to many to have tacit U.S. support. Prominent pundits and former officials have been pushing for stronger measures for some time, and at least one hardliner -- former special envoy to Iran Dennis Ross -- is now working in the White House. Washington will be blamed for an attack even if it wasn't our idea, because it is so closely tied to Tel Aviv and has made an issue of Iran’s nuclear program in the past.
As I've said before, the only way to convince Iran not to seek a nuclear weapons capability is to take the threat of force off the table and see if Iran's leaders will agree to forego weaponization under strict international safeguards. That approach may well fail, which would force Israel and the United States to fall back on a strategy of deterrence. But the post-election crackdown in Iran doesn’t mean that its leaders are either irrational or suicidal; if anything, it shows that they are just garden-variety authoritarians desperate to cling to their power and prerogatives. Deterrence will work, even if it is not our first preference.
In short, we are more-or-less where we were before. Preventive war could delay but not eliminate Iran’s nuclear problem, and an attack would only reinforce Iran's desire for a bomb of their own. Trying to foment regime change is more likely to strengthen the hardliners than to weaken their grip. The only realistic option is diplomacy, and Biden's loose talk didn't alter that reality either. But it is one of those issues where clarity is preferable to ambiguity, and where the administration needs to speak with one voice.
SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, June 23, 2009 - 2:06 PM

The New York Times has an important piece today on why Iran's clerical regime is unlikely to fall in the face of the current wave of protests. The short version is that Iran's rulers have several overlapping security organizations that they can call upon: the police, some three million members of paramilitary Basij, the 120,000-strong Revolutionary Guards, and an army of some 400,000. All report to Ayatollah Khameini and as far as one can tell from news reports, none of them show significant signs of disintegrating.
This story points to a serious lacuna in our understanding of what is happening in Iran. Despite the government’s efforts to exclude correspondents and shut down other channels of information (e.g., the Internet), we've been getting lots of reports and videos from the reformist forces. But I haven't seen any interviews or tweets from Basij members or Revolutionary Guards, or from the millions of Iranians who did in fact vote for Ahmadinejad. In short, we have no good way of knowing how firm the government’s position really is.
The literature on revolutionary upheavals teaches that governments do not fall so long as the leadership remains resolute and the security forces and the army remain loyal. If the Basij, Revolutionary Guards, and other security elements remain willing to follow orders -- and that seems to be the case so far -- then Iran's current leaders will remain in charge.
The only prospect for genuine revolution that I can see would be a prolonged and growing wave of popular discontent -- general strikes, funeral demonstrations that get bigger over time (as they did in 1979), etc., -- that begins to make normal life impossible, does further damage to Iran’s already-troubled economy and eventually leads to a major rift among the current rulers and to a major reshuffling of the leadership. But it is hard for me to imagine Khameini or Ahmadinejad boarding a plane into exile the way the Shah did in 1979.
Yet even if the current regime survives the present challenge, the impact of the crisis is likely to be salutary. Iran's appeal as a model of Islamic governance has been tarnished by this episode: instead of being the principled defenders of the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary vision of the "rule of the jurisprudent," his successors now look more like garden-variety authoritarians trying to hang onto privilege and power in the face of widespread popular discontent. And that means Muslims elsewhere will be less inclined to see Tehran as an inspiration, even if they are unhappy with political conditions in their own countries.
The current crisis may also put to rest a lot of the bellicose talk about military action. In recent years, advocates of "kinetic action" (read: preventive war) against Iran have sought to portray it as a nation of wild-eyed revolutionary fanatics, led by Holocaust-denying zealots who openly crave martyrdom and would therefore be willing to fire nuclear weapons at other countries even if it led to their own destruction. That alarmist image was always pretty ludicrous, and it looks increasingly inappropriate today. In the wake of this stolen election (and see here for more evidence of electoral chicanery), Iran's rulers looks less like a group of fanatics and more like a group of grumpy old men. I don't see Osama bin Laden or Che or Qutb or even Khomeini; I see Brezhnev, Andropov, Mussolini, or Ceaucescu. It is also clear that a sizeable segment of Iran’s population -- and especially its younger members -- isn't interested in a confrontation with the West and simply wants many of the freedoms that we claim to cherish. They are also patriots who love their country, however, and the surest way to turn them against us and to reinforce Ahmadinejad et al would be to start dropping a lot of smart bombs on them.
