Earlier this week, intelligence officials released new evidence confirming that the "Box on the Euphrates" near al-Kibar in Syria was in fact a nuclear reactor. They also released photographs that they used to argue that North Korea was providing significant levels of assistance to the reactor project in Syria.

The Syrian facility apparently contained a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor (a derivation from the Calder Hall design) extremely similar to the reactor at Yongbyon. It's a relatively simple design, extensively described in the public domain, and one that's capable of producing plutonium useable in nuclear weapons. Despite the surfeit of publicly available information on the reactor, the intelligence community firmly asserts that, in this case, the design information came from North Korea.

Noting that the Syrian reactor seemed ill-suited to electricity production (not least because there were no detectable power lines leading away from the site), intelligence analysts also concluded that it would have few uses other than for producing plutonium for an illicit nuclear weapons program. Israel came to a similar conclusion and, judging this to be a potentially existential threat, bombed the reactor as a result.

These revelations raise more questions than they answer. For instance, why release this evidence now? The analysts said it was hoped that, among other things, releasing this information would prod the North Koreans to be more forthcoming in the six-party talks. It seems just as likely that they may just be infuriated and walk away from negotiations (there is no public sign of such a reaction yet, though).

Perhaps most notable in the briefing on Thursday was how coy the analysts were being about the possibility that Syria has a covert nuclear weapons program. They noted very specifically that "there is no reprocessing facility in the region of al Kibar," but refused to elaborate when asked whether the Syrians might be building such a facility elsewhere. They also refused to comment on how Syria might have been planning to acquire the natural uranium required to fuel the reactor and they dodged a question about how North Korean diplomats have so far reacted to this disclosure.

These omissions could be designed to minimize diplomatic blowback -- perhaps the administration simply hoped to nudge the North Koreans gently, rather than shove them -- or perhaps the spooks simply don’t have much more information. Hopefully the North Korean and Syrian reactions over the next week or so will provide more insight. Watch this space.

ROBYN BECK/AFP/Getty Images

Even undeniably "puerile" debates can sometimes cough up interesting tidbits, and, on Wednesday, Hillary Clinton proposed an interesting way to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions: Extend nuclear deterrence to "those countries [in the region] that are willing to go under the security umbrella and forswear their own nuclear [weapons] ambitions." Unfortunately, moderator George Stephanopolous did not ask any follow-up questions, even though Sen. Clinton’s idea certainly merits a closer look.

The concept of a "nuclear umbrella" has been around almost since the Cold War and the nuclear arms race began. At the most basic level, it involves a nuclear- weapons state promising to use its nukes to respond if non-nuclear ally is attacked with nuclear weapons. Cold War strategists hoped that "extending" nuclear deterrence like this would cement important alliances and, crucially, eliminate the need for those countries to develop their own nukes. A nuclear umbrella is thus a tool of both diplomacy and of nonproliferation.

The key question here is credibility. How, for instance, would you convince the Soviets that the United States really would risk New York to defend Paris? During the Cold War, U.S. strategists achieved this credibility in several ways (pdf). First, American troops were deployed heavily in allied territory, placing them in the way of any nuclear attack. Second, U.S. nuclear weapons were often deployed in forward locations and sometimes integrated into allied command structures. Third, the umbrella only got extended to countries with which the United States already had strong alliances.

Unfortunately, even in Gulf regimes that are friendly to America, all of these preconditions are weak or nonexistent (pdf) -- which does not bode well for Sen. Clinton’s proposal. In addition, Iran does not have the ability to project power globally like the Soviet Union did, making any direct threat to U.S. interests unlikely. I should also note that any Iranian nuclear weapon is still a long ways off, and attempting to deter the Iranians is premature at this point.

However, the idea is still worth exploring as a contingency plan, and new ways of establishing credibility and commitment might be possible -- for instance, extending a missile-defense "umbrella," even one that doesn't work very well yet. But although technical measures like these may be part of the solution to U.S. problems in the Middle East, they can't supplant a broader strategy that uses all the diplomatic, political, and economic levers at America's disposal.

-/AFP/Getty Images

North Korea has been stepping up incendiary rhetoric in the past few days, ostensibly in response to South Korean comments that it would attack the North's nuclear installations in the event that Pyongyang launched atomic weapons. Once the North's preemptive attack is underway, the Korean Central News Agency declared, "everything will turn to ashes, not just a sea of flames."

Coupled with missile tests and diplomatic maneuvers, these comments are worrisome but not necessarily out of the ordinary for Pyongyang. Nevertheless, North Korea's claim is worth investigating: Can it really turn "everything" into ashes, or even "just" a sea of flames, given its relatively miniscule nuclear arsenal?

If "everything" means all of South Korea, the answer is definitely no. If it means Seoul, the question requires a bit more examination. Basically we need to know how many nuclear weapons Pyongyang has and how powerful they are. Knowing these facts allows some projections that, while extremely rough, are nonetheless interesting.

Very little reliable information exists, but based on aggregated seismic data from North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, Harvard analyst Hui Zhang estimates (pdf) that the yield of that explosion was between 0.5 and 2 kilotons (for comparison, the yield of the weapon used at Hiroshima was about 15 kilotons, while other countries' first nuclear tests generally yielded 9 kilotons or above). For simplicity’s sake, let's assume North Korea's test yielded about a kiloton. It is even more unclear what the weapon was designed to yield, but it was probably supposed to be between 4 and 20 kilotons.

As for the number of weapons, North Korea has recently declared (pdf) that it has 30 kilograms of separated, potentially weapons-usable plutonium. More almost certainly exists, but all of Pyongyang's usable plutonium has probably not been made into weapons. Since an implosion-type weapon requires (pdf) about 5 kg of plutonium, North Korea likely has at most six weapons.

Excluding fires and making some other simplifications, if we assume that Pyongyang can do no better than a 1-kiloton air burst, each explosion would kill about 50 percent of the population within a fifth of a mile. Six bombs would therefore kill half the population within about two thirds of a square mile -- an area encompassing not even half a percent of Seoul, which is about 234 square miles.

If, on the other hand, North Korea has six 10-kiloton bombs, it could kill 50 percent of the population in just over 3 square miles of Seoul -- slightly over 1 percent of the city's area. These calculations are probably very conservative, but even if the damages wildly exceeded expectations it seems unlikely more than 10 percent of Seoul's area would see widespread destruction. I certainly do not intend to minimize the horror of that level of death and destruction. But if North Korea wants to burn all of Seoul to ash, it is going to need more than a tiny nuclear arsenal to do so.

KARIM SAHIB/AFP/Getty Images

Nicolas Sarkozy has been raising quite a few eyebrows since he assumed the presidency, not least by leveraging French civilian nuclear expertise to gain diplomatic advantage in the Middle East. This week, the International Herald Tribune noted "unease" among nonproliferation experts "at the idea of exporting potentially nuclear-bomb usable technologies to proliferation-prone regions." The article also notes that, even putting proliferation concerns aside, obstacles to the large-scale spread of nuclear power exist -- some of which include high infrastructure costs, waste management issues, and personnel shortages.

France is not the only country seeking ways to surmount such obstacles, though. The U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is one of the best known of these initiatives. The core proposal behind GNEP is to employ advanced reprocessing technology to close the nuclear fuel cycle as much as possible. This entails recycling burnt nuclear fuel over and over until it is no longer useful for producing electricity or weapons. In so doing, GNEP aims to increase effective fuel supplies, decrease the amount of waste produced by nuclear power plants, and reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation. As initially conceived, existing nuclear exporters would (exclusively) perform enrichment and reprocessing services and provide them to any GNEP partner that agreed to refrain from enriching or reprocessing fuel on its own.

So far, it has signed on 21 nations as partners and has several others observing or interested. Most recently, the UK joined, praising GNEP for promoting "responsible nuclear development." In theory, this all sounds great, but GNEP has been attacked from several angles. Perhaps most crucially, the National Academies of Science and Engineering found that the required technologies are "too early in development" to justify large-scale implementation. Others (pdf) argue that reprocessing is economically unsound (at least for now); that waste issues won't be eased significantly; and that, using current technology, the initiative may actually be more proliferation-prone than the current nuclear fuel cycle.

As a result, Congress slashed funding for GNEP in the FY2008 budget, but the Bush administration has requested a significant increase for FY09. In addition, the program does seem to have broad international appeal. Partners include countries as widely spread as Bulgaria, Ghana, Poland, Senegal, and South Korea. With so many other nations involved, GNEP seems likely to persist in some form despite congressional opposition. But given the state of reprocessing science today and the political restrictions under which it operates, GNEP will likely undergo some significant changes in the future.

Late Wednesday night, the U.S.S. Lake Erie used its Aegis missile-defense system to shoot down an ailing reconnaissance satellite as it passed over the Pacific. Aegis is a key piece of the larger U.S. missile-defense system, combining extremely sophisticated ship-borne radars with heat-seeking interceptor missiles that can reach targets in low orbits (such as short- to mid-range ballistic missiles). After successfully using Aegis to knock out a target it was ostensibly never designed for, some may ask if this test of the system proves that the American missile-defense system works.

In a word, the answer is no. The mission is a qualified success for Aegis, since satellites and ballistic missiles share many characteristics at certain stages of flight. But taking out a crippled satellite and destroying an attacking ballistic missile are not the same thing. Most importantly, the satellite's trajectory was known in great detail and it could not maneuver under its own power. That's not the case for enemy ballistic missiles, which have unknown trajectories for large portions of their flights (though we can often guess where they're headed). Advanced missiles, moreover, are likely to be able to maneuver themselves midcourse and release decoys to confuse the missile-defense interceptors. Since shooting a missile out of the sky is a lot like hitting a bullet with another bullet, precise positioning data is crucial.