In fact, we actually do know precisely how to deal with this sort of situation. As we learned during the Cold War, the proper response to thuggish authoritarian regimes is containment via deterrence, combined with hardnosed diplomacy on specific security issues and a sustained effort to win over their societies by showing them that we know how to produce a better way of life. That strategy won the Cold War without the manifold dangers of preventive war, and probably saved millions of lives in the process. The clerics and their front man may hang on for now, and they might even get a few (unusable) nuclear weapons one day. But time is on our side, and we can afford to be patient.
OLIVIER LABAN-MATTEI/AFP/Getty Images
Thursday, June 18, 2009 - 4:13 PM

Like many of you, I'm sure, I remain preoccupied with the events in Iran. It's impossible to know exactly how events will evolve or what the medium-term significance will be, but the turmoil is as gripping as it was unexpected. In terms of Iran's people having a government that is more responsive to their wishes -- and in particular, one that is open to the sort of relaxation of tensions that the Obama administration has sought -- my hopes are with the anti-Ahmadinejad forces.
But we shouldn't succumb to the illusion that Ahmadinejad's defeat and Mousavi's triumph (or more broadly, the triumph of the anti-government demonstrators) would produce a dramatic shift in Iran’s foreign policy, and especially its nuclear energy program (and any nuclear weapons ambitions it may have).
For one thing, Moussavi himself has been a supporter of the nuclear program for many years, and the Times reported today that it was he who authorized the purchase of Iran's first centrifuges back in the 1980s. For another, public opinion surveys in Iran have shown that the vast majority of Iranians support the nuclear program. This means that a lot of the people wearing green and marching in the streets are not going to subsequently demand that Iran abandon its efforts to master the full fuel cycle.
Even if Iran were to become a full-fledged liberal democracy, it would not necessarily abandon its nuclear ambitions, including the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons. Right now, five of the world's nine nuclear weapons states are democracies (the United States, France, Great Britain, India and Israel), so being democratic hardly precludes wanting a nuclear arsenal.
The good news is that the history of the nuclear age demonstrates that nuclear weapons do not enable their possessors to conquer or threaten others with impunity, and thus don't provide much in the way of an offensive or coercive capability. Having tens of thousands of nukes didn't permit the United States or Soviet Union to blackmail other countries during the Cold War, having a handful of nukes hasn't enabled Kim Jong Il to dictate to anybody, and having a sizeable nuclear arsenal doesn't allow Israel to tell Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, or its various other adversaries what to do.
In fact, nuclear weapons are good for only one or two things: 1) protecting your own territory (and maybe the territory of especially close allies) against conquest and occupation, and 2) making it hard for others to coerce you. As IAEA head Mohammed El-Baradei said of Iran yesterday, "They want to send a message to their neighbors, to the rest of the world, 'Don't mess with us,'" adding that "it is also an insurance policy against what they have heard in the past about regime change."
So while I continue to hope that the reformist forces triumph, we shouldn’t be under any illusions about the short-to-medium term impact of the "revolution" on the major issues that currently divide us.
Getty Images
Thursday, June 18, 2009 - 9:47 AM
My point was about not recognizing now. As to the future, we have to see what it brings. A day is a long time right now in Iranian politics. So let's take this one day at a time for now."
Fine by me. And his blog has been a fascinating read since the election, not least for his spirited debunking of a lot of foolish neoconservative posturing on these events.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009 - 7:45 AM

The big Iran news today is that the Guardian Council, the clerical body that oversees elections and is controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has agreed to recount certain ballots disputed by Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign.