Finally, Navy personnel were able to choose the location and timing of the intercept. This allowed them to maximize visibility, to wait until the seas were calm enough for an ideal launch, and to keep as many radars and telescopes as necessary nearby to guide the interceptor and track the launch. The satellite was also several times larger than a ballistic missile would have been and was therefore easier to see.

That said, the fact that the Pentagon was able to reprogram missile-defense hardware for an anti-satellite shot in roughly a month is a geopolitically loaded development. China and Russia have long suspected that U.S. missile-defense programs were cover for eventual space warfare capabilities. Indeed, the Pentagon tacitly acknowledged the momentous nature of the mission by giving the secretary of defense final launch authority, rather than the captain of the Lake Erie. Now watch how many other countries suddenly find their satellites are crippled and need to be shot down -- purely for safety reasons, of course.

David Albright/ISIS

Recent reports from European diplomats have revealed a worrisome development: Iran is testing a new, more sophisticated type of centrifuge for enriching uranium. On a technical level, this demonstrates the skills of Iran's engineers, who appear to have applied "considerable technical creativity" to solve problems caused by manufacturing limitations along with export controls and sanctions. Politically, it demonstrates that Iran has, for now, no intention of bowing to U.N. Security Council demands and ceasing its enrichment activities.

Dubbed the IR-2, Iran's new centrifuge model is an Iranian-designed variant of the P-2 centrifuge used in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The original P-2 design, obtained by Iran in 1995 from the A.Q. Khan network, was apparently too difficult for Iran's engineers to manufacture without help. Iranian experts have reportedly succeeded in building and testing a few at Iran's enrichment plant in Natanz, but the Institute for Science and International Security believes (pdf) that Iran cannot make large numbers of the IR-2 without importing certain key items.

Even though the IR-2 appears to be easier for Iran to build, the new centrifuge maintains the same production capacity as Pakistan's P-2. Both can enrich uranium about 2.5 times faster than the P-1 centrifuges Iran has already been running at Natanz. Under optimal conditions, about 1,200 IR-2 centrifuges would need to operate for a year to make enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear warhead. The same goal would require about 3,000 P-1 centrifuges. (Natanz probably has about this many P-1s, but they have not been operating at full capacity.)

While not proof that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, perfection of the IR-2 could make a nuclear "breakout" scenario more feasible in the medium term. Iran has had some trouble perfecting operation of the P-1 centrifuges it already has, but one nuclear official said the IR-2 was "more ingenious" than the unreliable P-1. The comment implies that the new design might be easier for Iran to operate. That fact, coupled with a much higher rate of production, would make it much easier for Iran to make quick progress to high levels of enrichment (and, therefore, a nuclear weapon), if it decides to go that route. Notably, Iran was also able to develop the new centrifuge in secret. If the Iranians were able to hide development of a new centrifuge, might they also be more likely able to hide continuing weapons development?

That said, relatively little concrete information on this development is in the public domain. Watch this space for more detailed commentary when the IAEA releases its next report, hopefully at the end of the month.

The smelter, from a photo taken between 1911 and 1916 (Via SMH).

When pricing a house next door to the contaminated site of a former uranium smelter, even a house with waterfront access, most realtors would aim low. In Sydney, though, one such house is on the market for roughly $3.6 million. The realtor describes the site nearby, full of radioactive dirt contaminated with "traces" of uranium and thorium, as just "a slight variation from the norm."

Not surprisingly, the house has been on the market for awhile. Many potential buyers have expressed interest, but so far nobody has purchased it (the crackle of Geiger counters from across the street may have something to do with this). As nuclear power expands, though, it is worth examining just how dangerous such contamination can really be.

Few specifics about the case in Sydney have been released, but it is possible to speak generally about the materials involved. Uranium is only mildly radioactive, and exposure even to high levels of uranium is not known to cause cancer (high levels, if ingested, can cause kidney and tissue damage, though). So, "traces" of it are unlikely to be dangerous. Thorium can give you cancer if you inhale it in large amounts (or possibly when you ingest it), but has not been known to cause birth defects or fertility problems, as some other radioactive materials can. Again, "traces" of thorium are likely harmless.

The wild card in this situation is the radioactivity from the soil. When certain types of powerful radiation encounter everyday materials, those materials can become "activated." In other words, they become radioactive (to a weaker degree) themselves. However, after nearly a century, the soil at this site in Sydney would have reverted to a very low, though perhaps above "background," level of radioactivity. (The New South Wales government and an independent consultancy say the radiation level is higher than background, but safe.)

While a higher than usual level of radiation in the area sounds scary, it is probably not all that dangerous. Many studies have found that constant exposure to low levels of radiation does not pose a health risk. One study, performed by the U.S. National Cancer Institute, found no increased cancer risk for people living near 62 large nuclear facilities. If nuclear power spreads, we should remain vigilant, but there is no need for paranoia.   

JOE KLAMAR/AFP/Getty Images

Last summer I wrote briefly about the "nuclear renaissance," the widely anticipated shift to nuclear power as oil prices skyrocket and concern about global warming increases. Such anticipation has given rise to comments like this one, from the head of the French nuclear giant Areva:

We are facing a nuclear renaissance. Nuclear's not the devil anymore. The devil is coal."

Earlier this month, predictions of a nuclear renaissance were seemingly borne out in Britain, when the government announced its support for the construction of new nuclear power plants in the country to replace the current, aging fleet of reactors. All but one of Britain's nuclear power plants, which together supply 20 percent of the country's electricity, are slated to close by 2023. Because the lead time for constructing new reactors is so long (due to regulatory and construction requirements), a decision to replace the current fleet must be made soon.

The fine print of the British government's decision, though, highlights just how uncertain the nuclear renaissance still is. Energy companies will almost certainly pay the full costs of building and operating the new plants in the UK, but it remains unclear whether this will be economically feasible for them—especially since the government hasn't determined how nuclear waste will be disposed and who will pay for it. But the British public is warming to the idea of nuclear power, so there may be increasing pressure on policymakers to find solutions to these issues.

Not so in Germany, where opposition to nukes remains deeply entrenched. A program to completely phase out the country's nuclear power generation has been in place for seven years. Politicians and the public remain supportive of eliminating nuclear power, but polls show most Germans have no sense of how much their country currently relies on nuclear energy. This may have something to do with Germany's near-fanatical fondness for solar power. Polls also show that 63 percent of Germans believe solar power can provide most of their energy needs over the next three decades. (In fact, only 0.4 percent of cloudy Germany's electricity is solar-generated.)

With prospects for a global nuclear renaissance still murky, it should not be surprising that the big nuclear energy companies like Areva in France or RWE and E.ON in Germany are casting their sights on Britain for new business opportunities. Within Germany, though, we may soon find out whether other types of low-carbon energy sources are ultimately feasible for large-scale electricity production. If not, technologies like nuclear energy or carbon capture for coal power will need a second look.

NARINDER NANU/AFP/Getty

On January 1, 2008, amid all the turmoil resulting from the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazhir Bhutto, Pakistan and India quietly exchanged detailed data on the locations of their nuclear facilities. Intended as a confidence-building measure, this exchange has been happening annually since 1992, under the terms of the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities.

The agreement has held through both countries' nuclear tests in 1998, a standoff over Kashmir in 2001, and numerous terrorist provocations, so it should not be too surprising that the exchange occurred successfully in the midst of the current tension in the region. The fact that it occurred again, however, does indicate that the country’s troubles have not affected the Army—historically the strongest institution in Pakistan and the backbone of the government—enough to prevent it from keeping its international obligations.

While this exchange is a pretty thin reed with which to divine the current state of Pakistan’s government, nuclear confidence-building measures like this have a long and relatively successful history. The two Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (STARTs) involved the exchange of copious amounts of data between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and later Russia), in order to build confidence and allow nuclear arsenals to shrink. Today, with START II about to expire and no renewal in sight, many experts believe we are losing a critical tool for maintaining confidence between Russia and the United States.

The Indo-Pakistani information exchange is all the more significant because of the sensitivity of the data provided. Pakistan, for instance, has been unwilling to provide the United States with the locations of its critical nuclear sites, which has hindered U.S. attempts to help improve the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Let's hope more disclosures of sensitive information between India and Pakistan can further defuse tensions in the future.

With Vladimir Putin newly christened as Time's "Person of the Year" and oil prices still high, it's probably a safe bet that Russia will keep flexing its diplomatic muscles in 2008. One area to watch is the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which roiled U.S.-Russian relations throughout 2007. At issue is the U.S. decision to place ten BMD interceptors in Poland and a related decision to place a BMD radar facility in the Czech Republic.

Contention over U.S. BMD proposals in Europe has been simmering at least since May of 2006, but the war of words ratcheted up a notch last week when, following "disappointing" talks with the United States, Russian Army Chief of Staff Yuri Baluevsky said that using the interceptors based in Poland could trigger a retaliatory strike from Russia. Presumably he was referring to the possibility that the Russian early warning radars would mistake the interceptors as part of a nuclear attack. That could conceivably spur a hair-trigger response from Russia, which, if it happened, could involve massive nuclear retaliation.