This is, of course, a ruse -- a delaying tactic meant to divide the opposition by peeling off its most moderate members. Mousavi wants a complete annulment of Friday's official results.
Also of note: Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani -- who has congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his "victory" -- blamed the interior ministry for the recent attacks on students at Tehran University.
Hossein Ali Montazeri -- Iran's most prominent "dissident ayatollah" -- is now telling the protesters to use peaceful means to express their grievances. I'm not sure how influential Montazeri, once thought to be Khomenei's heir, really is today, but his opinion surely carries some weight. There's still no word from Rafsanjani. [UPDATE: Translation of Montazeri's statement.]
Finally, I'm sad to learn that reformist cleric Mohammad Ali Abtahi has reportedly been arrested. I've been reading his blog sporadically for years, but it seems to be offline now. Abtahi, a former Khatami deputy who backed Karroubi in these elections, was frequently quoted in the Western press.
It will be interesting to see what happens during today's dueling demonstrations, and whether Mousavi's call for a general strike is being observed. State media has called on Iranians to protest against "outlaws," and Mousavi is reportedly telling his supporters not to demonstrate today. Still, that's what he said yesterday -- and people came out in droves anyway. It's not clear to what extent he controls this movement.
One ominous sign that Ahmadinejad thinks he has this situation under control? He went ahead with a planned trip to Russia despite the unrest back home. I see that he met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Perhaps the two of them compared notes on how to steal an election?
VLADIMIR RODIONOV/AFP/Getty Images
Monday, June 15, 2009 - 6:07 PM
As anticipated, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke on Iran during his appearance with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi this evening. And he reiterated, according to the pool report filed by McClatchy's Steve Thomma, the message Vice President Joseph Biden said Sunday: that Washington intends to try to engage Iran despite the election dispute, because it considers it in U.S. interests to do so. But he also told the Iranian people that "the world is watching" and is "inspired" by the participation:
"I have always felt that, as odious a I feel some of President Ahmadinejad's statements (are), as deep as the differences that exist between the United States and Iran on core issues, the use of tough hard headed diplomacy, diplomacy without illusions, is critical when it comes to pursuing a core set of national security interests....
"We will continue to pursue a tough direct dialogue between our two countries."
He also said he and the world are watching the protests of Iranians who think their votes were stolen.
"I am deeply troubled by the violence that I've been seeing on television. I think that the democratic process, free speech, the ability of people to peacefully dissent, all those are universal values and need to be respected," he said.
"When I see violence perpetrated on people who are peacefully dissenting....and whenever the American people see that, I think they are rightfully troubled.
To those people, he added, "I would say that the world is watching and inspired by the participation."
With no independent U.S. observers of the election, the president added, according to Thomma, that "he could not comment on allegations of vote fraud. He noted that the Iranian government promised an investigation, and said he hoped it would be done fairly and without any further violence."
Monday, June 15, 2009 - 3:36 PM
I have been out of the country the past several days and regret that this is my first post on the absolutely stunning events unfolding in Iran. I was up way past my bedtime last night reading and otherwise catching up on the mountain news, pictures, videos, and Twitter feeds that I had missed (a task made far easier by the inspired and Stakhanovite blogging of Andrew Sullivan). Taking this all in at once was an overwhelming experience. I'm not sure what the word is for a feeling of exhilaration laced with horror, but that is what I felt, and still feel, watching hundreds of thousands of Iranians try to lift the boot off their faces, while also seeing the bloody price that many are paying for it.
At this point, the validity of the election results seems so shrouded in "serious, substantive, detailed charges of voter fraud" -- to quote Steve Hayes -- as to make a stolen election a sound assumption until credible, better evidence emerges to the contrary - evidence that is not offered in either of the op-eds by Ken Ballen and Patrick Doherty or Flyntt and Hillary Mann Leverett. I mean, would any serious person point to a poll taken in early October as evidence of how a U.S. election would turn out, especially when a majority of respondents said they were "undecided"? Of course not. So let's not treat Iran any different. The real question, it seems to me (and here I agree with Bill Kristol), is less whether the election was falsified than what to do about it?