Yet Russia's threat isn't as credible as it may seem. First, the reliability of the Russian early warning system—consisting of radar installations and satellites—is highly questionable. While Russia's concerns about not being able to distinguish between an offensive missile launch and a defensive interceptor launch are valid, there are also valid concerns that the Russian system would not be able to detect either type of launch reliably.

Second, BMD interceptors are fundamentally a defensive weapon. They will launch only in response to an attack or missile launch elsewhere (the United States claims its nascent system is aimed at Iran, but interceptors based in Poland could also block missiles from Russia). The interceptors alone therefore could not be mistaken for a threat to Russia. For that, a launch of offensive missiles would be required. 

Russia's real concern is probably twofold. First, BMD interceptors in Poland might block Russian missiles and limit Russia's freedom of action. Baluevsky's recent statement may actually be intended to derail the U.S. basing plan by raising the specter of nuclear attack in Poland, since public opinion there is already skeptical of the U.S. proposal. Second, Russia has long sought to keep NATO and the United States out of the former Soviet "sphere of influence." Missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic may bring the alliance too close to Russian territory for comfort. And it looks as if the Russian bear still knows how to growl, at least.

An Indian Charlie-class sub (via FAS)

Passport has already had a lot of coverage of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran (you can see my take here over at Danger Room), so I'd like to call attention to a development that has hitherto flown under the radar: India is readying its first domestically built nuclear submarine for sea trials in 2009.

The sub, reportedly a modified version of the Soviet/Russian Charlie-II, has been code-named the Advanced Technology Vessel. While the Soviet Charlie II sub did not have the capability to carry nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, the Indian version reportedly will. (Though one source implies it may use cruise missiles instead.) Either way, the program is further evidence of India's accelerating military expansion. It should be noted, though, that the 2009 test date is a slight slip from revelations a few months ago, which said the sub would be tested next year.

India's ostensible motive is to develop a secure "second-strike capability," i.e. the ability to withstand a nuclear attack and still be able to hit back with nukes. Both India and Pakistan currently rely on a combination of bombers and short- to mid-range missiles for their nuclear delivery platforms, though India is more dependent on aircraft and Pakistan on missiles. A seafaring deterrent capability for India will provide a more secure force, but it is unlikely to make Pakistan more vulnerable to nuclear attack—the country's lack of strategic depth already ensures its vulnerability. India will have an advantage in survivability, though. Submarines are the most secure type of nuclear delivery platform possible. China may also have reason to be concerned, given ongoing border disputes with India and the potential for further competition in the future.

The context in which the Indian navy chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, revealed the submarine also sheds light on the Indo-Russian defense relationship. India has only one aircraft carrier in its inventory — the INS Viraat — which is aging and operating well beyond its expected lifetime. India therefore ordered an aircraft carrier from Russia to be delivered in 2008, so as to prevent a gap in Indian naval capabilities. Unfortunately, the project is behind schedule and Russia has doubled the price tag already. As a result, Admiral Mehta called for an end to price negotiations with Russia on the carrier contract amid calls for the entire relationship to be reexamined. Given these difficulties, look for India to move for more indigenous capabilities — like its nuclear sub — as fast as possible in coming years.

FAROOQ NAEEM/AFP/Getty Images

The New York Times recently revealed a secret U.S. program that has spent nearly $100 million over the past six years to help secure Pakistani nuclear weapons and facilities. Concerns about legal issues and Pakistani sovereignty, however, have sharply limited what U.S. funds can achieve.

For instance, the U.S. government chose not to share information about its permissive action links (PALs), which are the "crown jewel" of its nuclear security technologies. PALs basically ensure that nuclear warheads cannot detonate without proper authorization. To many scientists, sharing details about PAL technology is a no-brainer. But because PAL systems are designed to be as secure as possible, each is integrated deeply into a warhead’s electronics; disclosing details about PALs could therefore reveal compromising characteristics of U.S. nuclear-weapon designs. Disclosing classified information of this nature also happens to be illegal under U.S. law, and NPT signatories are banned from helping Pakistan (technically a non-nuclear weapon state as far as the NPT is concerned) with its arsenal.

Perhaps most problematic, though, is that Pakistan has been reluctant to reveal details about the locations of its existing warheads or about fuel production for new weapons. This seems to have limited the United States to training personnel and providing equipment, but in many cases Pakistan won’t even show American officials how or where the equipment is being used. Pakistan is also seeking to downplay the significance of the U.S. aid, describing the Times article as an "exaggerated picture of our efforts to learn from the best practices of other countries with regard to their nuclear safety and export controls."

The level of funding is substantial, however, given the small size of Pakistan's arsenal; it's really a lack of cooperation that is limiting what this program can achieve. Without learning more, we can only hope that the U.S. military doesn't have to send in special forces to find and secure the weapons itself.

(More here over at Wired's Danger Room.)

SAMUEL KUBANI/AFP/Getty Images

In the next few days, the International Atomic Energy Agency plans to release its "eagerly-awaited" report on Iran's disputed nuclear activities. If the agency finds that Iran has not been sufficiently forthcoming about its nuclear program, the report could spur a drive toward further sanctions at the U.N. Security Council.

Earlier this week, Iran released documents that the IAEA has been demanding for two years: blueprints showing how to machine uranium metal into spherical shapes appropriate for the core of a nuclear weapon. When asked why it would have information that has "no value outside of a nuclear weapons program," Iran responded that it received them inadvertently while purchasing its nuclear equipment on the black market decades ago.

On the surface, this claim is plausible. The A.Q. Khan network (and presumably, any other extant illicit networks supplying nuclear material) dealt in all types of dangerous materials and information, and the nature of a black market lends itself to disorganization and mistakes like the one Iran claims occurred.

Even if Iran did not actively seek out information that could only be used in nuclear weapons, though, the real question is why the country's leaders would wait two years to comply with the IAEA's request to relinquish the documents. At best, the Iranians were holding the blueprints in reserve for situations like today's, as a bargaining chip. At worst, they were holding them to eventually use them in a weapons program. Either way, Iran was not cooperating fully with the IAEA in its attempts to ascertain the true nature of the country's nuclear program—not a good sign.

Fortunately, though, these documents apparently did not contain blueprints for an entire nuclear weapons core. Machining enriched uranium (or plutonium) metal into a perfect sphere is merely one of many engineering challenges posed by an implosion nuclear weapon—an explosives array must be carefully designed to compress the metal effectively, for instance, and as we've seen with Iran, the enrichment process itself is very difficult to perfect without help. Hopefully the IAEA report will show Iran has benign intentions or, at least, that it has not progressed further towards building a nuclear weapon. But we'll have to wait and see.

Iran's Bushehr power plant - AFP/Getty Images

Russia has been in the news a lot lately following President Vladimir Putin's big trip to Iran and what look suspiciously like efforts to stay in power after his term expires. But without much media fanfare, the Russians have been quietly working on an initiative that could do a world of good.

Over the past few years, Russia has been collaborating with the United States and other supplier nations to limit the spread of sensitive enrichment technologies that can be used to produce fuel for civilian uses as well as for nuclear weapons. Cooperation here is a matter of necessity: Efforts to halt the spread of atomic weapons simply won't get very far without Russia, one of the world's most important suppliers of nuclear technology and fuel for energy production.

The Russians are about to launch an "international fuel enrichment center" in Angarsk, a city in eastern Siberia. The precise details of the arrangement are still unclear, but it appears as if all countries will be able to participate in the center "without any political preconditions," according to Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations. In return, it was initially believed that participating states would receive assured access to nuclear fuel from Angarsk. However, a recent report by Oxford Analytica merely noted that participating countries would "share in profits" from the facility — a vague formulation that leaves open many questions about the nature of the agreement.

Assured access to fuel, though, is the main principle behind each of the handful of "multilateralization" proposals that have been put forth for the nuclear fuel cycle. Certain states, such as Iran, argue that they need to develop their own fuel-cycle capabilities (i.e. centrifuge enrichment plants) to guard against disruptions in the international market for nuclear fuel. Even though the market has never seen a notable disruption, this argument is valid to a certain degree; for a state that is heavily reliant on nuclear power, a disruption would be crippling, and just because market disruptions haven't happened doesn't mean they won't. Development of enrichment facilities, moreover, is allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The current fuel-cycle countries hope that multilateral initiatives such as the center in Angarsk will reduce incentives for more states to build enrichment capabilities. They could also help reveal Iran's true intentions — why refuse to participate in the Angarsk center if their only concern is reliable access to fuel? With a possible renaissance for nuclear power on the horizon, initiatives like Angarsk are promising attempts to slow proliferation of dangerous technology without eviscerating the NPT.

RAVEENDRAN/AFP/Getty Images

Last week, a late-night phone call between President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sparked widespread sputters about the vital signs of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. In response to questioning, White House spokesman Tony Fratto responded "no, it’s not dead," even though Singh has, at the very least, set the deal aside for now.

The deal has been slipping over the past few months because of Indian domestic politics. Singh's government depends on the Communists for support in Parliament. When the government signed the nuclear deal with the United States, the Communists were infuriated. They believed the deal would sacrifice Indian sovereignty and potentially risk indigenous scientific development. A confrontation ensued: The Communists vaguely threatened to withdraw support for the government (which would force a snap election) if the deal were not subjected to parliamentary debate, and the government dared them to go ahead.

The deal now appears to be in worse shape than the White House is willing to acknowledge. Singh's government blinked first, and final negotiations on the deal have been postponed, apparently indefinitely. As Singh's office delicately put it, "[C]ertain difficulties have arisen with respect to the operationalization of the India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement."