Hopefully President Obama will finally begin addressing this question when he speaks at 5 PM Eastern today. I understand his reasons for silence thus far (gather information, hedge bets, preserve options, etc.), but the Obama administration's failure to utter anything more than, in essence, "we're monitoring the situation, and it's not all pleasant" is woefully inadequate and quite embarrassing. A better alternative would start with demonstrating that Obama is willing to spend his immense soft power capital, not just accrue it.
Some have suggested that U.S. statements of support for Iran's peaceful dissidents would be perceived as meddling and thus counterproductive. Well, not if you write it correctly. Obama should make clear that neither he nor the U.S. government wish to pick winners in Iran's election. That's up to the Iranian people, and we support their right to cast their ballots for whomever they wish -- and to have those votes counted. No one should be excluded. Just as importantly, Obama should make clear that Iranians are the rightfully proud stewards of a great civilization -- one that has deep traditions of democracy and popular sovereignty -- and this makes it all the more sad and troubling for the world to watch as members of Iran's government inflict violence upon fellow Iranians and fellow Muslims for peacefully expressing their desire to have their voices heard. That is not justice.
Obama should wrap his own message in as broad a multilateral package as possible. He should lean heavily on countries to withdraw recognitions of an Ahmadinejad victory and instead push them to issue statements expressing deep concerns about the street violence and reports of voter fraud. He should exert some diplomatic muscle to keep other governments from prematurely jumping off of this line as well. He should instruct Secretary Clinton to coordinate a joint statement, perhaps under the auspices of the G-7, to begin shaping this line into a new international consensus while more information is gathered. The administration should also make a run at getting a U.N. Security Council statement to this effect. Though it's unlikely that Russia and China will agree to such a statement, Obama should force them to scuttle it publicly. The international principle for action right now should be "do no harm."
Most importantly, Obama needs to make it clear that a continuation or escalation of the violence by the Iranian regime against the Iranian people will diminish the chances of improving relations with the United States. This will give the courageous men and women now in the streets of Iran significant cover to stay there if they think that is the right course of action. It will also send the right signals to other autocratic governments in the Middle East and beyond, all of which are watching to see how willing Obama is to put his money where his mouth was in Cairo -- or whether his desire to engage the Iranian government trumps any concern for how it treats its people. No one should believe that other heavy-handed governments aren't watching our actions intently, and if they sense indifference on Obama's part to the plight of Iran's dissidents, no one should expect that things won't get a whole lot uglier for decent people with audacious hopes of their own in places like Egypt or Syria or Russia.
This is hardly an exhaustive list, and Obama should have done it already. But this evening is better late than never. As for what actions are warranted beyond that, we'll just have to see how things develop.
Monday, June 15, 2009 - 1:04 PM
Writing on ForeignPolicy.com late last month, analyst Mehrzad Boroujerdi described Mir-Hossein Mousavi's Iranian election campaign as something of a potato revolution:
[P]otatoes, it seems, have everything to do with the Iranian elections this year. Ramping up the public distribution of potatoes, along with a wide range of other government subsidies and alms, has become Ahmadinejad's preferred strategy for buying votes. While the Western world has focused on the incumbent's inflammatory statements about the Holocaust and his confrontationist nuclear policy, his domestic critics have focused their ire on his flawed economic remedies and populist demagogy, in addition to his erratic diplomatic style. Hence, potatoes, and the surprise return of Mousavi, a man little known outside Iran.
Well, Mousavi looks to agree. Speaking at a rally today, an observer's twitter feed reports him saying:
These masses were not brought by bus or by threat. They were not brought for potatoes. They came themselves."
Potatoes, it seems, just don't buy what they used to in Iran... and I doubt revolution was the purchase that Ahmadinejad had in mind.
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