Singh does not want to risk early elections, apparently. Barring that possibility, the current government will remain in power until 2009. A statement by an important parliamentary ally summed up what is likely the government's thinking, "Frankly, the deal is not important… The government is important."

As attempts to finalize the deal drag on, key supporters in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the U.S. Congress may also lose enthusiasm. And as the United States enters election season, the Democrats will probably be increasingly unlikely to hand a foreign-policy success to President Bush and the Republicans. Another indication that prospects for the deal are slipping comes from its supporters, who have begun to hedge their bets by attempting to "describe the nuclear accord as one piece of a broader relationship" that will endure, regardless of the deal's success. The deal isn't completely dead yet, but it is looking less and less likely in the near future.

SEAN GALLUP/Getty Images News

Recently, Passport noted a very interesting tidbit from Der Spiegel: French President Nicholas Sarkozy apparently suggested that "perhaps the Germans would consider taking a political stake in the French atomic arsenal."

Der Spiegel appears to be the only source for this assertion, which could actually have several interpretations. Der Spiegel itself interpreted it as a suggestion that France might physically host nuclear weapons on German soil, but derided the idea as "pointless" and just another in a series of Sarkozy’s gaffes that have "surprised, stymied, annoyed, and flabbergasted" German leaders.

The magazine failed to note, however, that such an offer would not be without precedent, since Germany has hosted U.S. nuclear warheads for decades (for use by NATO forces). All but a handful have been withdrawn, but somewhere around 20 remain, probably at Ramstein Air Force Base. Hosting French nuclear weapons in a similar manner would not suddenly make Germany a nuclear power—which makes the German response, that "Germany did not seek to become a nuclear power," all the more perplexing.

Perhaps this incident is really a story about European integration, which has often been driven forward by a Franco-German "engine" of cooperation. One of the most difficult sticking points of integration in the European Union has always been defense capabilities—of which nuclear weapons are perhaps the most difficult, for obvious reasons.

Even in the context of integration, though, the facts on this incident are too vague to come to any firm conclusions. Perhaps Sarkozy is trying to jumpstart the integration process, in the face of possible new referendums on a new EU constitution. Perhaps he was trying to position France, as opposed to Britain, as the critical guarantor of the EU's security. Either way, the nuclear aspect of cooperation in Europe will be an area to watch in coming years.

PAUL CROCK/AFP/Getty Images

Last week, the Pentagon admitted that a B-52 had mistakenly flown nuclear-armed cruise missiles across the United States. And worse, for almost fourteen hours no one—at the base of departure, on the bomber itself, or at the base of arrival—had any idea something was wrong. Officials have assured the public that there was no danger of a nuclear explosion, even if the plane had crashed.

The specific warheads carried by U.S. cruise missiles belong to the W80 family, in this case the W80-1. (Other versions of the W80 are designed for use with Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are launched from submarines.) There are about 1,450 of these warheads in the active stockpile, with another 360 or so in the inactive stockpile. They have "dialable" (variable) yields of up to 150 kilotons, or about 10 times that of the Hiroshima bomb. And, as mentioned by the Pentagon, they have several safety measures built in to prevent accidental detonation.

First, the actual detonation system is physically protected by an "exclusion zone," which isolates it from electric (and to some extent physical) shocks. The exclusion zone can be connected to the rest of the warhead’s electronics by a "strong link," which does not physically connect until the warhead is armed.

An accident—fire, lighting strike, crash, etc.—could breach either or both of these safeguards, so the electronics inside the exclusion zone also contain safeguards, called "weak links." These are electronic links designed to fail under lower stress than either the exclusion zone or the strong link. This ensures that, for instance, if the exclusion zone collapses, the weak links will as well and the nuclear core will remain inert.

And beyond those nested safety systems, most U.S. warheads have other safeguards, including insensitive high explosives that will not detonate easily due to mechanical shock. The biggest worry with this incident was not technical, but organizational: How did nuclear warheads get loaded onto a plane and flown across the country before anyone even noticed they were gone?

Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a new agreement this week called Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues (pdf). "Outstanding Issues" refers to the handful of past and current issues with Iran's nuclear program that the IAEA has not been able to resolve to its satisfaction.

Essentially, the agreement lays out a logical order for addressing these issues and begins to set a timetable for doing so. The IAEA is to submit all outstanding questions in writing by September 15, 2007, and Iran will then respond to each in a defined sequence.

The agreement is a mixed bag, from a U.S. perspective. On the upside, the IAEA appears to have resolved its outstanding questions on Iran's plutonium experiments, the first such resolution in four years. And clarifying publicly the issues that remain to be addressed, as well as setting out which should be resolved first, will be helpful as the diplomatic process moves forward.

But the agreement also has its downsides, some of which David Albright and Jacqueline Shire of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) pointed out (pdf) yesterday. They worry that the text's reference to "closing files" could block reconsideration of crucial issues, if new information came to light after a particular issue was "closed." Albright and Shire also note that the timetable for the process has been drawn out at least until late 2007, and possibly even to early 2008.

However, ISIS's press release does not mention a worrisome undercurrent running through the entire agreement. Basically, Iran is putting the burden of proof on the IAEA to show that its nuclear activities are not peaceful. The underfunded, understaffed Agency would benefit greatly from a political push to reverse this state of affairs; member states themselves should be responsible for providing such proof.

A recent report by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center suggests one way of achieving this: "country-neutral" rules regarding noncompliance, which would go into effect automatically if the IAEA cannot reach consensus on the compliance of a suspected proliferator. Such rules would trigger certain consequences if consensus is not reached, regardless of the country being scrutinized, and would give much stronger incentives for countries like Iran to actively work at dispelling worries about their nuclear programs. If this role reversal could be achieved, Iran and its ilk would have much more difficulty buying time or avoiding sanctions by manipulating the IAEA.

As the so-called "war on terror" rolls on, the balance between security and public oversight remains tense. Recently, this tension surfaced when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission revealed a series of previously undisclosed accidents that took place over the past few years at Nuclear Fuel Services, one of only two U.S. companies that are allowed to process highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear fuel. In 2004, citing national-security concerns, the NRC deemed as "Official Use Only" all documents relating to Nuclear Fuel Services and the other HEU processing company, BWX Technologies, and sealed them away from public view.

iStockphoto.com

As a result, several "abnormal occurrences" remained secret, including one particularly dangerous incident involving a spill of 9 gallons of HEU in liquid solution on March 6, 2006. When in liquid form, HEU must be handled with particular care to prevent creating a critical mass. If enough of the liquid collects within a certain volume, a dangerous, uncontrolled chain reaction can occur. Usually, such reactions will not result in a nuclear explosion, but they do release significant amounts of radiation. Processing facilities have extensive safeguards in place to prevent this, but accidents do happen.

This time, the spill did not turn out to be serious, ranking a lowly 2 out of 7 on the IAEA's International Nuclear Events Scale. (With a 2, there is very little threat to the surrounding area or even to the actual facility. Three Mile Island was a 5. With a 7, you're in Chernobyl territory.)

It's worrisome, however, that the NRC kept such a basic safety breach secret for so long. Rather than examining documents to see which truly contained sensitive information, the NRC just hid everything. And interestingly, the NRC did not fine Nuclear Fuel Services for the violation. Instead, a performance review was initiated. In past years, the NRC fined companies for violations like this and made the events public. Replacing fines with performance reviews is fine, but the NRC should bring back public announcements. To its credit, the NRC at least admits that "the pendulum maybe swung too far" towards excessive secrecy.

Potential terrorists might benefit from knowing the exact details of an accident or the security changes implemented after it, but there will rarely be much harm in disclosing the incident itself. In some cases even the old security procedures that led to such accidents could be safely disclosed, if they were no longer being used. And in general, increasing the transparency of the NRC's oversight role can spur greater vigilance and hopefully help prevent more dangerous "nuclear mishaps" in the future.

ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images

"All parts of [our] centrifuges are built in Iran," said an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Tuesday. If true, it's depressing news. Some analysts argue that the Iranians are having trouble enriching uranium because they can't import the right spare parts.

On the other hand, Khamenei might just be blowing smoke. The Iranians say they can make all the parts, but that doesn't mean they can make all the parts well. They're still feeding uranium into the assembled centrifuges slowly, which could indicate worries about operating them at high speeds. And the centrifuges are not being spun at full capacity, either.

Most likely, the Supreme Leader wants to instill doubt in the Security Council that new, targeted sanctions would be effective. Khamenei's assertion—combined with a few other recent Iranian maneuvers—could delay Security Council action, at the least. At worst, it could splinter support among the permanent five and entirely derail the possibility of further action.

Few people have noted two other interesting tidbits in Iran's announcement. First, it was an advisor to Supreme Leader Khamenei, not President Ahmadinejad, who made the statement. Rumor has it Khamenei thought Ahmadinejad was going too far in his rhetoric towards the West about Iran's nuclear program. With Khamenei's advisor now making aggressive statements in support of the nuclear program, perhaps the Supreme Leader has decided to adopt a confrontational approach more like that of Ahmadinejad.

Second, Khamenei's news may have caused crude oil prices to rally earlier this week. Iranians are increasingly unhappy with their country's deteriorating economy, and violent unrest followed the government's recent decision to ration gasoline. Khamenei may be trying to manipulate the oil markets, hoping to alleviate domestic pressure. Given how fickle oil markets can be, this might be an encouraging sign of just how desperate the Iranian regime has become.